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1 Introduction 
The rate of [institutional] change is often of no less importance than the 
direction of the change itself; but while the latter frequently does not depend 
upon our volition, it is the rate at which we allow change to take place which 
may well depend upon us. 
 
Polanyi (1944, pp. 36-37) 
 
[B]oth the IB [International Business] and CC [Comparative Capitalism] 
literatures have stressed the view that institutions exhibit path dependence, 
and national systems tend to be stable or slow to change. 
 
Jackson & Deeg (2008, p. 554) 
 
Investment is the ‘process of exchanging income during one period of time for an 
asset that is expected to produce earnings in future periods’ (Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2018) and represents a defining feature of firm activity. Firm investments 
can be passive, as in purely financial investments, or they may actively expand a 
firm’s resources, technologies and productive capacity. The latter form of 
investment provides the basis for ‘long-run profits’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 29) and, thus, 
represents a significant determinant of the competitiveness of a firm. However, 
investment returns can never be fully predicted in advance (Lazonick & Mazzucato, 
2013). Investors that are unable to structure and make sense of their environment 
will lose confidence in their judgments about future returns and are likely to 
postpone their investment to avoid losses (Bloom, Bond & Van Reenen, 2007). The 
fact that investments are made, not least because they are enforced by the 
competition between firms, raises the question of what generates predictability in 
an increasingly uncertain global economy (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
One way to answer this question is to turn to the uncertainty-absorbing properties 
of institutions. Institutions are the ‘humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction’ (North, 1991, p. 97) embodied in laws, 
regulations, standards, norms and values. By providing constraints to social 
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interaction, institutions are powerful forces of stability, enabling individual agents 
to make judgments about the future trajectory of their social and economic 
environment and, thus, to form expectations (Dequech, 2004). This function of 
institutions is tied to their dynamic properties of slow, gradual and path-dependent 
change (Thelen, 2009). However, many events in the recent past have shown that 
institutions can take on much more radical forms of change. Take for instance the 
ongoing instabilities in Latin American countries, which have led to strong increases 
of economic uncertainty (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013), or the radical institutional 
restructuring in economies of the former Soviet Union (Murrell, 1993). 
This thesis argues that these geographically dispersed instabilities are of high 
relevance for multinational enterprises (MNEs) which operate in multiple national 
institutional environments. The MNE is ‘an enterprise that engages in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more 
than one country’ (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a, p. 3). The International Business 
literature has long emphasized that underdeveloped institutional environments, 
mostly in developing and emerging economies, present significant barriers to the 
investment activity of MNEs (Peng, 2002; Daude & Stein, 2007; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008b). While the link between FDI, uncertainty and institutional 
underdevelopment, e.g., in the form of deficient property rights, has been discussed 
in detail, the role of the dynamics of institutional environments has received little 
attention. However, the long-term nature of FDI is likely to require not only 
institutions that are developed, but also stable. 
The following will argue that the disruptiveness of institutional change can act as a 
barrier to MNE activity in the form of FDI, because the resulting uncertainty makes 
it difficult for MNEs to judge the potential of an investment. This requires a view of 
FDI as a strategic investment, as described in the opening paragraph. As we shall 
see, the current literature in IB builds significantly on another theoretical 
perspective that views FDI as a result of governance choices. In part, this thesis aims 
to contrast these approaches and tries to unravel how the understanding of 
institutions as determinants for FDI may differ between them. In addition, it is my 
aim to extend the existing concepts of institutional determinants by integrating 
some of the principles of the Comparative Capitalisms (CC) approach, which focuses 
on the topology of national institutional systems (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), and which 
began to discuss institutional change in more recent years (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
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1.1 Research Questions 
Following this brief introduction to the main argument, I hypothesize that radical 
institutional change has a negative effect on the decision of MNEs to invest in a 
country. Following this, I will outline four questions, each corresponding to the main 
part of the dissertation. The first two questions are motivated by conceptual and 
theoretical problems, while the latter two are empirically driven. 
Question 1: Can the interrelationship between institutional change, 
uncertainty and FDI be conceptualized based on the existing theory of the 
MNE? 
The Framework Chapter addresses the current status of IB theory and specifically 
its ability to integrate a dynamic view on institutions. This chapter will review and 
contrast the existing theories of FDI, as well as relate them to the underpinning 
institutional theories. This question aims to extend the current academic discourse 
by developing a conceptual framework that proposes radical institutional change as 
a barrier to strategic MNE activity in the form of FDI. 
Question 2: How does a dynamic view on the economic and social environment 
of the MNE affect current theory building in International Business? 
Essay 1 applies some of the implications of the previously developed conceptual 
framework, specifically relying on some crucial points represented in Edith 
Penrose’s seminal work The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Penrose, 1995) to a 
recent theoretical discussion in IB on a systematic relationship between 
multinationality and performance. The question, thus, aims to further advance new 
theory-building in IB by highlighting issues related to the dynamics of the economic 
and social environment of the MNE.  
Question 3: How can we measure degrees of institutional change and what is 
the relationship between radical institutional change and the FDI 
attractiveness of a country? 
Having established the theoretical relevance of the conceptual framework, Essay 2 
aims to explore the empirical relationship between degrees of institutional change 
and FDI attraction on the country level. The aim of this question is to contribute to 
empirical studies of institutional change in IB. 
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Question 4: How is the concept of institutional complementarity affected by 
varying degrees of institutional instability? 
In the Framework Chapter, I argue that institutional stability is vital to allow foreign 
investors to build expectations based on their holistic judgment of an institutional 
system. Essay 3 upholds the general hypothesis of a negative relationship between 
radical institutional change and FDI attraction but explores it with a different 
methodology that allows for the interdependence between institutions. 
1.2 Key Concepts 
The following clarifies the three central concepts of this work, providing basic 
definitions and some vital background knowledge. 
Multinational Enterprises and Foreign Direct Investment. The MNE was already 
defined as a firm that ‘owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more 
than one country’ (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a, p. 3). This also characterizes the 
MNEs as a firm operating in more than one institutional environment. In this work, 
the economic activity of the MNE is understood as being motivated by its long-term 
performance. The term performance is meant to reflect the fact that MNEs have a 
variety of different strategic options, e.g., cutting-costs or increasing profits, that 
could make them more resilient in global competition (Dunning, 2000). Thus, I do 
not postulate a single objective of the firm such as profit maximization.  
The MNE invests in its resources, capabilities and capacities to increase its long-
term performance. Some of these investments may be confined to a single country, 
while FDI represents a border-crossing investment. FDI is defined as an investment 
resulting in at least a 10% ownership in an enterprise abroad outside of the realm of 
regular purchases of traded shares (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a). FDI, like any other 
data, represents an imperfect measure of the economic activities of the MNE. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of different proxies of MNE activity suggests that FDI is in 
fact representative of the economic activities conducted by MNEs (see, e.g., Wacker, 
2016). 
Institutions. In this work, I follow the definition of institutions proposed by Douglass 
North due its important role in the field of International Business (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008a; Hotho & Pedersen, 2012), as well as due to his focus on the country 
level. It may seem arbitrary to choose a definition in the absence of any alternative. 
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However, in the context of the breadth of the institutional literature, I stick to the 
philosophy that ‘which definition of an institution to adopt is not an issue of right 
or wrong; it depends on the purpose of the analysis’ (Aoki, 2001 p. 10).  
‘Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction’  (North,  1991, p. 97). 
In his work, North defines the function of institutions as reducing the ‘uncertainty 
by providing structure for everyday life’ (North, 1990 pp. 3-4). This work will 
concentrate on formal institutions because of the difficulty of empirically assessing 
informal institutions, especially in the setting of country comparisons (see Voigt, 
2018), as well as due to their very static character. 
Uncertainty. I have argued that a mechanism between the disruptiveness of 
institutional change and FDI is based on the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
can be defined in at least two ways. One of the most popular perspectives on 
uncertainty in business studies is based on the bounded rationality of individuals 
(Simon, 2000). North (1990) explains this type of uncertainty ‘as a consequence of 
both the complexity of the problems to be solved and the problem-solving software 
(to use a computer analogy) possessed by the individual’ (p. 25). Hence, this views 
uncertainty as an epistemological problem in which more information could be 
acquired, but the mental capacity to assimilate and interpret this information is too 
limited, or too costly to acquire (Casson, 1999). 
The second form of uncertainty developed from the seminal contribution of  
(Knight, 1921) and is based on the contention that true uncertainty is reflected in 
situations where knowledge about the future simply does not exist. Hence, it is an 
ontological form of uncertainty as there is no information about a future event to be 
discovered in the first place (Slater & Spencer, 2000; Dunn, 2001). Most 
epistemological accounts of uncertainty retain the idea of a set of probabilities 
attached to possible outcomes (Dunn, 2001). Here, institutions could be the 
necessary constraints to shape the behavior of agents so that subjective probabilities 
can emerge. Institutional change could lead to an ontological form of uncertainty 
since the constraints necessary to attach probabilities to outcomes are themselves 
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in flux. Thus, I suggest that the occurrence of radical institutional change is likely to 
be a source of radical uncertainty of the kind assumed by Knight (1921)1. 
1.3 Methodology 
Due to my focus on national institutional environments, i.e., social constraints on 
the country level, as well as FDI, i.e., the aggregate investment activity of MNEs, the 
analysis is situated at the macro- and meso-level. Studies on this level of abstraction 
require conceptual work in order to go beyond mere statements of empirical 
regularities. Therefore, I take the stance of critical realism (Foss, 1994; Bhaskar, 
2010), including the position that empirical observations are imperfect reflections of 
the underlying mechanisms that have created these observations in the first place 
(Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004). This ontological realism incorporates a perspective 
on causality as a complex phenomenon, suggesting that the positivistic 
interpretation of isolated cause and effect is naturally inapplicable in an open system 
such as the global economy (Collier, 1994; Lawson, 1999). Instead, we must accept 
that any empirical observations may result from the interaction of the mechanism 
we wish to uncover with other mechanisms, and that the combination of 
mechanisms might be context specific. This leads critical realists to accept 
methodological pluralism drawing on literature, logic and empirical observation to 
generate conceptual frameworks that can be the starting point for future research, 
helping to approximate the underlying mechanisms in an iterative process. 
This philosophical stance has some implications for the methods chosen to explore 
the last two research questions. Essay 2 utilizes a panel regression approach to 
analyze radical institutional change and FDI on the country level. In critical realism, 
regressions are an attempt to detect macro-level patterns that are not expected to 
be universal, but rather more probable to be traced in aggregate data. In other 
words, the regression is firmly defined as a tool to obtain an interpretable 
observation of reality and not as the manifestation of reality (causality) itself (Jones, 
2010). This view implies that a regression analysis might be the most suitable for a 
specific research problem but must be accompanied by other methods that may 
operate at its epistemological limits.  
                                                     
1 Blyth (2002) makes a similar connection between institutional change and ‘Knightian uncertainty’, 
although in the context of economic institutions and policy. 
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Therefore, Essay 3 uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) based on the 
analysis of conjunctions of explanatory conditions and, thereby, allows one to 
explore causality in a non-linear and contextual form (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). Due to the inductive nature of QCA, this thesis also provides a combination 
of hypothesis testing and an inductive approach, reducing the exclusive reliance on 
a single methodological stance and its respective limitations (see, e.g., Goldstone, 
2004). 
As with any other research design, this thesis faces several limitations. While the 
empirical essays spell these out in more detail, an overarching limitation is its 
interdisciplinarity. Even if I would suggest that interdisciplinarity is vital as it 
introduces perspectives otherwise underexplored in the primary field of study, the 
complexity of interdisciplinary work puts limits on the depth that this thesis can 
accomplish, specifically in terms of its empirical analysis. Thus, the conceptual 
framework developed here is not devised in a way that could allow an exhaustive 
empirical testing in the three essays but as a basis for further inquiry. 
1.4 Structure and Content 
The thesis is written in an independent-essay structure. All parts can be read 
independently from each other, including the Framework Chapter. This Framework 
Chapter is confined to Chapter 2 and establishes a conceptual framework based on 
existing literature. Chapter 3 is composed of three essays that operate within this 
broad framework and follow the outlined research questions. Chapter 4 concludes 
the thesis by summarizing the findings and presenting their relevance for theory and 
practice. Table 1.1 represents the structure of the thesis in relation to the contents 
that were discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 1.1: Structure and content of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Framework Chapter 
Reviewing the Economic Theory of the MNE 
Section 2.2 
New Institutional Economics as an Underpinning of MNE Theory 
Section 2.3 
Conceptual Framework 
Section 2.4 
Implications for 
developing the 
theory of the MNE. 
Implications for the 
relationship between 
uncertainty and a 
country’s 
attractiveness for FDI. 
Implications for the 
theory of Comparative 
Capitalisms in the 
context of FDI 
attraction in 
institutional unstable 
countries. 
Chapter 3 Essay 1 
Dynamic 
Perspectives on the 
(Dis)economies of 
Multinationality: 
Insights from the 
Penrosian Theory of 
the Firm 
Essay 2 
Institutional Change 
as a Source of Non-
Market Uncertainty 
and its Impact on 
MNE Investment 
Activity in Developing 
Countries 
Essay 3 
Institutional 
Configurations of FDI 
Attraction in Post-
Transition Economies: 
The Roles of 
Commonality, Diversity 
and Stability 
Chapter 4 Conclusion 
2 Framework Chapter 
The contention that radical institutional change has a negative effect on FDI must 
be approached from the existing theories of the MNE and their understanding of the 
role of changing institutions. However, a dynamic view on institutions in IB is still 
in its infancy. The central argument that I will advance in this chapter is that some 
of the existing MNE theory is underpinned by a rather static and narrow perspective 
on institutions. To begin with, I will set the stage by introducing the important 
contribution of Jackson and Deeg (2008) that departs from the traditional view of 
institutions in IB. The authors provide a concise characterization of the existing 
paradigmatic view on the nexus between MNEs and institutions, as well as some 
ideas to guide future research. This will serve as a first orientation before the chapter 
will review the theory of the MNE in more detail. In the following, the attention shall 
be on two core themes of Jackson and Deeg’s (2008) paper, namely the narrow 
conception of strategic fit and the need to recognize the topology of institutional 
systems in IB. 
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2.1 Institutions in International Business Theory 
Jackson and Deeg (2008) aver that the current state of institutional scholarship in 
IB has a specific approach to institutions akin to the notion of strategic fit. For IB 
scholars, institutions are defined as constraints to MNE strategy so that the MNE 
must adapt to its institutional environment in order to improve its performance 
(Ingram & Silverman, 2000; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). There are essentially two views 
on the origin of this performance improvement.  
The first suggests that MNEs benefit from increased access to resources and 
networks as a result of gaining legitimacy by adapting to the conventions of a society 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This mechanism results in the operation of three sets of 
isomorphic (convergent) forces, namely coercive, mimetic and normative pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, while the coercive pressure arises from the 
need to comply with the law of a host country (see Ingram & Silverman, 2000), the 
mimetic pressure arises from an active mimicking of the established approaches of 
local firms that could reflect best practice in a foreign environment (see Henisz & 
Delios, 2015, pp. 354-355). Normative adaptation results from activities of the MNE 
to avoid organizational conflicts and may provide access to relational resources such 
as business networks (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Tihanyi, Swaminathan & Soule, 
2012). This perspective on institutions is strongly associated with the field of 
Organizational Institutionalism (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012). 
The second view claims that MNEs maximize their performance by adapting the 
governance mode of economic transactions (Hennart, 1982; Brouthers, 2002; Powell, 
2014). The latter are mainly reflected in transactions of knowledge, technology or 
intermediary goods (Buckley & Casson, 1976). MNE performance is seen to be 
directly determined by the costs of conducting economic transactions and these, in 
turn, are affected by the institutional environment (Casson & Wadeson, 2012). For 
example, since knowledge generated in research and development (R&D) activities 
is a public good and may be appropriated in the context of insecure intellectual 
property rights, the MNE is likely to conduct such a transaction inside of its 
organizational boundaries to safeguard its proprietary assets. If such a situation 
arises between two country markets, this internalization of transactions would result 
in FDI (see, e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976). This perspective builds on the foundations 
of the New Institutional Economics (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012). 
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Jackson and Deeg (2008) point out that both views share the position of an 
institutional environment as a stable backdrop for the MNE to either strive to 
conform to social pressures or to optimize their transactions. Moreover, while the 
organizational institutionalist perspective has produced interesting findings on 
issues pertaining to individual MNEs, such as problems in practice transfer between 
two differing institutional environments (Kostova, 1999), this literature has not yet 
contributed significantly to the economic theory of FDI; not least because economic 
variables tend to be sidestepped2. Maybe due to this unclear stance towards 
economic variables the institutional theory of the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) view has taken a paradigmatic position in the economic theory of the MNE 
(Dunning, 2003; Buckley & Casson, 2009; Rugman, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2016). This 
theory is narrowly focused on economic exchanges, and strategic fit is seen as an 
adjustment to an existing structure. 
In order to extend this view on institutions, and specifically their effect on MNE 
performance, Jackson and Deeg (2008) introduce the perspective of the Comparative 
Capitalism literature that is, as we shall see, both broader than the view of the NIE 
and actively focused on economic variables. While these scholars also see a firm’s 
strategy ‘as being constrained by institutional structures’ (ibid., p. 546), they argue 
that institutional environments generate opportunities for MNEs (and firms in 
general) to develop their capabilities and resources. For example, the institutional 
environment of the United States, characterized by network structures, capital 
market financing and flexible labor markets (Aoki, 2001), catalyzed activities of 
radical innovation. Accordingly, the strategies of firms are based more often on the 
development of capabilities and resources that can be reused when product 
portfolios change rapidly (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). Here, the institutional system 
affects the strategic investment opportunities available to firms, which highlights the 
enabling role of institutions (see Nelson & Nelson, 2002). Instead of a predefined 
governance mode that would minimize transaction costs given a fixed institutional 
environment, i.e., the matching of puzzle pieces, the CC view sees firms as less 
constrained in their ability to strategically use the context provided by institutions. 
Another characteristic of the CC approach is that institutional environments are 
understood as interdependent systems instead of individual variables (Jackson & 
                                                     
2 I would argue that these approaches tend to  ‘oversocialize’ (Granovetter, 1985) the MNE. 
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Deeg, 2008). While the authors specifically suggest the use of case-based methods, 
this also entails the theoretical position that it is not necessarily individual 
institutions that support strategic investments – see, e.g., the popular focus on 
property rights in the FDI literature (Bailey, 2018) – but the combinations of multiple 
institutions. These institutional configurations generate institutional 
complementarities that lead to very broad and stochastic, but nevertheless 
persistent specializations of firm investments through increasing returns3 (Amable, 
2000). Institutional complementarities are largely seen as self-stabilizing, even 
though some researchers have challenged this contention (Schneider, M. R. & 
Paunescu, 2012). This raises the important question if firms can utilize these 
complementarities in situations where institutional stability cannot be maintained. 
To summarize, there are two critical points that are taken up in this work: First, the 
concept of strategic fit to an institutional environment differs depending on if it is 
viewed from the perspective of governing transactions or conducting strategic 
investments. Second, the concept of institutional complementarity as arising from 
institutional configurations suggests that firms could be sensitive to institutional 
changes that go beyond traditional market institutions such as property rights. This 
is because it is the overall configuration of social institutions that affects the 
opportunities for strategic investment.  
These two points have hitherto not been discussed in the context of the economic 
theory of the MNE and its explanations of FDI, specifically in reference to the 
contrast between FDI as a form of governing transactions and FDI as a strategic 
investment. There are two corresponding positions in the theory of the MNE. The 
first is the transaction-cost-internalization approach, which Dunning (2003) 
referred to as the ‘exchange approach’. As explained before, it defines the economic 
problem as the need for efficient organization of transactions. The second paradigm 
is the ‘value-added approach’ (Dunning, 2003), which is primarily concerned with 
the MNE’s strategic investments in resources, capabilities and capacities to maintain 
or increase its long-term profitability. These distinct perspectives, as I shall argue, 
derive from the theoretical underpinnings of both approaches and affect their 
                                                     
3 This idea reflects the network effects of increasing returns of institutions, following the similar point 
raised by Arthur (1989) in the context of technological trajectories. 
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perspectives on temporal processes as well as on the related emphasis of either 
environmental statics or dynamics. 
2.2 Reviewing the Economic Theories of the MNE 
The goal of the following sections is to critically survey those economic theories 
most central to the explanation of MNE activity. I have introduced the distinction 
between theories of the value-added approach and the exchange approach. The 
former, which I will trace back to Hymer (1976), identifies structural market 
imperfections. These arise from the tendency of capital-intensive industries to 
change from a competitive to an oligopolistic or monopolistic market situation, 
where few large firms have pricing power and constrain output to increase profits 
(ibid.). It is argued that in such cases the orthodox theory of perfect competition 
does not provide an explanation for firm behavior or welfare outcomes (Robinson, 
1969). The second approach, Transaction-Cost-Internalization Theory (TCI) 
elaborates on the natural (sometimes called transactional) imperfections of markets 
that arise from costs associated with contracting in cross-border transactions 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976). The third approach, the Eclectic Paradigm, is a 
representative of the value-added approach (Dunning, 1977, 1988a, 2001), but also 
unifies the two market imperfection approaches into a single framework. The 
following subsections are divided into two parts respectively. The first part begins 
with an overview of the development of the economic theory and its implications 
for the economic environment of the MNE. The second part reviews how the 
respective theory has affected the understanding of institutional environments in 
the context of MNE activity. Table 2.1 illustrates the structure of the review. 
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Table 2.1: Aims of the review section. 
Section 2.2: Review 
Perspectives on the MNE 
Monopolistic 
Ownership 
Advantages 
(value-added 
approach) 
(Section 2.2.1) 
Internalization 
Theory 
(exchange 
approach) 
(Section 2.2.2)  
Eclectic 
Paradigm 
(value-added 
& exchange 
approach) 
(Section 2.2.3) 
Economic Reviewing explanations of MNE investment and… 
Institutional  …their incorporation of institutional factors 
 
2.2.1 Theory of Monopolistic Ownership Advantages 
In the 1960s, Stephen Hymer wrote his dissertation on FDI as a form of MNE activity. 
Until then, scholars unsuccessfully attempted to explain FDI as investments 
determined by differences in cross-border interest rates (Ietto-Gillies, 2014). This 
caught Hymer’s attention and led him to lay down the foundations of what would 
become IB and the theory of the MNE. Hymer’s work is characterized by two distinct 
phases: his first steps were the creation of a microeconomic theory of the MNE, 
largely found in his dissertation Hymer (1960; published in 1976), whereas his further 
development led him to comment on the contradictory dynamics of the global 
economy from the standpoint of Marxist political economy. He continuously 
showed interest in the growth and size of enterprises (Hymer & Pashigian, 1962) and 
the resulting tendency for global monopolization (Hymer & Rowthorn, 1970). Even 
if partly ideologically motivated, all of his contributions remain important to this 
day (Pitelis, 2002). 
Hymer (1976) began his dissertation by uncovering significant discrepancies 
between the prediction that FDI was allocated according to interest rate differentials 
and the empirical observations: Interest rates were weak predictors of FDI; FDI 
occurred often bi-directionally within specific industries; and the dominance of US 
FDI suggested the presence of other determinants (Hymer, 1976). Being familiar 
with developments in Industrial Economics, he concluded that microeconomic 
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considerations must be explored in order to understand why a firm would extend its 
operation to a foreign country.  
Hymer proposed two main reasons for MNE activity4: First, he theorized that 
national firms may want to control ‘…enterprises in more than one country in order 
to remove competition between them…’ (ibid., p. 38). He therefore suggested that 
imperfect competition would lead to collusion in industries where a sufficiently 
small number of firms from different countries would establish ‘some form of 
accommodation’ (ibid., p. 86) on the international level. Second, he went on to 
assume that large national firms possess firm-specific advantages that enabled them 
to succeed in their home country. Given their motivation to eliminate competition 
from other countries and to exploit their home-grown advantages profitably abroad, 
such firms are likely to be pulled into international operations5. 
In much of his writing, there is an influence of Bain’s seminal study on barriers to 
entry (Bain, 1956)6, which Hymer believed to be an important factor in determining 
MNE activity. In industries without entry barriers, many similar firms compete, 
making it unlikely for foreign firms to get a foothold. Hence, increasing industry 
concentration leads to a higher attractiveness for foreign firms. In reverse 
conclusion, this means that potential MNEs would have to overcome extant entry 
barriers by superior monopolistic advantages, while overcompensating the 
disadvantages that arise from the lack of familiarity with the foreign business 
environment. 
Hymer also attempted to explain why firms chose FDI, i.e., the direct ownership of 
assets, over other forms of contractual or licensing arrangements. He argued that 
this was due to a combination of market imperfections and uncertainty, making the 
internalization of cross-border markets a more profitable outcome than its 
alternative of arm’s-length relations. There was a discussion of whether this was a 
rephrasing of the main points made by Coase (Pitelis, 2002; Buckley, 2006) and 
                                                     
4 There is a mention of diversification as a third but minor point (see, Pitelis, 2002). 
5 This point connects to Hymer’s identification of cross-country profit rate differentials (ibid., p. 89), 
which is usually explained as a reference to diversification. From a dynamic standpoint, the ability to 
transfer capital to its highest-return location within the MNE is not only a diversification of risk but 
connects to the strategic exploitation of ‘monopolistic’ advantages. 
6 In Bain’s seminal study, these barriers to new entrants are comprised of product-differentiation 
barriers, absolute cost advantages, economies of scale and the amount of capital required for entry. 
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Hymer even developed these thoughts by explicitly mentioning Coase, but later 
abandoned this direction (Hymer, 1968). 
Hymer’s second phase, rooted in Marxist political economy, is sometimes seen as a 
departure from his earlier approach; however, Buckley (2006) argues that several 
commonalities exist in the development of his thoughts. While I do not share all of 
Buckley’s analysis7, he identifies Hymer’s view of a dynamically unfolding global 
economy as a central part of the Hymerian worldview. The attention to dynamics 
can at least be traced back to Hymer & Pashigian (1962), who empirically 
investigated the firm size distribution of the largest firms operating in the US from 
1946 to 1955. They found that the standard deviation of firm growth was declining 
with increasing firm size and made the controversial claim that this was an outcome 
of either increasing returns to scale and/or the ability of large firms to retain 
monopoly profits based on barriers to entry à la Bain (1956). This, I would argue, is 
the genesis of Hymer’s dynamic view on competition, where successful firms grow 
and develop resources, capabilities and capacities that increase their probability of 
success in future competition8. 
By his discovery of Marxian economics, Hymer found a representation of 
competition that was more in line with his earlier conclusions than most other 
economic theory. Marxian economics adopts the view of classics such as Smith, 
Ricardo and Mill that capital accumulation is an inherent feature of capitalism 
(Tsoulfidis, 2015). Hymer developed this idea into to his ‘law of increasing firm size’ 
(Hymer, 1970). In a later paper, Hymer gave a brief account of how competition was 
driving the dynamic properties of his law, which is best cited at length. 
‘Business enterprises usually are built around some special discovery or 
advantage. Before their innovation becomes general, they can under-sell 
their competitors and still sell at a price well above cost of production. But 
their position is constantly threatened by new entrants who may discover a 
                                                     
7 Buckley tends to view Hymer’s contribution from his own perspective based on Coase, which is of 
course legitimate, but begs the question if Hymer himself really wanted to develop his thoughts in this 
direction – we will never know, and going by a single article in 1968 that has the style of a hasty note 
seems unconvincing. 
8 Thus, it is important to realize that Hymer saw the size of the enterprises as correlated with its 
evolutionary survivability. He accepted advantages arising from centralization (while we shall see that 
internalization theory does not discuss such advantages). 
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new technology, a new product, a new form of organization, or a new supply 
of labor’ (Hymer, 1972, p. 95). 
To escape the potential competitive threat of intra-industry profit equalization, 
firms are forced to develop new products, shifting towards higher profitability, or 
they can increase the length of the product cycle by means of marketing and cheaper 
labor supply (see Hymer, 1972). He suggested that ‘[t]hese two methods, of course, 
are intertwined, for the wider a firm's market, the more it can spread the costs of 
innovation, and the more it can afford to spend on research and development’ (ibid., 
p. 96). He went on to explain the relevance of investments as follows: 
‘Both these methods require further investment. At a given point of time, a 
corporation may be earning a high rate of profit because it is onto a good 
thing, but competition and technological change threaten to wipe out its 
advantage. It must plough back its profits in order to improve production 
and expand its scale […]. Thus under capitalism change becomes normal and 
businessmen can never afford to look upon and treat the existing form of a 
process as final. The incessant revolutions in production and the 
depreciation of the existing capital which this implies spur them on to new 
methods and new places’ (ibid., p. 96). 
For Hymer, it is competition between firms that is the crucial regulating factor of 
their investments. In combination with his 1962 paper, it is evident that Hymer saw 
the large industrial MNE as a natural outcome of the competitive process. Hymer and 
Parshigian (1962) state that, when compared with small enterprises, ‘…large firms 
with their lower unit costs will withstand adverse conditions better and will have a 
higher survivor value’ (p. 567). Hence, the Darwinian nature of competition will 
favor, on average, the large enterprise or as Samuelson (1948) observed: ‘Large size 
breeds success, and success breeds further success’ (p. 125). Hymer’s (1972, p. 96) 
argument that the ‘incessant revolutions in production’ will pressure the firm, 
including the MNE, to explore ‘new methods and new places’, hints at the close 
connection between the scale and scope of MNEs and the continuous investment in 
physical and social technology under competition (Cantwell, 2000). Although 
Hymer does not explicitly talk about radical uncertainty, the references to constant 
competitive threats and the imperative for novelty are indirect expressions of it. 
17 
 
His second conclusion was that the ever-increasing size of MNEs must lead to fewer 
numbers which would eliminate competition. The outcome was claimed to be a 
world system of monopoly capital (Hymer & Rowthorn, 1970). Here, Hymer and 
Rowthorn (1970) emphasized the role of national governments in their Sisyphean 
task to constrain the extent of monopoly mainly through altering the institutions of 
competition law. This brings us to Hymer’s view on institutional environments. 
The Institutional Environment in Hymer 
Hymer’s contribution to the understanding of institutions in IB must be discovered 
between the lines as he does not directly write about institutions. However, his 
interest in political economy clearly indicates an institutional perspective. The most 
important area in which he influenced the theory of the MNE to this day is the role 
of the unfamiliarity with local institutional environments as a cost factor. 
In his discussion of the costs incurred uniquely by MNEs, Hymer argued that 
domestic enterprises ‘… have the general advantage of better information about their 
country: its economy, its language, its law, and its politics’ (Hymer, 1976, p. 39). For 
MNEs, acquiring this information may be of considerable cost. Over time, this 
approach developed into the liabilities of foreignness literature that concerns itself 
with the broad barriers to foreign operation (Zaheer, 1995; Luo & Mezias, 2002). The 
literature emphasizes the social component of such barriers, especially in terms of 
the unfamiliarity of the local institutional environment faced by MNEs (Eden & 
Miller, 2004). Hymer realized that MNEs could overcome these costs (although he 
did not specify how), concluding that these were one-off costs (see Hymer 1976, p. 
36). In other words, after establishing operations in a country, costs related to 
institutional factors would not have to be incurred again. Hymer, therefore, 
implicitly acknowledges the possibility of learning. 
2.2.2 Transaction Cost-Internalization Theory 
The Transaction Cost-Internalization Theory (TCI) developed from the 1970s 
onwards out of the foundations of Coase (1937) who argued that the ‘cost of using 
the price mechanism’ (p. 390) was the primary explanation for the nature of the firm. 
Contributions from McManus (1973), Buckley & Casson (1976), Swedenborg (1979) 
as well as Hennart (1982) were most decisive in pushing internalization theory into 
the paradigmatic position it holds today. All authors mentioned above were, in some 
form or the other, inspired by the writings of Coase. Some internalization theorists, 
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e.g., Buckley and Casson (1976), explicitly state that their views developed largely 
parallel to Williamson (1975)9. However, Hennart (1982), focusing on hold-up 
problems, remains closer to the Williamsonian framework. This short review will 
concentrate on Buckley and Casson (1976)10 since their study proved to be one of the 
most influential in the IB field and its foundations are still adopted, relatively 
unchanged, by recent contributions (Rugman & Verbeke, 2008; Buckley & Casson, 
2009). 
The kernel of internalization theory is conceptualized in Buckley and Casson (1976) 
(henceforth B&C) and enriches Coase’s theory of the firm with the elements of 
location choice, the public good nature of knowledge and the relationship between 
R&D and profitability. In an attempt to provide a general theory of the MNE, the 
authors argue that MNE growth is governed by the existence of market 
imperfections which are overcome by internalizing an external market through the 
establishment of a hierarchical corporate structure. Thus, the firm grows because it 
can circumvent the costs of using the imperfect market mechanism by carrying out 
transactions within an institutional alternative which is mimicking the function of 
a perfect market as closely as possible (see B&C, p. 37). The boundaries of the MNE 
are determined at the margin of costs of internalization offsetting those of external 
market arrangements (Kay, 2014). In Buckley’s words: ‘[a] firm will grow by 
internalizing imperfect external markets until it is bounded by markets in which the 
transactions benefits of further internalization are outweighed by the cost’ (Buckley, 
2002, p. 368). 
One unique element in the theory of B&C is the focus on the internalization of 
intermediate markets both for products and knowledge. The authors show that the 
pre-war global economy was characterized by the emergence of MNE activity in 
industries heavily utilizing primary inputs (ibid., p. 36). Therefore, multinationality 
was mainly driven by the benefits from internalizing intermediate product markets 
to overcome the difficulties associated with sourcing those primary inputs from 
external markets. Following the Second World War, B&C observe a shift towards 
higher returns on R&D due to factors such as the rising income of the middle-class, 
                                                     
9 Williamson (1975; 1985) popularized the ideas of Coase throughout the economic profession. The 
difference between Williamson and the internalization theorists mainly comes down to the latter’s 
refutation of opportunism as a behavioral norm and the emphasis on knowledge as a public good as 
the primary reason for internalization as opposed to asset specificity. The theoretical mechanism is, 
however, similar. 
10 In the following, page numbers will be based on the 2002 edition. 
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the space- and arms-race as well as a tendency of consumers to favor novelty. The 
result was a focus on the internalization of knowledge transfers as opposed to those 
associated with intermediary inputs. 
This shift resulted in the central role of R&D as a defining feature of the B&C 
framework. Due to its increased importance in the post-war global economy, it is 
seen as a predictor for competitive success and profitability. Thus, the theory closes 
a gap left by Hymer namely, by attending to the question of how monopolistic 
advantages are generated. The primary explanatory element in the theory remains 
governance cost differentials due to natural market imperfections with a focus on 
knowledge transfer, the difficulties of licensing knowledge and time-lags in the 
production process (see ibid., p. 89). R&D is treated as the essential driver for the 
growth of the firm, because extant and newly generated knowledge will have to be 
transferred and such transfers are likely to be conducted internal to the firm given 
market imperfections. 
In B&C, the theory of the location decision is subsidiary to the explanatory power of 
market imperfections. The choice of location is influenced by both factor costs (with 
reference to the principle of comparative costs) and the location specific barriers to 
internationalization usually conceptualized as arising from distance. Here, distance 
is defined not only as geographic, but also as functional, social and cultural. Thus, 
the degree of market imperfections and internalization barriers encountered depend 
on the potential location of a subunit. It is assumed that the MNE chooses the lowest 
cost location for its activities. 
It is apparent that the TCI framework differs from Hymer’s view of MNE expansion 
as driven by competitive pressures to acquire new competitive advantages. For TCI, 
competition is based on ‘beating the market in flows of intermediate products and 
services’ (Buckley, 2018) more so than beating competitors through expanding 
market share. This, in combination with the use of the tools of neoclassical 
economics, results in a much more passive view on MNE expansion where ‘every 
firm is satisfied with the boundaries that prevail’ (Casson, 2015, p. 64). Moreover, 
B&C do not explore the dynamic processes of learning, opportunity discovery and 
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investment in productive technology (Tolentino, 2001). Such determinants are only 
indirectly connected to MNE growth in the internalization framework11.  
The Institutional Environment in Internalization Theory 
Casson & Wadeson (2012) provide two explanations through which institutions 
affect the act of internalization and with it the FDI decision. First, institutions, 
especially social conventions, are crucial for building trust between contracting 
parties, i.e., reducing exchange uncertainty. The authors argue that most theorists 
focus solely on the law as a disciplinary device, whereas social conventions are often 
overlooked. But throughout history, trade relationships have often been based on 
family ties or diaspora networks, allowing for social sanctioning and thereby 
assuring an acceptable level of mutual trust; the result of which is a lowering of 
transaction costs. This is a crucial extension of the original view of Williamson (1975) 
where trust could not play a role, but it also remains close to Williamson’s later view 
of trust in a mechanical or calculative sense (see Williamson, 1993a). 
The second mechanism is the ability of institutions to reduce communication and 
information costs (Casson & Wadeson, 1996; Casson, 1999). This highlights how 
institutions not only increase levels of mutual trust and improve contract 
enforcement, but also enable a reduction in the search and advertisement costs of 
firms in intermediary product markets. Casson and Wadeson (2012) argue that 
effective market institutions decrease the friction of exchange through property 
rights and contract enforcement as well as through reducing information 
asymmetry; in this regard they follow in the footsteps of North (1990). 
In the wider IB literature, these characteristic interpretations of institutions 
stimulated two types of institutional studies, both relying on the idea that ‘factors 
[factor endowments] are used to produce goods or services (that is, they are used for 
transformational activities), whereas institutions are used for the exchange of inputs 
and outputs with other firms (that is, for transactional activities)’ (Wan & Hoskisson, 
2003, p. 28). Thus, both follow the separation of the productive sphere from that of 
exchange. The first type of study explores the effect of institutional quality on MNE 
activity. Here, better institutions are defined as those that decrease the costs of 
                                                     
11 That is to say that as far as these processes generate knowledge, they increase the potential for 
internalization given market imperfections. 
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transaction and may alter the modality with which the MNE exploits its advantages 
(Brouthers, 2002).  
The second approach looks at the dyadic relationship between the institutional 
quality of the MNE’s home country and its host countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The 
gap or difference in institutional development is termed institutional distance (see 
Kostova, 1999) and a considerable number of studies have explored the effect of this 
gap on various aspects of MNE operations (for a review, see Hutzschenreuter, 
Kleindienst & Lange, 2016). The argument is that higher degrees of institutional 
distance will lead to higher information costs and lower levels of mutual trust (ibid.). 
In terms of the latter factor, cultural aspects have gained increasing attention, 
following internalization scholars’ call for exploring the role of social conventions 
alongside more formal institutions (Casson, 1993; Brouthers, 2002). 
Both perspectives reduce institutions to their ability to economize on transaction 
costs based on the argument that this is the central function of institutions in 
economics. Such a view has been critiqued for being too narrow (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008). For example, the literature of innovation systems clearly unravels the role of 
national institutions in providing the basis for the generation of knowledge and not 
only its transaction (Lundvall, 2007). Similar arguments have been developed on the 
firm level by cognitive theorists (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Nooteboom, 2009) or those 
that focus on the innovation process (Cantwell, 2000; Lazonick, 2016). 
2.2.3 The Eclectic Paradigm 
The Eclectic Paradigm (EP) of international production (also known as the OLI 
paradigm) is based on the work of John H. Dunning (Dunning, 1977, 1998a) and aims 
to explain ‘the extent and pattern of international production, i.e., production 
financed by FDI and undertaken by MNEs’ (Dunning, 2001, p. 176). In the early stages 
of its development, the EP was mainly concerned with the interaction of so-called 
ownership advantages (O-As), defined as the advantages derived from the home 
country and the parent company, and location advantages (L-As), defined as the 
advantages derived from host country factors (Cantwell, 2015). In a further 
modification, Dunning revisited internalization advantages (I-As), which have a 
direct relation to the internalization theories introduced above (see Dunning, 2001). 
However, the motivation for foreign production was conceptualized as long-term 
profit seeking as opposed to the transaction cost minimizing of TCI theories 
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(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, pp. 63). Dunning defined his level of analysis as ‘the 
totality of firms engaged in foreign value-adding activities’ (Dunning, 1988b, p. 39). 
The eclectic paradigm went through several development phases the most 
significant of which has altered its status from its initial intention as a theory to an 
analytical framework or paradigm (Narula, 2006). In the following, I will very briefly 
outline the developments of the EP. Given the breadth of the theories the eclectic 
paradigm could potentially incorporate (Dunning, 2000), I further limit myself to 
the insights that derive from its classification in O-As, L-As and I-As. 
The core of the EP has only marginally changed from its first full iteration in 
Dunning (1977) and is based on three interrelated forces (adapted from Dunning, 
2001, p. 176): 
O-As: The competitive advantages that ‘firms of one nationality possess over 
those of another nationality in supplying particular markets’ (ibid, p. 176). 
I-As: The advantages arising from the perception that ‘markets for the 
generation and/or use of’ (ibid., p. 176) O-As are better internalized into the 
firm’s structure. 
L-As: The advantages derived from operating value-added activities abroad. 
Over time, Dunning made changes to the three factors, while largely maintaining 
their original separation. The evolution of O-As is possibly the most significant one. 
Based on the early work of Hymer (1976) on monopolistic advantages of MNEs, it 
was revised five times (Eden & Dai, 2010) so that it could encompass three sub-
categories. In the original form, O-As were basically seen as advantages deriving 
from: (1) the ability to erect barriers to market entry, i.e., advantages from monopoly 
power; (2) the asset base of the firm, largely encompassing resources and 
capabilities; (3) the specific capabilities of a firm’s managers. In order to better 
reflect the differences between the asset base of the MNE and its capabilities, 
Dunning introduced the separation between asset-based O-advantages (Oa) and 
transaction-based O-advantages (Ot). The newly added Ot-advantages were arising 
from the common governance of the (international) multi-plant firm and could stem 
from (1) advantages enjoyed by multi-plant firms over de novo firms and (2) 
advantages arising specifically from multinationality (Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). 
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Ot-advantages were a response to the criticism of internalization theorists that saw 
natural market failure as necessary and sufficient to explain MNE activity. Their 
reasoning, as outlined before, was based on transaction cost considerations, 
meaning the ability of the firm to substitute market transaction costs with (lower) 
hierarchical governance costs. Dunning responded by arguing that the capability of 
internalization was simply assumed in internalization theory. This was, however, 
not realistic since firms differed in their capabilities to internalize markets, i.e., to 
coordinate and set-up new ownership ties. Therefore, the Ot-advantages were 
explaining the capability of the MNE to internalize markets, as opposed to the I-
advantages, which explained the potential gain behind such an act. 
Moreover, this entailed a view of O-As as the central point of a theory of 
international production (of course, contrary to the view of TCI, which would argue 
for the primacy of I-As). Dunning (2001) pointed out that ‘a firm’s ability to benefit 
from such activities [internalization] must be related to the assets which it possesses 
prior to the act of internalisation’ (p. 175, italics in the original). In other words, it is 
the combination (or accumulation) of existing assets with newly internalized assets 
that generate the benefit for the MNE, which reduces the autarky of I-As 
significantly. Moreover, Dunning & Lundan (2008, p. 118) argue that the 
internalization of transactions does not resolve the opportunism problem at the 
center of transaction cost theorizing but shifts it to the capability of the MNE to 
motivate and incentivize its own staff. The latter is determined by firm-internal 
institutions which would have to resemble O-As. This brings us to the next stage of 
the O-A development. 
The institution-based ownership advantages (Oi) established the important 
argument that MNEs derived advantages from their internal governance systems, its 
shared values and norms, as well as the institutional context of its home and host 
economy in a non-market related context (Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). Moreover, 
MNEs were increasingly characterized as a coordinated network of non-ownership 
ties, the governance of which relies on the capability of the MNE to institutionalize 
certain relationships using, e.g., codes of conduct or conscious trust-building 
exercises  (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). More generally, the capability of the 
MNE to flexibly adjust its own institutionalized form make Oi-advantages an 
indispensable asset.  
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For example, the shift towards higher modularization and outsourcing of knowledge 
intensive activities pressures MNEs to innovate completely new governance 
mechanisms (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005). In the words of Dunning & 
Lundan (2008): ‘…, institutions have become a more integral part in explaining the 
determinants and effects of IB activity, mainly, as we have said, because 
globalization and technological advances have widened the options for behavior of 
both firms and governments; and because the environment in which MNEs operate 
has become more uncertain, complex and volatile’ (p. 126). 
The second component of the eclectic paradigm concerned the location dimension. 
This referred originally to the host country due to advantages derived from the home 
country being subsumed under O-As. Dunning later on realized that the advantages 
from location had become a relatively neglected or one-dimensional factor in the 
study of MNE activity (Dunning, 1998b). For example, Rugman (1976) merely 
defined location as a factor of risk diversification through geographical spread. 
Dunning argued that location choice was more than that. Besides resource 
endowments and factor prices, it comprised variable transportation costs, cross-
country differences, and was influenced by economies of agglomeration. Moreover, 
government regulations and political factors are an important dimension of the L-
advantages, such as different barriers or subsidies for foreign investment. From this 
viewpoint, a defining feature of the MNE is its access to more than one national legal 
and regulatory system, which again emphasizes the EPs institutional underpinnings. 
Finally, I-advantages explain how an MNE will engage in cross-border value-added 
activity, i.e., through which operational and investment modality. We have already 
seen that Dunning modified the parsimonious concept of internalization derived 
from the TCI by arguing that the accruing benefits could only be understood in 
relation to the O-As of the MNE. Any attempt to exclude the latter from the analysis 
would yield a theory that focuses on a partial aspect of the determination of MNE 
activity (see Dunning, 2003). Nevertheless, Dunning accepted that the theory of the 
MNE would have to be based on structural and natural market imperfections, which 
would refer to the ‘situation in which markets fail to behave in the way required of 
them’ (Dunning, 1993, p. 59), without questioning the notion of what was required 
of them in the first place. 
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The Institutional Environment in the EP 
The EP embeds institutions in all its components and, therefore, provides the most 
extensive treatment of social factors of the three theoretical approaches. A 
comprehensive overview of the role of institutions in the EP is provided in Dunning 
& Lundan (2008b) and Dunning & Lundan (2008a), and the previous discussion of 
the EP already revealed its unique approach to firm-specific institutions. By applying 
the ideas of North (2005), the EP highlights the interaction of macro-institutions, 
mainly captured in the L-As, and firm-specific institutions, captured in the O-As. In 
terms of the latter, Dunning & Lundan (2008b) argue that ‘some components of Oi 
are reflected in firm-specific norms, […], others are more influenced by the norms 
and values external to the firm, and particularly that of the human environment in 
which the firms are embedded and conduct their activities’ (p. 580-581, italics added). 
Thus, the EP recognizes the embedded nature of the MNE in its social environments 
(see, e.g., Heidenreich, 2012).  
Moreover, Dunning & Lundan (2008b) paraphrase Nelson & Nelson (2002) who 
described institutions as a ‘makeshift road across a swamp’, suggesting that the 
restrictions of this road generate possibilities and not just constraints. The EP also 
suggests that MNEs transfer institutions and may co-evolve with their external 
institutional environments (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). Both assertions are 
important in that they suggest that institutions, even as location factors, should not 
be seen as exogenous. Finally, besides all these unique elements, the EP also 
emphasizes the role of institutions in the coordination of the MNE as a system of 
economic exchanges.  
2.2.4 Summary 
The previous section took up the largely descriptive exercise of exploring the roots 
of MNE theory, specifically the foundations of the value-added and the exchange 
approach. The former had its roots in the imperfect competition framework 
established by Hymer (1976), while the latter is firmly based on Coase (1937) and his 
successors of the NIE. Concerning the economic activity of MNEs, both the value-
added and the exchange approach acknowledge the innovative activities of MNEs, 
albeit with very different degrees of attention. TCI explains cross-border investment 
by the need to transfer already existing knowledge assets (ownership advantages) in 
the context of high transaction costs. Taking this view on the activity of MNEs also 
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defines the role of institutions in the determination of FDI activity as affecting said 
transaction costs. 
On the contrary, the EP puts the generation and exploitation of ownership 
advantages at the center of the theory (see Tolentino, 2001). The purpose of FDI is 
to raise the long-term profitability of the MNE, which turns the attention towards 
issues of temporality. An investment must be understood as operating in a time 
horizon of which a significant portion is not yet realized and remains uncertain. This 
is a stark difference to the TCI, seeing FDI as a response to currently existing 
transaction costs. Here, uncertainty is captured in the particular transaction at a 
point in time. Due to the EP’s greater allowance for temporality, it would be much 
more suitable to a dynamic understanding of MNE operations, and therefore 
Cantwell (2015), following Hymer’s dynamic competition concept, interprets the 
framework as an evolutionary process of recreating ownership and location 
advantages. However, he admits that this is only one interpretation and that a more 
static interpretation of strategic fit is also taken up by many scholars. 
Due to this flexibility of the EP, it also showcases the most extensive understanding 
of institutions on two broad levels, namely firm-specific and country-specific 
institutions. Firm-specific institutions, reflected in the Oi-advantages, are either 
seen as generating efficiency of transactions through monitoring and incentives, or 
as capabilities conducive to the transfer of practices into foreign environments and 
common values such as firm-internal visions and corporate culture. Country-
specific institutions, reflected in the Li-advantages, are a critical determinant for FDI 
location choice. The mechanism behind this, however, is mainly adopted from the 
exchange perspective, based on the argument that institutional quality, in the form 
of transaction-cost-reducing institutions, leads to an increase in FDI attractiveness. 
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Table 2.2: Results of the review section. 
Section 2.2: Review 
Perspective 
Monopolistic 
Ownership 
Advantages (value-
added approach) 
(Section 2.2.1) 
Internalization 
Theory (exchange 
approach)  
(Section 2.2.2)  
Eclectic Paradigm 
(value-added & 
exchange 
approach) (Section 
2.2.3)  
Economic MNE seeks profits. 
Exploits and 
expands ownership 
advantages. 
Competition as a 
disequilibriating 
factor generates 
uncertainty. 
Competition fades 
in the long-run due 
to monopolization. 
MNE minimizes 
transaction costs. 
Uncertainty results 
from knowledge 
asymmetries in 
exchange. 
Equilibrium 
tendency. 
MNE seeks profits.  
Exploits and 
expands ownership 
advantages through 
fitting governance 
modality. 
Theoretical 
framework includes 
evolutionary 
approaches. 
 
Institutional Institutional 
unfamiliarity as a 
source of costs for 
new investments. 
No particular 
theoretical 
underpinning. 
Institutions as 
determinants of 
transaction costs. 
Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975; 
1985) as theoretical 
underpinning. 
Institutions as 
determinants of 
transaction costs, 
but also 
understood as 
ownership 
advantages (Oi). 
North (1990; 2005) 
as theoretical 
underpinning. 
  Common underpinning of the New 
Institutional Economics 
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In the light of these results, displayed in Table 2.2, I would argue that the value-
added approach as represented by the EP could benefit from a broader view on 
institutions as advocated by, e.g., Jackson and Deeg (2008). Currently, the 
institutional discussion in IB is strongly focused on the coordination of transactions 
in the MNE at a point in time, and much less on the development of ownership 
advantages in a dynamic setting. The EP is somewhere in between, and some 
contributions show that it could develop an institutional perspective that is much 
more responsive to an evolutionary view than that offered by the TCI (Cantwell, 
Dunning & Lundan, 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2010). However, I claim that the 
common underpinnings of the NIE are not sufficient to represent the role of 
institutions from a dynamic perspective. This is not only essential for a 
conceptualization of the role of different degrees of institutional change in this 
work, but for a development of the value-added approach in general. I shall 
substantiate these claims in the following section. 
2.3 New Institutional Economics as an Underpinning of 
MNE Theory 
‘[I]t seems to me that the new institutional economics is a matter very largely 
of selecting from the tool bag of modern economic theory those tools most apt 
for the study of the narrow though important range of problems, involving 
impediments to transactions, on which the new institutionalists have chosen 
to focus, maybe I am missing something.’ 
Posner (1993 p. 85) 
Having demonstrated that the underpinnings of institutional theory in IB are largely 
provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE), I will now critically review these 
foundations. As previously established, the TCI builds to different degrees on Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1975), while the EP draws significantly on North (1990; 2005). 
Williamson’s and Coase’s primary concern was to model how the characteristics of 
economic transactions would influence the existence and boundaries of the firm. 
North (1990; 2005) on the other hand aims to explain the economic development of 
nation states, focusing on institutional change. He also builds on Coase, especially 
emphasizing the importance of efficient property rights (see Coase, 1960). The 
common ground of both is the concept of transaction costs, which will be defined 
below. 
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2.3.1 The Economic and Institutional Environment in Equilibrium 
Following the foundations of Coase, both North (1990) and Williamson (1975) put 
forward a framework in which transaction costs represent the main explanatory 
concepts. Williamson (1975) argues that the characteristics of an economic 
transaction determine its cost and, with that, the decision of whether this 
transaction is organized through contractual relations in the market or by hierarchy 
within the firm. Williamson’s transaction costs are (1) search and innovation costs, 
(2) bargaining and decision costs and (3) policing and enforcement costs that arise 
when setting up an exchange in a market or organization (see Williamson, 2000). In 
almost the entirety of his work12, Williamson defines individuals as driven by 
opportunism or ‘self-seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1975, p. 9) under conditions of 
bounded rationality, i.e., limited mental capacities that result in uncertainty. In this 
world, factors such as the collusion of suppliers or asset specificity introduce 
uncertainties and thereby raise the costs of market transaction13. The economic 
problem is restated so that firms: ‘Organize transactions so as to economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism.’, leading to ‘[…] a different and larger conception of the economic 
problem than does the imperative ‘Maximize profits!’’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 32). 
However, while this view does indeed lead to a more encompassing view than 
perfectly competitive equilibrium models, it also abstracts from the very processes 
that the value-added approach would see as most central to the explanation of the 
firm: production and investment for development. In fact, both Williamson and 
North share the assumption that transaction costs can be separated from production 
costs (transformation costs in North’s terminology). This neglect of production costs 
is a characteristic of NIE approaches (see Demsetz, 1988). There are possibly two 
reasons for this. First, most NIE approaches draw in some way from Commons (1931) 
who equally separated production and transaction costs for analytical reasons. 
Second, and more importantly, NIE adopts the underlying theory of prices and 
production from neoclassical economics (Langlois, 1998). According to North 
(1990), neoclassical production theory is merely incomplete and requires the 
                                                     
12 In Williamson (1993b), there is an implicit acknowledgment of the role of trust, but only in relation 
to non-commercial relations. 
13 Small numbers of suppliers could create a supplier monopoly that raises input prices. Asset specificity 
refers to investments that are specific to a transaction and have a higher value in this context than in 
any second-best use. Both situations increase transaction costs and would incentivize the organization 
through hierarchy – although this would come with its own costs that need to be traded off. 
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addition of transaction costs to fix it. This is a critical juncture at which the NIE 
implicitly adopts an equilibrium view of production derived from the notion of 
perfect competition. 
In the zero transaction-cost world of neoclassical economics, perfect competition is 
defined as an equilibrium state in which firms are infinitesimally small price-takers 
(Stigler, 1957). Besides the issue that this understanding of competition makes it 
difficult to explain the increasing dominance of large scale enterprises observed 
throughout history, there is no need for a theory of organization as the price-taking 
firm is bound to set marginal costs to marginal revenue under conditions of 
complete information (Lazonick, 2016). Critics argued that this is an unrealistic 
idealization of competition and that empirical reality did not agree with the theory’s 
predictions (McNulty, 1968; Hayek, 1996). 
As a response, the imperfect competition school attempted to explain the large 
industrial enterprise, including MNEs (Hymer, 1976), by arguing that such firms 
were setting mark-up prices by exploiting their monopoly power, e.g., through 
erecting barriers to entry (Bain, 1956). NIE is a second response to the same issue 
but avoids the characterization of large firms as monopolies and, thus, necessary 
sources of inefficiency. For NIE, growing firms expand their boundaries to 
internalize transactions that would be too costly to be conducted in the market 
(Williamson, 1975). It adopts the marginal calculus of neoclassical theory to show 
that an optimum size of the firm exists and that this size is determined by the 
structure of transaction costs (Kay, 2014)14. 
Following this, Williamson argues that the development of the firm, understood as 
a choice between governance alternatives, is determined by exogenous transaction 
cost structures. Hence, the NIE is a theory of the relative costs of transactional 
alternatives, i.e., economic organization, and not of production, leaving the 
neoclassical production function view operating in the background. As Langlois puts 
it, ‘all deviations from the assumptions of the production-function formulation – are 
seen as falling exclusively under the jurisdiction of the kingdom of transaction costs’ 
(Langlois, 1998, p. 2, italics in the original). 
                                                     
14 Kay (2014), besides showing that Coase (1937) intended to stay within the boundaries of marginalist 
principles, also provides a discussion of how Coase may have misapplied the principle by comparing 
two sets of marginal costs instead of marginal cost and marginal benefit. 
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There are two points that arise from this. First, as the transaction cost structure is 
taken as a given by the firm, the model corresponds to an optimization framework 
in which the firm tends towards equilibrium, which is equivalent to stating that 
firms grow to an optimal size (Coad, 2009; Powell, 2014). Second, by optimizing 
transactions, a firm simultaneously minimizes its exposure to uncertainty. On the 
one hand, this is because the existing uncertainty of a transaction led the firm to 
optimize its governance structure in a way which would eliminate this uncertainty. 
On the other hand, the complete sphere of production and competition are 
eliminated as sources of uncertainty since, by definition, the neoclassical model 
cannot accommodate those. The result is a perspective in which the very economic 
activity of the firm, i.e., governance choice, reduces uncertainty.  
By introducing the link between governance choices and external institutions, this 
view also assumes an exogenous and stable institutional environment as part of the 
constraints that enable optimization. However, Williamson (1975) was mainly 
concerned with the institution of the firm, i.e., what he called ‘private’ institutions. 
Thus, the discussion of the wider institutional environment of the firm requires a 
shift towards the writings of Douglass North. Moreover, in contrast to the 
exogeneity of (public) institutions in Williamson’s basic framework (see North, 
1994), North (1990) developed a theory of institutional change. 
In North’s early positions, institutional change is exclusively driven by changes in 
relative prices, which reflects the neoclassical approach to price theory and 
equilibrium adjustment. However, as Vandenberg (2002) notes, North (1990) does 
not refer to immediate adjustments, nor does he fully exclude a circular causality in 
which institutions affect relative prices which affect institutions, and so on. This 
rather unorthodox vision of the price mechanism, further reinforced by the 
introduction of ideology as a cognitive filter for prices, shows that North went 
beyond basic neoclassicism. In contrast to the Panglossian world of Williamson15, he 
argued that the subjective cognitive model of agents, their ideology, can suppress 
progressive institutional changes. In much of North’s analysis, the efficiency of a 
prevailing institutional structure remains central. But since transactional efficiency 
                                                     
15 Panglossian in the sense that Williamson’s optimizing framework implies that the boundaries set by 
firms always represent the most optimal choice given a set of external (fixed) conditions. For a similar 
view, see, among others, Granovetter (1985). 
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is a state and not a process, the comparison between efficiency states, i.e., 
comparative statics, takes precedent (Vandenberg, 2002; Milonakis & Fine, 2007). 
This is underlined by the fact that North’s theory, by definition, describes 
institutional change as gradual, effectively standardizing the process of institutional 
change to a single variety. In North (1990), he presents the evolution of common law 
as an analogy to his theory of institutional change. In common-law systems, 
individual cases (agents) change the existing social structures incrementally based 
on what is deemed legitimate, i.e., the superior solution. While North agrees that 
revolutionary changes may occur, he sees these events represented by violent 
overthrows of governments or civil wars. That structural reform programs may differ 
in their intensity of change from North’s common-law analogy is not discussed. 
It can be concluded that North’s framework does not incorporate different 
intensities of institutional change beyond the dichotomy of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ analyses (North, 1990). To his defense, when taking a birds-eye view on 
history, as often done by North, this dichotomy might be sufficient. After all, 
explaining the demise of feudalism may not require an in-depth analysis of its short-
term temporal dynamics. But the enterprising activity of firms is not only affected 
by the efficiency outcome, as NIE would have it, but, as I will develop in the following 
sections, by the way the institutional environment was transformed to arrive at this 
outcome. 
2.3.2 Contrasting Views on Economic and Institutional Dynamics 
It is, perhaps, pertinent to observe that in the kind of world in which we live, any 
particular MNE one might like to consider is never likely to be in equilibrium, in 
the sense that it can be said to have achieved all the goals it sets itself. 
Dunning (2014, p. 51) 
Economic Dynamics and Competition. Due to the NIEs reliance on the neoclassical 
view of production costs, i.e., price theory and the production function, as well as its 
optimization framework, the economic environment of the firm takes the form of 
stability that is only broken when changes in relative prices occur. In the neoclassical 
view of competition, the market efficiently allocates resources in equilibrium as 
firms are unable to alter market prices (Stigler, 1957; Clifton, 1977). This views 
competition and the market as a form of coordination between infinitesimally small 
firms for the greater good of overall efficiency. The NIE allocates any form of 
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deviance from this ideal to the area of exchange and transaction costs (Langlois, 
1998).  
Alternative theories of competition16  challenge this perspective by asserting that 
firms do set prices and that firm size or industry concentration is not a 
representation of the absence of competition (Andrews & Brunner, 1975; Penrose, 
1995; Moudud, Bina & Mason, 2012; Tsoulfidis, 2015). According to this literature, the 
problem with imperfect competition approaches is their use of perfect competition 
as a definition for actual competition, which is then argued to be absent due to the 
deviance of reality from the perfect ideal (Moudud, 2010). On the contrary, in the 
classical tradition starting with Adam Smith, competition is seen as a process of 
rivalry which is consistent with the idea that even a market served by few very large 
firms could be highly competitive (McNulty, 1968; Clifton, 1977). 
One scholar that based her reasoning on such a pragmatic perspective on 
competition is Edith Penrose. Her seminal work The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 
was published in 1959 and developed independently from Coase (1937). Her 
inspiration was drawn from scholars as diverse as Schumpeter, Hayek and Marx 
(Pitelis, 2009), all of whom proposed a dynamic understanding of competition 
despite their otherwise conflicting views. The differences between Penrose’s view of 
enterprising activity and contributors like Williamson (1975) lies in the recognition 
that firms are not simply adjusting to transaction costs but use their resources in 
strategic ways to overcome constraints and change their own cost structure 
(Lazonick, 2015). 
Hence, transaction costs as well as production costs become endogenous as the firm 
continuously invests in its resources and capabilities in anticipation of its 
competition. Where neoclassical economics views the coordinating force of 
competition as a ballet, Schumpeter (1978) referred to the reality of competition as 
warfare, emphasizing that competition as envisaged by neoclassicals is a void 
concept for the business economist as firms are pro-active agents subjected to a 
struggle for survival as opposed to passive optimization. The dynamism of this view 
raises the issue of radical uncertainty. As Moudud points out: ‘[s]ince the future is 
                                                     
16 Classical competition approaches have developed from heterodox economics with the goal to provide 
a more realistic microfoundation for competition than is perfect competition. Interestingly, this 
approach also criticizes theories of imperfect competition as these use the notion of perfect 
competition as a definition for actual competition, which is then argued to be absent (Moudud, Bina & 
Mason, 2012). 
34 
 
fundamentally unknown, […] large-sized firms shielded behind entry barriers may 
face the ignominy of losing their market shares to smaller-sized new entrants’ 
(Moudud, 2010, p. 6). Thus, investments in resources, capabilities and capacity 
become a coercive pressure and form the explanation for the tendency of firm 
expansion as stated by Hymer (1972). 
This view changes the NIE perspective in at least three respects. First, strategic 
agency is not confined to the optimization of contractual arrangements at the 
intersection between market and hierarchy (see Langlois, 1998; Lazonick, 2016). 
Second, firms tend to expand and differentiate as opposed to equilibrate at optimal 
size, which is grounded in the continuous investments needed to remain 
competitively viable against an uncertain competitive threat (Cantwell, 2000). 
Third, the process of competition results in a non-ergodic environment in which 
firms cannot objectively reflect on their position with certainty as there is no 
probabilistic information on future states (Davidson, 1992; North, 2005). These 
external sources of radical uncertainty arising from competitive interaction also 
cause the emergence of firm-internal uncertainty, especially through innovation 
(Spender & Kessler, 1995).  
Penrose (1995) clearly recognized that the uncertainties entailed in such a view of 
business activity would provide an alternative explanation of why the firm exists as 
a social institution instead of a collection of arm’s-length relationships. In order to 
cope with the economic uncertainties, firms generate knowledge and experience 
both in coordinative and entrepreneurial areas, generating plans or strategies on 
issues such as anticipation of demand, actions of competitors and technological 
trajectories (Penrose, 1995). With this she was in line with Knight’s view of the firm 
as a reaction to irreducible uncertainty (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993). 
In conclusion, I adopt the position that markets and competition operate to 
incentivize agents in a way that destabilizes their common future. In this context, 
Schumpeter’s (1987) analogy of warfare is not so far off reality: firms develop 
technologies as ‘competitive weapons’ (Tolentino, 2001), they frequently ally in cases 
of a common enemy or interest (Dunning, 2015), and already won market share 
remains contested so much that even the victor must fear small-scale insurgency 
(Moudud, 2010). In this model of competition, it is impossible to ignore the issue of 
radical uncertainty and its endogenous occurrence. Social institutions, on the other 
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hand, enable stability and certainty, as was North’s (1990) contention. The following 
paragraphs are not meant to challenge this claim, but to complement it with the 
possibility that social institutions fail to provide these functions in some processes 
of change. 
Processes of Institutional Change and Uncertainty. In the past two decades, 
institutional change has become a vibrant research topic, not only in the NIE but 
also in other institutional approaches (Campbell, 2004). In the context of global 
political economy, one aspect of this research revolves around the lasting dynamic 
of liberalization observed since the 1970s. Based on a survey of various indicators, 
Spilimbergo, Prati & Ostry (2009) outline these changes in institutional conditions 
from the 1970s onwards, pointing out the longevity of the process. Agreeing with 
this empirical reality of institutional change, Streeck & Thelen (2005) developed a 
framework in which institutional change is transformative but proceeds only 
gradually, i.e., it is persistent. 
This concept of transformative but gradual institutional change was a response to 
so-called punctuated-equilibrium models of institutional change (Krasner, 1988; 
Campbell, 2004). These view institutions as generally stable with change proceeding 
in a revolutionary fashion; from one equilibrium to a new equilibrium. The crucial 
difference to the mode of gradual change is the higher intensity of change once an 
equilibrium shift occurs. Instead of high levels of persistence and low levels of 
intensity, the punctuated equilibrium model argues for low levels of persistence and 
high levels of intensity. These two perspectives, I would argue, are not only 
competing theoretical models but hold insights for different empirical realities of 
institutional change. 
If this is so, it would be likely that there exists another variety of institutional change 
that represents high persistence and high intensity. Indeed, Levitsky & Murillo 
(2013) draw our attention towards the gap that exists between these two views of 
institutional change. More precisely, they argue that Streeck & Thelen (2005) are 
correct in seeing gradual change as predominant; however, only in developed 
economies in which institutions are supported by strong enforcement mechanisms. 
Looking at the developing world, in particular Latin America, Levitsky & Murillo 
(2013) conceptualize a third form of institutional change, namely serial replacement. 
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Serial replacement is ‘frequent and radical’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013, p. 8) change of 
institutions. In their paper, Levitsky and Murillo provide several empirical examples 
of serial replacement in different areas of the political economy of Latin America, 
citing, among others Loveman (1994) for evidence of frequent constitutional 
changes. While constitutional changes may not necessarily be critical to foreign 
investors, economic liberalization is of considerable importance. Here, Levitsky and 
Murillo (2013) paint a very different picture than Streeck and Thelen (2005), stating 
that ‘[i]n Latin America, …, economic liberalization often entailed the rapid and 
wholesale dismantling of economic institutions’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013, p. 9) and 
‘governments undertook sweeping institutional reforms–including large-scale 
privatization and deregulation and a dramatic restructuring of trade and foreign 
investment regimes–of a kind that had previously been associated only with 
Pinochet-style dictatorships’ (p. 19). 
These processes of change are frequently supported or challenged by policy making 
institutions with different capacities and, hence, there is the possibility that change 
can advance at different speeds and intensities. This was visible in the process of 
economic transition in former states of the Soviet Union, driven by extensive and 
persistent reforms under the moniker of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Rodrik, 
2006). These forms of institutional transformation processes progressed with high 
intensity and speed, but both factors were found to be varying across countries 
(Heybey & Murrell, 1999; Godoy & Stiglitz, 2007). 
According to this empirical evidence, it seems important to differentiate between 
different forms of institutional change. The intensity of change, here defined as the 
depth of institutional restructuring, and the persistence, here defined as the duration 
of ongoing change, seem to be a good basis for determining whether institutional 
change could be considered as radical. In the following I define radical institutional 
change as institutional change that is both intense and persistent. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the different types of institutional change in relation to a continuum 
between intensity and persistence. 
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Figure 2.1: Classifying institutional change in a continuum. 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
The NIE provided an important but narrow path for IB theory to acknowledge the 
role of institutions in the investment activity of the MNE. The criticism of the NIE’s 
core theories and the contrast to alternative approaches has supported the 
contention that the NIE is largely focused on comparative statics and equilibrium 
conditions. By contrast, the economic environment of the firm is a source of 
endogenous and prevalent uncertainty. At the same time, I have argued for the 
possibility that the institutional environment could cease to be a factor of stability, 
e.g., in times of ongoing political reforms. This results in a general framework that 
separates between the institutional and the economic environment as two distinctly 
different spheres, specifically due to the former’s tendency of destabilization. Figure 
2.2 illustrates this general conceptual idea. In the following, I will first elaborate on 
the relationship between investment and institutions by drawing on the alternative 
view of the CC. Afterwards, I shall briefly take the findings back to the context of the 
MNE. 
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Figure 2.2: The economic and institutional sphere of firm activity – a framework. 
2.4.1 Institutional Environments and Investment under Economic 
Uncertainty 
I began this chapter with an overview of the points made by Jackson and Deeg 
(2008), which presented the institutional theory of the CC view to the IB discussion. 
In the broader tradition of the CC view, firms are found to actively embed themselves 
in institutional structures. The idea of embeddedness can be traced back to Polanyi 
(1944) and was re-popularized by Granovetter (1985) with his concept of relational 
networks. Beckert (2007) points out that the embeddedness literature after 
Granovetter failed to fully explain why social embeddedness is necessary for 
economic entities. In his view, embeddedness is a reaction to the endogenous 
instability of market relations and, thus, enables firms to remain actionable under 
uncertainty (see ibid., p. 11). Thus, firms seek orientation in relatively stable social 
institutions. 
An example of this type of embeddedness can be found in the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach (VoC) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). The VoC literature identifies the stability of 
two institutional arrangements of capitalism, namely coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs), for reasons of economic 
efficiency. This efficiency arises from comparative institutional advantages in 
productive activity that emerge from the complementarity of institutions (Amable, 
2000; Hall & Gingerich, 2009). The crucial aspect of the VoC is that ‘the institutional 
structure of the economy encourages certain types of investments’ (Hall & Soskice, 
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2001, p. 49) so that firms develop distinct advantages depending on the form of 
institutional context they are embedded in. This was already outlined with the 
example of firms that operate under an institutional logic of radical innovation, 
focusing on ‘switchable assets’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
According to this logic, institutions can affect the rate of return on certain types of 
investments, e.g., increasing the costs of low-capital intensive investments by 
maintaining strong labor market institutions, or through legitimizing investment 
that was deemed illegitimate before. The process of financialization provides a good 
example of the latter. As global financial markets became increasingly deregulated 
in the 1980s, profits in heretofore regulated industries began to soar, and firms 
started to invest in these new opportunities amidst a relatively weak state of 
industrial capital at the time (Milberg, 2008). This guidance of capital flows towards 
whole economic sectors is of course only one manifestation of the directional vector 
on the macro-scale. On the micro-level of the firm, where the uncertainties of the 
competitive process prevail, the sense of direction and predictability established by 
institutions may be critical to support any strategic investment at all. 
Strategic Fit vs. Strategic Agency 
At this point I come back to the previously raised issue of how strategic fit is viewed 
in IB versus the CC approach. IB approaches that build on the NIE maintain that 
individual behavior is explained through a set of exogenous preferences: ‘[f]or 
transaction cost economics […] institutions do not fundamentally alter the strategic 
preferences of actors’ (Allen, 2004, p. 100). In this case, strategic fit is simply the 
choice-within-constraints framework outlined and criticized by Jackson and Deeg 
(2008). Contrary to this, the CC approach recognizes that institutions can affect 
these preference structures (see Allen, 2004, p. 89). This explains why the 
institutional function of a directional vector for strategic actions is difficult to 
integrate into the NIE, namely because the direction of lowering transaction costs is 
hard-wired into the system so that other options of strategic behavior cannot be 
fully recognized.  
In the NIE view, strategic behavior of firms is characterized by optimization 
according to price signals, i.e., transaction costs, and history unfolds as a sequential 
chain of such optimizing decisions. Institutions can only matter in each slice of time 
as an outcome condition for transaction costs. The extended view presented here 
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argues that strategic agency goes beyond optimization according to transaction 
costs. Generally, strategic agents make decisions not merely based on current 
variables, but by considering their potential unfolding in the future, which is 
essentially the problem of investments under uncertainty that was laid out in the 
introduction. The institutional environment is of special importance since the 
market endogenously generates the uncertainties that make optimization decisions 
impossible, as argued in Section 2.3.2.  
As opposed to the endogenous uncertainty of the economic environment, 
institutions are sticky and path-dependent precisely to enable long-term orientation 
for agents (Thelen, 2009). In the VoC approach, firms assess their institutional 
environment to derive a directional vector that reduces otherwise radical 
uncertainty about strategic investments. This directional vector is part of a firm’s 
judgement or expectation about the future. This connects to the basic Keynesian 
position that investment is driven by expectations and enabled by the confidence 
that entrepreneurs have in them (Dequech, 1999; Ferrari-Filho & Conceição, 2005). 
But instead of assuming that radical uncertainty is ubiquitous and, thus, ‘animal 
spirits’ and conventions determine investments (Akerlof & Shiller, 2010)17, we can 
take the VoC approach into account. Here, sticky and path-dependent institutions 
generate a topology of broad profitable areas for investment which firms utilize in 
order to form their expectations. This does not mean that institutions determine 
particular investment projects, but that they generate some information for the firm 
that can be used to generate a credible expectation about the future of the 
investment. In other words, firms are enabled to be strategic about an otherwise 
very uncertain future. 
In this context, Beckert (1999) emphasized that any form of strategic agency must 
rely on institutions as these ‘reduce uncertainty by creating expectations of what 
others will do’ (Beckert, 1999, p. 782), and so form ‘the basis for rational assessment 
of means-ends relationships’ (ibid., p. 786).  Dequech (2004) proposes that 
institutional structures have a second function besides achieving transactional 
efficiency, namely a cognitive function. This function goes beyond the equalization 
of knowledge asymmetries between individuals in exchange and refers to the role of 
                                                     
17 It is popular to interpret Keynes approach to expectations through animal spirits as a reference to 
pure emotions. However, what objective factors may trigger these animal spirits seems to be of 
relevance as well. 
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institutions in reducing the variability of reality through time. Dequech (2004) 
points out that radical uncertainty comes in degrees; hence, the amount of traction 
that institutions have on fixing the variables of relevance for decision-makers over 
time may directly affect their confidence in the expectations they hold (he calls this 
the ‘informational-cognitive-function’). 
In summary, I propose that institutions are an important source of predictability in 
an economic environment that tends to generate radical uncertainties 
endogenously. Instead of thinking of investment as a by-product of some 
optimization function, I follow the alternative view of strategic investments. 
Institutions enable strategizing and may directly affect the relative profitability of 
broad areas of investment as in the VoC. From this, I induce two potential 
mechanisms that would affect the investment activity of firms in cases where 
institutions are in flux, namely (1) due to organizational disintegration, and (2) due 
to a loss of confidence in expectations. 
(1) Organizational Integration, Knowledge Generation and Investments 
New investment, understood as the growth of the firm in some strategic direction, 
is characterized by a material component of capital expenditure which is 
underpinned by the generation of experience and knowledge (Penrose, 1995). These 
cognitive resources are the source for identifying new investment opportunities and 
enable the firm to support the planning and implementation of strategic 
investments. Lazonick (2015) refers to this as the ‘social conditions of innovative 
enterprise’ (p. 24) and suggests that strategic investment programs require the 
‘essential social condition […] to engage in and make use of collective and 
cumulative, or organizational, learning’ (p. 24).  
The precondition for organizational learning is the existence of prerequisite 
structures to organize and accumulate knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Lazonick 
(2015) refers to these structures as ‘organizational integration’ necessary for the 
generation, transfer and, especially, accumulation of knowledge. The latter point is 
also prominent in evolutionary accounts were institutional structures serve as 
organizational memory (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and even as the basis for 
technological paradigms (Dosi & Nelson, 2010). If these firm-internal institutional 
structures are, as the VoC and related approaches emphasize, strategically 
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embedded in wider institutional environments, radical institutional change could 
lead to disordered unembedding. 
In the extreme case of radical (intense and persistent) institutional change, 
organizations may have to fall back to ad-hoc structures and their very capacity of 
generating structures to support the generation of new knowledge is reduced. 
Newman (2000) provides some empirical evidence of this micro process in the 
transition economy context, showing that, in the rapidly changing environment of 
the Czech Republic, many firms had trouble establishing new organizational 
structures and those that did initially lost their capacity of further adjustments due 
to organizational disintegration. 
(2) Future Expectations and Institutional Systems 
Jackson and Deeg (2008) argued that institutional environments should be viewed 
as configurations or systems of institutions with high degrees of interdependency. 
This explains why institutional changes are prone to result in radical uncertainty as 
their interdependence (or complexity) will generate unforeseen consequences (see 
North, 2005). Moreover, this generates another point of contact to the theory of the 
firm in the tradition of Penrose. Penrose (1995) described the process of building 
expectations of the future as driven by an ‘image’ of the environment that guides 
entrepreneurial judgment. While this image is subjectively construed, it is partly 
based on an interpretation of the external environment over time (Foss, 1998; 
Blundel, 2015). Such a broad interplay of subjective and objective views of reality 
implies that firms will not be focused on a single institutional structure such as 
property rights. Instead, the image is generated in relation to the interplay of the 
structure with the activities of the firm so that even a disturbance of non-market 
institutions could reduce the confidence in new investments. 
The persistence of institutional change is likely to be a crucial factor in distorting 
the relationship between expectations and experience as it causes the directional 
vector of institutions to break down. As a response, Penrose suggested that when 
‘expectations are disappointed, a sharp curtailment of investment plans may follow’ 
(Penrose, 1995, p. 73). Beckert (1999) points out that the failure to develop stabilizing 
institutions in Eastern Europe has suppressed ‘a rational type of entrepreneurship’ 
(p. 782). In cases where institutional change undermines the institutional support 
for future expectations, firms may refrain from bearing the uncertainties of long-
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term investments altogether. This situation is exemplified in Figure 2.3, where I take 
the example of a potential investment in an assembly subsidiary, i.e., an investment 
with moderate complexity whose effective return depends strongly on labor costs. 
 
Figure 2.3: The effect of radical institutional change on strategic investment. 
2.4.2 Radical Institutional Change as a Barrier to MNE Investment 
One of the main tenets of IB theory is that the complexity of cross-border business 
results strongly from the fact that the MNE operates in multiple, foreign 
institutional environments. This results in the multiple embeddedness of the 
subunits of the MNE, meaning that host country subsidiaries are institutionally 
embedded both in the corporate network and the host countries’ institutional 
environment (Meyer, Mudambi & Narula, 2010). From a simplified but quite 
accurate perspective, the MNE extends the strategic decision-capacity of the 
headquarters by the use of local interfaces, which are integrated through an 
administrative system of firm-internal institutions. Only the Eclectic Paradigm 
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develops this concept of multiple embeddedness directly by suggesting that Oi 
factors are partially embedded in Li institutions (Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). 
Foreign direct investment is a form of strategic investment that requires the 
generation of cognitive resources, as was explained in the previous section. This 
links the strategic investment activity of the MNE with supporting firm-internal 
institutional structures. For example, Dunning & Lundan (2010) discuss the way in 
which the interaction of Oi and Li factors can form the foundation for capability 
development, the latter being a form of strategic investment. For example, they state 
that ‘[t]he firm provides the institutional framework within which the formal and 
informal rules and incentives that guide the process of knowledge generation and 
transfer are formed and implemented’ (ibid., p. 1234). 
Moreover, firms develop ‘communities of practice’ (ibid., p. 1235) as a response to 
the uncertainties of the innovative process ‘that provide a context for structured 
experimentation’ (p. 1235). Hence, strategic investments in the process of extending 
the MNE’s resources, capabilities and capacities require Oi’s that are at least partly 
embedded in the Li’s of a given location. Disintegration possibly severs this link 
between Oi’s and Li’s, reducing the effectiveness of these institutional support 
structures, and hampering the ability of discovering new profitable investment 
opportunities through experimentation. Without the discovery of profitable 
opportunities, the likelihood of investment is strongly reduced. On the contrary, 
subsidiaries in particularly stable institutional environments may feature more 
resilient Oi’s and, given their more innovative and experimental stance, represent a 
more attractive target for capital allocations by the corporate center. These 
complications are captured in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Multiple embeddedness in the context of the conceptual framework. 
This introduces the sine qua non of IB, namely spatial heterogeneity. The MNE is 
unique in its ability to shift capital not only between different utilizations, e.g., 
sectors and industries, but also between different institutional environments 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008a). If MNEs face radical institutional change in one their 
operating environments, they have the capacity to withhold investment and 
determine a more suitable location for it. Hence, I would propose that radical 
institutional change has a specifically marked effect on the strategic investments of 
MNEs. In addition, this reminds us of Hymer’s important realization that MNEs 
suffer from liabilities of foreignness (see Zaheer, 1995, 2002). Thus, institutions are 
likely to be even more crucial in their function as cognitive orientation devices. If 
institutional continuity breaks down, MNEs might not be able to adapt as fast as 
domestic enterprises that have a deeper understanding of the wider institutional 
environment, including its informal components, and access to other important 
assets such as stakeholder networks. 
I conclude that radical institutional changes are likely to affect the investment 
activity of MNEs. However, I have outlined that there are some qualifications that 
arise from the unique character of the MNE, mainly that the MNE has options of 
circumventing the negative effects of radical institutional change. This may not be 
so in cases where large capital sums were already committed to an environment, 
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effectively tying the MNE to its location. Nevertheless, MNEs are more flexible in 
their capital allocation which would suggest that the relative institutional stability 
of a country vis-à-vis another country could operate as an attractor for FDI. From 
this conceptual perspective, the FDI attractiveness of a location is not only 
determined by the institutional structure at a point in time, but also by the 
consistency of this structure through time. The following three essays will develop 
some of the ideas that derive from this. 
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3 Essays 
3.1 Essay 1: Dynamic Perspectives on the (Dis)economies of 
Multinationality: Insights from the Penrosian Theory 
of the Firm 
 
 
Abstract 
What drives and simultaneously constrains the growth of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs)? International Business theory has identified potential economies and 
diseconomies of multinationality as potential answers. Contractor (2007) argues 
that the transaction-cost-focused perspective on (dis)economies of multinationality 
is faulty since it ignores the dynamic evolution of MNEs. He proposes a model in 
which MNEs grow and evolve in the profitable direction of increased 
multinationality. This paper argues that the latter approach equally ignores 
dynamics and the associated uncertainty. This is supported by developing a critique 
based on the principles outlined in Penrose (1959), and with an application of the 
derived concepts on the example of (dis)economies of the global value chain. 
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3.1.1 Introduction 
One of the core areas of inquiry of International Business (IB) studies is to identify 
the advantages and disadvantages associated with international production activity 
as embodied in the organizational arrangement of the Multinational Enterprise 
(MNE). Many studies have attempted to uncover whether the multinationality18 (M) 
of a firm will lead to higher levels of performance (P) (Lu & Beamish, 2004; Thomas 
& Eden, 2004; Kirca, Roth, Hult & Cavusgil, 2012; Nguyen, 2017). This M-P literature 
claims that increasing M must increase P as we would otherwise not see the 
persistent drive towards expanding MNE operations (Contractor, 2012). 
Accordingly, the M-P literature has established its own theoretical principles, where 
increases in M result in economies of scale, scope and arbitrage (Hennart, 2011). 
However, empirically, the M-P literature has produced inconclusive evidence 
(Hennart, 2007). 
The commendable work of Contractor (2007a, 2012), who partly synthesized the 
empirical evidence into a single framework, has led to the so called s-curve model. 
In this model, initial increases in M are subject to decreasing returns since young 
MNEs lack the needed business experience to benefit from cross-border operations. 
However, for the largest number of firms in the middle part of the distribution, 
increasing M affects their performance positively (economies of M). Only at the 
extreme of over-internationalization do very large MNEs face diseconomies of M. 
This theory explains the diversity of empirical findings in a way that is 
complementary to the liabilities of foreignness and MNE regionalization literature 
(Contractor, 2007a)19. The resulting theory is given the prefix ‘evolutionary’ 
(Contractor, 2007b), referring to its dynamic underpinnings that should form a 
contrast to static theories of MNE growth (see Figure 3.1). 
                                                     
18 In this paper, I define multinationality (M) as both multinational scale and scope. Since the discussion 
of this paper does not revolve around the conceptualization of M, I argue that this is appropriate. For 
an appreciation of the conceptual depth of the M construct, see Ietto-Gillies (2009). 
19 Liabilities of foreignness refers to the additional costs of operating abroad that may put MNEs in a 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis domestic firms (Zaheer, 1995). Regionalization refers to the relatively 
high regional concentration of sales and assets of the majority of large MNEs (Rugman & Verbeke, 
2004). 
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Figure 3.1: S-Curve model. Illustrated following Contractor (2007). 
P stands for performance and M for multinationality. 
In this paper, I question the dynamic character of the s-curve model by building on 
Edith Penrose’s seminal work The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (TGF), which I 
argue to be a theoretical basis for a dynamic theory of the firm. Most other criticisms 
of the s-curve model are developed from a transaction-cost/internalization theory 
(TCI) perspective (Hennart, 2007; Verbeke & Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li & Goerzen, 
2009; Powell, 2014). For example, Hennart (2007, 2011) comes to the conclusion that 
a positive M-P relationship is untenable under the assumptions of TCI. 
By drawing on TGF, I argue that the s-curve model is not evolutionary in the sense 
that it could reflect the general dynamism of MNE activity, leading to several 
conceptual gaps. TGF is to be understood as a ‘single argument’ (Blundel, 2015) and, 
hence, the structural separation of arguments in this paper is not meant to represent 
the independence of the issues discussed. In fact, most of the arguments are 
dynamically interrelated and I present an attempt to synthesize them through an 
application to the phenomenon of global value chains (GVCs). 
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 3.1.2 introduces the theoretical 
foundations of TGF alongside its implications both for economies and diseconomies 
of multinationality. Section 3.1.3 develops the implications derived from a discussion 
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of diseconomies of multinationality in the context of institutional diversity as an 
external barrier to cross-border business activity. Section 3.1.4 uses the established 
theoretical principles to analyze the growth of global value chains (GVCs) and its 
relationship with the M-P model. Section 3.1.5 concludes the paper. 
3.1.2 Penrosian Insights and M-P Research 
To begin with, I will revisit some core tenets of Penrose (1959); a work that is often 
claimed to have preceded the resource-based view but that goes far beyond 
questions of resource generation and exploitation (see Rugman & Verbeke, 2002). In 
her writings on the firm, Penrose incorporated an unorthodox and eclectic approach 
to economic theory. TGF does not explain firm growth as an adjustment to 
equilibrium conditions but as a continuing spiral of accumulation. This intrinsic 
expansionary tendency sets Penrose’s theory apart from much of the transaction 
cost/internalization (TCI) literature which theorizes about an equilibrium at which 
‘every firm is satisfied with the boundaries that prevail’ (Casson, 2015, p. 64). 
Such an intrinsic expansionary tendency is more in line with the evolutionary theory 
of the firm (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Dosi & Nelson, 1994). The most important 
characteristic of a theory of evolutionary economics is its general dynamism. An 
evolutionary view in business economics must deal with change and the question of 
where an observed phenomenon originated from, i.e., the issues of historicity and 
path-dependency (Dosi & Nelson, 1994, 2010). Besides this more general focus on 
dynamic explanations, an evolutionary theory is based on a procedural 
understanding of competition as a selection mechanism that coerces investments in 
innovation akin to the Schumpeterian concept of ‘creative destruction’ (Metcalfe, 
1998). Finally, the concept of co-evolution can explain the complex interdependence 
between firms and the broader environment, according to which the environment 
is neither exogenous nor fully endogenous (Lewin, Long & Carroll, 1999; Cantwell, 
Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
It is somewhat paradoxical that Penrose refuted the usefulness of evolutionary 
analogies in economics20, the most famous of these certainly being the variation-
selection-retention framework (Penrose, 1952). I will not discuss her position in-
depth here, but will simply point out that TGFs concepts are closely related to what 
                                                     
20 Incidentally, the same is true for Joseph A. Schumpeter who has since been a core influence in 
evolutionary economics (Saviotti & Metcalfe, 2018). 
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most evolutionary economists talk about. For example, Penrose conceptualized firm 
growth as an open-ended expansionary process driven by the search for and 
generation of productive opportunities (Pitelis, 2009); a mechanism of variation. She 
argued that competition pressures firms to invest their retained profits in the 
process of innovation to further their competitive strength (Penrose, 1995, p. 26). 
Even an innovative firm ‘must expect that in time it will be overtaken if it fails to 
continue to develop its advantage’ (ibid., p. 120); a mechanism of selection. Firms 
actively seek competitive differentiation to survive and to grow their ‘defenses in 
depth’ (ibid., p. 121), which entails a degree of specialization; a mechanism of 
retention. In the light of these dynamics, Penrose suggested that ‘expansion is 
necessary in a competitive world’ (ibid., p. 31). 
One reason why Penrose did not accept evolutionary analogies might be that some 
formalizations of evolutionary models require the modeling of the variation process 
as a random search, which is in contradiction with Penrose’s observations (the bulk 
of her criticism was specifically addressed to Armen Alchian’s model)21. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to argue that the commonalities between 
evolutionary views of the firm and TGF are quite strong. Moreover, the critical 
characteristic that unifies these theories against those of the TCI variant is the 
expansionary tendency of firms, which cannot exist in a framework based on a 
notion of optimal firm size (Coad, 2009, pp.  100). The implications of TGF’s dynamic 
theory for the economies of multinationality will be expanded in the following 
section. 
                                                     
21 For a short rejoinder on Penrose’s critique, see Alchian (1953). 
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3.1.2.1 Economies of Multinationality 
Economies of M play a different role in TGF, TCI and M-P approaches respectively, 
as shown in Figure 3.2. In the M-P approach of Contractor, multinational expansion 
is explained as being driven by a direct relationship with performance (Contractor, 
2012). In his view, the performance increase resulting from increases in M has led to 
the steady increase of MNE activity over the past decades. Only inexperienced or 
extremely over-internationalized MNEs fail to benefit from this positive M-P link. 
In contrast, the TCI approach argues that firms grow by seizing advantages derived 
from internalizing otherwise costly market-transactions. MNEs maximize their 
profits by internalizing markets until the cost of an additional marginal unit of 
internalization offsets the benefits derived from it (Hennart, 2011; Casson, 2015). 
Thus, expansion is explained as an adjustment towards optimal environmental fit 
and the economies of multinationality play a secondary role. In TGF, long-term 
profitability is seen as the outcome of investments in productive opportunities that 
inevitably cause a growth of the firm (Penrose, 1995, pp. 23). Thus, growth is an 
outcome of the competitive process and the effects of economies of scale are 
subjected to this dynamic. 
Figure 3.2: Three models of MNE (firm) growth. 
The graphical representation of the Transaction-cost-Internalization box is adapted 
from Powell (2014). M stands for multinationality; P for performance; Mo is the optimal 
level of M; Max(P) is maximized P. 
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General dynamism: Economies of size and growth 
The M-P approach claims that a positive link between M and P explains the existence 
and growth of the MNE; i.e., the profitability of increasing M is a necessary condition 
for MNE activity (Contractor, 2012). From a dynamic perspective, this raises two 
issues. The first is the question of how an increase in M was made possible in the 
first place – I will return to this issue in the next section. The second logical question 
is whether it is the accumulated M, i.e. the level of M, or increases in M that explain 
the positive effect on performance. This difference is important as advantages from 
size do not necessarily result in expansion in the absence of advantages from growth. 
Penrose made precisely this distinction between economies of size and economies 
of growth. 
TGF argues that firms could potentially reap advantages from either the process of 
growth or the static condition of size (Penrose, 1995, Ch. 6). Here, economies of size 
are equivalent to traditional scale and scope advantages22 (for a discussion, see Gold, 
1973). The economies of size can be further separated into economies of size in 
operations, a sustainable advantage that is realized after expansion, or economies of 
size in expansion, an advantage of transitory nature that disappears after the 
completed expansion process. Economies of size in expansion suggest that large 
firms may be able to expand more cost-efficiently into new markets or industries 
due to an advantage from size, e.g., the availability of large advertising budgets for 
positioning a new product (ibid, pp. 84). However, this does not entail any 
advantage in the productive operations following the positioning. Expansion can, 
thus, be motivated by advantages that are non-persistent, which raises the question 
if advantages from multinationality are accumulative, or partly dissipate after the 
expansion is completed. 
Another example of such economies of size in multinational expansion is an MNE 
that has gained international experience in setting up subsidiaries from prior 
expansion. This experience could provide the MNE with an advantage in future 
expansions as the costs of setting up subsidiaries in foreign countries is reduced. 
Here, the advantage stems from the level of M, but there is likely to be no persistent 
performance impact on the operations of new subsidiaries under competitive 
conditions. Moreover, experience is subject to decay as conditions change in a 
                                                     
22 They are defined by both technological and managerial economies acting on the level of the firm or 
the level of the plant. 
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dynamic environment. For example, Argote, Beckman & Epple (1990) emphasize the 
transitory nature of experience-based production advantages. 
By establishing the economies of growth, Penrose invokes the theoretical core of TGF 
according to which firms endogenously discover new productive opportunities from 
unused resources. These productive opportunities exist irrespective of size (Penrose, 
1995, pp. 87)23. Hence, while economies of size in expansion exclusively refer to 
situations in which the attained size of the firm, and the associated advantages, have 
a positive effect on future expansion, economies of growth also include those 
situations in which advantages from growth are independent from firm size24. 
Therefore, economies of size are not necessary for firm growth. Penrose gives the 
example of firms that could benefit from economies of size but, as they are incapable 
of challenging already existing large producers due to a lack of economies of growth, 
would only be able to exist in the ‘interstices of the market’ (ibid., p. 88). 
For example, an MNE that expands into a foreign market to satisfy a country-specific 
demand by producing a new product with an entirely new form of production is 
motivated by economies of growth. While it is possible that economies of size in 
expansion have made it less costly for the MNE to enter, geographic scope per se 
might be of no sustainable advantage to the new expansion. In the example, there is 
no necessary reason that multinational scope generates a sustainable advantage, 
especially if the technology with which this new product is produced is in no way 
linked with the existing productive activities of the firm. This leads to two 
conclusions. 
First, it is problematic to assume that economies of M are necessary for the existence 
and growth of MNEs without clearly specifying the type of economies referred to. 
On the one hand, acquiring a foreign supplier to avoid the risk of supply chain 
disruption is hardly motivated by the fact that the firm expects necessary increases 
in performance as it hedges against the risk of underperformance (for similar 
                                                     
23 Coad interprets this part as evidence that TGF remains in a world of constant returns to scale. While 
Penrose clarifies that it is not helpful to assume that an abstract notion of firm size is driving expansion, 
she also does not argue against the existence of economies of size. In fact, economies of growth can 
simultaneously be derived from size: ‘economies of growth may exist at all sizes, and some of them may 
have no relation either to the size of the firm before it undertakes an expansion based on them, or to 
any increase in efficiency due to a larger scale of production’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 88).  
24 ‘This means not that the firm has no competitive advantages in its new operations, but that these 
advantages do not rest on the fact that the new activities are part of the activities of a larger firm’ 
(Penrose, 1995, p. 89). 
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examples, see Hennart, 2011). On the other hand, MNEs that could benefit from 
economies of M might be unable to challenge existing competitors at a higher level 
of output and so have no advantages from expanding. Therefore, putting forward 
the superiority of multinational expansion as the reason for multinational expansion 
seems circular and devoid of explanatory content. In the evolutionary process of firm 
growth, multinationality can only be understood as an outcome of the competitive 
process, not a parameter to be set. 
Second, some performance advantages derived from M only benefit the expansion 
process and, thus, are of transitory nature. The experience example is a case in point. 
In an evolutionary setting, this suggests that MNEs with high levels of M might have 
considerable advantages in expanding into new foreign markets, even if this does 
not imply any sustainable advantage. For individual MNEs, the lower cost to expand 
internationally might even raise the danger of ‘empire building’ where managers 
push expansion plans for their own benefit, often with negative long-term 
performance effects on the corporate level (Hope & Thomas, 2008)25. Besides these 
transitory economies of expansion, TGF argues that economies of growth are 
predominantly of transitory nature as well. This is because of the constant pressure 
of competition, which I will explore in the next section. 
Dynamic competition: The motor of expansion and exploration 
‘Big-business competition’ (Penrose, 1959, p. 204) plays a major role throughout 
TGF. It is the driving force for continuous reinvestments of retained earnings in new 
productive opportunities. Penrose argues that the firm can never stand still and 
must constantly search for new options to avoid the attacks of competitors. In 
contrast to neoclassical economics, competition is seen as a disequilibriating process 
(Pitelis, 2009). In order to survive, a firm must constantly ‘develop its [competitive] 
advantage’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 120). For reasons of consistency, I will henceforth refer 
to these as firm-specific advantages (FSAs)26. There are two implications of TGF’s 
view on competition which I will treat separately in the following. First, FSAs are 
necessary for firms to grow and, in a dynamic process, growth is necessary for the 
further development of FSAs. Second, the firm is not a profit maximizer but may 
                                                     
25 Penrose (1995, pp. 163) also discusses the issues of empire-building as a distortion. 
26 The term firm-specific advantage reflects the necessary separation from country-specific advantages 
in the context of the MNE. 
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rather forego short-term profits in the process of developing future advantages to 
secure long-term profits (see Penrose, 1959, pp. 23). 
Firm specific advantages and multinationality. In a critique of the M-P view, Verbeke 
& Brugman (2009) argue that performance is exclusively determined by FSAs and 
not by multinationality per se. Against this, Contractor (2012) points out that ‘the 
full exploitation of the internalized FSAs certainly requires expansion into several 
multinational markets’ (p. 326). From a dynamic perspective, it is possible that both 
views are partially correct. Consider the following examples that Contractor (2012) 
outlines in support of his contention that multinationality is a sufficient advantage 
for MNE expansion. On one occasion, Contractor points out that ‘it would be akin 
to arguing that the primary determinant of a consultant’s income is his/her 
education level and training and that the number of clients he/she has or their 
geographic spread are unimportant variables. Consultants, however well trained, 
who serve clients in only their own municipality will have lower income until they 
go farther afield and secure distant clients’ (Contractor, 2012, p. 326). In this thought 
experiment, he fails to explicitly acknowledge the simple fact that a consultant will 
not have achieved multinational customer scope through incompetency and failure. 
This is important, however, as it suggests that the potential of increasing 
multinational scope can only be realized by commanding superior capabilities and 
resources. 
In a second example, Contractor (2012, p. 326) argues that some trucking companies 
are essentially devoid of FSAs and are ’winners’ due to their multinational scope. 
This again overlooks the fact that integrated trucking companies invest in FSAs such 
as fuel-efficiency, IT-systems, just-in-time processes and, indeed, managerial 
capability to compete (Engel, 1998; Parming, 2013). The multinational scope of the 
top performing transport MNEs is precisely the cumulative outcome of knowledge 
generation and investment in capital-intensive FSAs. 
Contractor (2012) rightly observers that investment in capital goods and R&D will 
drive up fixed costs requiring increasing ‘global amortization scope’ (p. 322); hence, 
multinationality enables the spreading of costs over additional markets. But it is not 
explicitly discussed that the increase of global market scope is in itself an application 
of FSAs in competition. As Penrose observed, the beneficial effect of a firm’s scope 
increase depends on ‘whether or not its resources are likely to be sufficient for the 
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maintenance of the rate of investment that will be required to keep up with 
competitors’ innovations and expansion in its existing fields as well as in the new 
one’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 120). Consistent with this, Gimeno & Woo (1999) found that 
‘economies [of scope] may not result in superior performance if rivals are able to 
draw on similar economies and are motivated to compete intensely’ (p. 239). 
From a dynamic perspective, advantages of both scale and scope are conditional 
upon the ability to increase demand, the chance of which is increased by the 
possession of strong FSAs in an uncertain competitive environment. It is (at least) 
problematic to think about any benefits of scale and scope in a cross-sectional 
setting. Even if scale advantages derive from engineering-related reasons, e.g., a 
minimum economic scale of automobile production, the final condition to realize 
these advantages is to sell the added output. This requires FSAs to either take market 
shares from existing competitors or to generate new markets (Pitelis & Teece, 2010). 
From a dynamic perspective, the development of advantages of M is strongly 
supported if not conditional upon the exploration and exploitation of FSAs. 
At the same time, there is no reason to object to the reverse causality highlighted by 
Contractor (2012), namely that with higher levels of M, MNEs can outspend 
competitors in R&D and technology acquisition due to their ability to spread fixed 
costs over a larger number of country markets. Penrose realized the dynamic 
interrelationship of lowering variable costs through technological investments at the 
expense of fixed costs, and the fact that this requires market share is also part of the 
Penrosian theme (Lazonick, 2001).27 
Thus, not only is FSA development a precondition to realize and maintain 
multinational scale and scope, but the attained scale and scope may provide 
advantages for future FSA developments. This spiraling accumulative process is 
directly related to Penrose’s theory of the firm and complements her view on the 
equally important accumulation of knowledge. M-P defenders and critics like 
Verbeke & Brugman (2009) seem to be on two sides of the same coin. From a 
Penrosian perspective, it seems undisputable that the primary factor influencing 
MNE performance are FSAs, but the development of these advantages requires 
                                                     
27 ‘For any given product larger firms probably do require a larger margin over direct cost for profitable 
operations, not because of a larger administrative overhead as is sometimes alleged, but because of the 
kind of oligopolistc competition in which they become engaged’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 198). To avoid giving 
too much credit to TGF, the importance of low prices as opposed to monopolistic mark-ups in 
supporting large investments is made explicitly later in Penrose (1990). 
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adequate scale and scope in multiple markets to reduce unit-costs in the context of 
rising investments and capital intensity – a form of dynamic advantage.  
This argument could also explain the problems of endogeneity that have plagued 
empirical M-P studies (Powell, 2014). For example, when statistically controlling for 
endogeneity, Berry & Kaul (2016) were unable to replicate the results of Lu & 
Beamish (2004) - a seminal article lending support to the s-curve model. Similarly, 
a qualitative study conducting interviews with managers concluded that it would be 
more accurate to see the multinational expansion process as the generation of real 
options for the exploitation and exploration of FSAs (Carneiro, Amaral, Pacheco, 
Moraes & Figueira da Silva, 2014). This is consistent with the evolutionary view put 
forward here. 
Profitability is an imperfect measure of evolutionary fitness. One of the core 
difficulties in M-P research is how to define P. This is not merely a methodological 
issue, but it has theoretical relevance as was indicated by Verbeke and Brugman 
(2009). The bulk of M-P studies focuses on profitability measures and so increasing 
M is expected to increase profit rates such as return on assets (ROA). TGF, on the 
other hand, integrates a broader view of performance as understood in concepts 
such as evolutionary ‘fitness’ (Dosi & Nelson, 1994). The implications of this view on 
performance are the most pronounced in a later article on the MNE (Penrose, 1990). 
Here, Penrose establishes the importance of pricing strategy as a competitive device. 
What follows from her discussion is that firms may sometimes forego profits by 
lowering prices to expand their revenue in later periods and to pressure competitors 
with weaker cost advantages28. In such situations, profits cannot fully capture the 
competitiveness of the firm. If managers consider the sustainability of performance, 
i.e., the evolutionary fitness of their firm, retaining price-flexibility can be an equally 
important dimension of competitive performance. This price flexibility is enabled 
by reducing variable costs and one of the most potent ways of achieving this is the 
investment in new technologies (Penrose, 1990). 
Given that investment in new technologies tends to increase the capital employed 
relative to the firm’s competitors (Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Lazonick, 2015), a 
                                                     
28 Lazonick (2016) puts this the following way: ‘A potent way for an innovating firm to attain a greater 
extent of the market is to share some of the gains of this cost transformation [transforming variable 
costs into fixed costs through investment in technology] with its customers in the form of lower prices’ 
(p. 12). 
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strengthening of the profit margin from reduced variable costs may not be 
represented in profitability measures that also capture the increasing amount of 
capital assets. While the firm might have gained price flexibility and even increased 
its absolute profits, a measure of ROA could simultaneously be stagnating29. Hence, 
profitability measures are a very imperfect representation of the survivability of a 
firm. Accordingly, studies found that market selection is not driven by profitability 
but by ‘survival-of-the-more-efficient’ (Foster, Haltiwanger & Syverson, 2008; 
Cantner, Krüger & Sӧllner, 2012)30. 
This has some concrete implications for the M-P view. First, the effect of M must be 
tested on different forms of P in a dynamic competitiveness framework31. In other 
words, to develop a complete picture, more M-P studies must consider measures 
besides ROA such as unit-costs, profit margins or even firm survival, which is also 
stressed in a recent review of the M-P literature by Nguyen (2017). Second, as the 
largest MNEs also tend to have high capital intensities, we must pay more careful 
attention to the potential link between MNE size and reduced profitability. In a 
meta-analysis, Yang & Driffield (2012) found that the firm size distribution of the 
sample affects the reported M-P effect. This calls for further research to clarify 
whether very large MNEs do indeed face diseconomies from over-
internationalization or are simply characterized by higher capital intensity. With 
this question we can shift our attention to the diseconomies of multinationality. 
3.1.2.2 Diseconomies of Multinationality 
In this second part of the paper, I review Penrose’s position on decreasing returns to 
size and how these relate to the diseconomies associated with M in the IB literature. 
Contractor, Kundu & Hsu (2003) to some extent agree with the TCI view by 
modeling two balancing forces of economies and diseconomies of M. Comparing the 
TCI view of Powell (2014) to that of the s-curve model reveals that the fundamental 
difference is TCI’s proposition of an individual optimal size at which the firm 
maximizes its performance (Powell & Lim, 2018). Against this the s-curve suggested 
that an expansion of M can lead to persistent performance benefits and only causes 
                                                     
29 Research has not found a general positive relationship between the size of the firm and its 
profitability (Dhawan, 2001). Moreover, there is some evidence that large firms, in terms of capital 
advanced, tend to have lower but more stable profitability than relatively smaller competitors (Hymer 
& Pashigian, 1962; Pomfret & Shapiro, 1980; Dunne & Hughes, 1994) 
30 For a discussion of the evidence, see Dosi, Pugliese & Santoleri (2017). 
31 One of the more rare cases of an M-P study utilizing costs-to-sales ratio is Al-Obaidan & Scully (1995). 
However, only unit production costs can avoid an influence of pricing on the performance measure. 
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diseconomies in extreme cases. The common point, thus, is that diseconomies of M 
are bound to occur at some level of multinational size. I shall begin discussing this 
view on systematic diseconomies by juxtaposing the internal limit of firm expansion 
in TGF to that of TCI and the M-P view. Afterwards, I will outline Penrose’s view on 
external limits in relation to the environment that complements the view on 
diseconomies of organizational coordination. 
General dynamism: Diseconomies of size and growth as internal limits 
Most contributions exploring decreasing returns to scale draw on the neoclassical 
theory of the firm, which explains the upward sloping part of the cost curve with the 
existence of fixed factors of production, here particularly management (Lazonick, 
2016). Contributions such as Coase (1937) and later Williamson (1975) have further 
refined these principles of generally declining effectiveness of management with 
firm size and added the critical role of transaction costs. The TCI perspective, e.g., 
as presented by Buckley & Casson (1976) and Hennart (1982), follows this general 
position. 
Casson (2014) argues that ‘[a]s the complexity of the division of labour increases, 
record-keeping becomes more onerous. As the workforce expands, relations become 
impersonal, trust becomes weaker, and morale may suffer, and as specialisms 
proliferate rivalries may develop between different specialist groups’ (p. 216). Thus, 
at a threshold size of the MNE, organizational conflict emerges, deriving from 
opportunistic predispositions and more benign failures of commitment (Verbeke & 
Greidanus, 2009). With increasing size and diversity, interpersonal trust is difficult 
to maintain and rising specialization results in an increase of intra-firm group 
distance or rivalry (for an evolutionary approach to this dynamic, see Cordes, 
Schwesinger, Müller & Lundan, 2016). 
Managers are seen as the lynchpin that hold these diverse organizations together, 
but a single manager’s capability is limited so that increasing size translates to a 
larger administrative overhead, higher costs, and eventually failure from 
overcomplexity (Casson, 2014). Building on Coase (1937), TCI argues that besides 
these costs of internal coordination (costs of hierarchy), there are costs of using the 
market as an institutional alternative. MNEs grow to the size and diversity at which 
the diseconomies of expansion offset any further gain from internalization (Casson, 
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2015). This reflects a trade-off between internal costs of coordination as well as 
external ‘costs of using the price mechanism’ (Coase, 1937, p. 390). 
To this conceptualization of the size of the MNE as an internal limit to expansion, 
TGF adds a dynamic component. Analogous to the distinction between economies 
of size and growth, TGF differentiates between the diseconomies of size and growth. 
The former would only present fixed limitations, even for individual firms, if 
management indeed was a fixed factor. However, the real constraint arises from the 
resource limitations of the firm to realize expansion at any given point in time, since 
the development of managerial capacity cannot be achieved ad-hoc (Foss, 1998). 
Even an attempt to buy managerial capacity does not circumvent the need to 
integrate and train new managers (Slater, 1980). Managerial capacity becomes a 
crucial bottleneck to the amount of expansion any organization can withstand at a 
given point in time. 
Therefore, diseconomies of growth arise from the need to allocate managerial (and 
other) resources to the process of growth32. What is unique to Penrose’s view is that 
after this process ends, the managerial diseconomies are neutralized by a process of 
knowledge generation and routinization (Best, 1990). Even more so, the initial 
diseconomies are overcompensated as routinization generates new managerial 
capacity to be used in further expansion. This learning mechanism is the core of TGF 
and explains both the source of new productive opportunities and the necessary 
managerial capacity needed for further expansion. In a way, TGF conceptualizes the 
firm as an institutional structure implying a dialectical relationship between 
entrepreneurial dynamics on the one side and the stability necessary for the 
accumulation of knowledge and routines on the other. For these reasons, TGF 
introduces no theoretical limit to the size of the firm but only to its growth. 
Penrose recognized that such an incremental process of learning to deal with ever 
larger enterprise structures would lead to organizational transformations, a point 
forcefully formulated by Chandler (1990). Her perspective was also an anticipation 
of the co-evolutionary view on the firm-environment relationship, which, in the 
context of IB, emphasizes the mutual influence between MNEs and their external 
environment (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). From the co-evolutionary view, 
                                                     
32  ‘A firm has a given amount of experienced managerial services available at any one time. Part of 
these are needed for ordinary operations; the rest are available for planning and executing expansion 
programmes’ (Penrose, 1995, p. 57). 
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MNE structure is not independent from the challenges it faces in a changing global 
economy. Equally, there is no reason to believe that the conditions of the global 
economy are exogenous to MNEs at least in the long-term. Penrose envisioned that 
firms would discover new forms of ‘authoritative communication’33 (Penrose, 1959, 
p. 18) enabled through an innovation of firm-internal policies or, in modern jargon, 
institutions34.  
Penrose transfers the Schumpeterian view of technological change from the physical 
to the social realm. In line with this, Lundan (2010) argued that the institutional 
structure of an MNE may grant it unique capacities to overcome its 
multidimensional expansionary limits. Innovative institutions provide managerial 
capacity to overcome many of the issues related to multinationality, offer efficiency 
gains through routinization and coordination, and generate a support structure for 
innovation and learning processes (Kogut & Zander, 1993a, 1996; Spender & Kessler, 
1995; Dunning & Lundan, 2010). Thus, expansion is not only about how coordination 
is maintained in the context of transaction costs, but also about the generation of 
administrative structures and other firm-internal institutions that enable efficient 
transactions in the first place (see Kogut & Zander, 1993b). 
In the analysis of diseconomies of multinationality, we should not only be concerned 
with static variables, like the level of multinationality or the overall size of the MNE, 
but also with those dynamic factors that enable or prevent the MNE to accumulate 
knowledge over time in an effort to overcome the negative implications of the static 
variables. This should result in an increased focus on the dynamic limits of MNE 
expansion instead of an elusive optimal size that has yet to be supported empirically 
(Coad, 2009). In this context, the foundations of Penrose integrate managerial 
creativity, entrepreneurial judgment and planning in an uncertain world, whereas 
TCI remains centered on passive adaptation and fit to achieve optimality (Lazonick, 
2015). The s-curve model must separate more clearly between factors that may be 
                                                     
33 ‘Authoritative communication’ can consist on the one extreme of the actual transmission of detailed 
instructions through a hierarchy of officials and, on the other, of the mere existence among a group of 
people of observed and accepted policies, goals, and administrative procedures established at some 
time in the past (Penrose, 1995, p. 18). 
34 Penrose seemed to mainly think of formal institutions and less of the informal underpinning of firms 
such as common values and visions (she mentions these on the side). This might be more of a case of 
essentialism than reductionism since growing organizational complexity beyond a point can only be 
achieved through formal institutional authority (Dunbar, 2011). 
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transformed into temporary constraints by MNEs and those factors that potentially 
decrease the MNEs’ capacity to do so. 
Environmental dynamism: An external limit in Penrose 
At various points in TGF, Penrose highlights how the environment is closely 
connected with internal processes of the firm. In terms of the entrepreneurial 
mechanism, i.e., the discovery of new productive opportunities, the environment 
acts as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s head (see Penrose, 1995, p. 189). The image 
is not a carbon copy of reality but a judgment of the observable contingencies and 
an extrapolation of possibilities into the future (Foss, 1998). Hence, the firm and the 
environment are seen as interdependent by Penrose. 
Accordingly, administrative adjustments may not only be triggered by internal 
expansion but equally by environmental changes. Penrose (1959) argues that '[o]f 
the managerial services available to a firm, some will be required for current 
operations; the amount required will depend on the size of the firm and on external 
conditions' (p. 175, italics added). In TGF, these external conditions refer to 'market 
conditions' (p. 181). If the environment is highly competitive and characterized by 
constantly changing demand and supply conditions, '...the firm may not be able to 
do much more than keep on its feet and, if it expands at all, can expand only slowly' 
(p. 179). 
I would argue that there is no reason to assume that these environmental 
disruptions are exclusively driven by competitive conditions, and Penrose herself 
constructs a more general counterfactual. Based on the thought experiment of a 
totally stable environment, she concluded that firms with 'optimum administrative 
procedures and framing an optimum set of policies could operate successfully 
without any overt acts of ‘central management’ at all' (ibid., p. 15). They would 
exploit 'established regulations' and existing policy ‘directives’' (ibid., p. 15) without 
adaptation. Thus, TGF views environmental change as necessitating adjustments of 
the firm's routine-based administrative system. 
The adjustment problems of environmental disruption are compounded by the fact 
that environmental change causes uncertainty. Penrose writes: 'the effect of 
uncertainty is to require that some of these available [managerial] services be used 
to gather information, digest it, and reach conclusions' (p.57). Much in line with the 
above, Thompson (1967, p. 159) agreed that ‘[u]ncertainty appears as the 
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fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with uncertainty, as 
the essence of the administrative process’. This has interesting implications for 
diseconomies of multinationality as it shifts the attention from coordination 
problems to planning problems that go beyond the variation of transaction costs. 
Here, I see the potential to integrate Penrose with the IB focus on global institutional 
diversity as developed by both TCI and the M-P. It seems important to explore how 
dynamic environmental factors impact the ability of the MNE to expand and 
maintain an administrative system, i.e., to stabilize and routinize activities at its 
periphery. This requires institutions that provide a degree of predictability to the 
task environment. 
3.1.3 Dynamic Institutions and MNE Expansion Beyond TGF 
In IB, distance and diversity of institutions feature prominently in the discussion of 
external limits to MNE expansion, specifically in relation to transaction costs. There 
are at least three different perspectives of how institutions affect the diseconomies 
of multinationality. First, institutions affect the efficiency of exchange in a given 
economy (North, 1990). This transactional efficiency of institutions is usually 
captured in the concept of institutional quality (Peng, 2002). Second, institutions 
differ across countries, which can result in even stronger inefficiencies when 
exchanges bring together individuals socialized in only one of the two systems. The 
difference between two institutional environments is referred to as institutional 
distance (Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst & Lange, 2016). Third, the MNE is an 
organization that spans several institutional environments and, thus, aggregates 
institutional diversity from the heterogeneity described above, leading to network 
management issues (Arregle, Miller, Hitt & Beamish, 2016). 
Most applications of these approaches, implicitly or explicitly, follow the general 
thinking of Coase (1937) or Williamson (1975), i.e., the TCI approach. For some TCI 
scholars, transaction-cost-related factors are exogenous so that they become 
variables in the optimizing decisions of MNE managers. Other scholars, especially 
TCI scholars with a strategic management focus, have suggested that these factors 
can be manipulated by MNEs through strategic action (Verbeke, Li & Goerzen, 
2009). For example, organizational learning enables the MNE to understand, cope 
with, and even prevent the problems deriving from diverse institutional 
environments (Javernick-Will, 2009; Henisz & Delios, 2015). Here, the 
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environmental diversity is more akin to a moveable constraint as envisioned by 
Penrose. 
But moving such a constraint through learning and adjustment is costly. Already 
Hymer (1976) established that an increase of international scope would lead to 
additional costs incurred by the MNE due to its limited familiarity with local 
conditions, including institutions (Zaheer, 1995; Eden & Miller, 2004). Hymer (1976) 
treated this in the context of a one-off ‘fixed cost’ (p. 39). However, these initial 
disadvantages could also be overcompensated by organizational learning. Recently, 
IB scholars have argued for the existence of dynamically arising advantages of 
foreignness (Shi & Hoskisson, 2012; Edman, 2016). There are several reasons why an 
active process of embedding in, and learning about, local institutional environments 
can translate into an advantage. 
For example, national institutions create necessary regularities that are leveraged by 
MNEs, granting them efficiency and operational stability as a result of the 
predictability of their task environment (Whitley, 2007). Moreover, local institutions 
provide the context and foundation for developing administrative structures with 
the goal to implement centralized practices and routines; this increases efficiency 
and reduces the potential of intra-organizational conflict (Kostova, 1999; Hotho, 
Saka-Helmhout & Becker-Ritterspach, 2014). Third, the MNE faces unforeseen 
institutional issues (Orr & Scott, 2008; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010) and institutional 
voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), which could open strategic options otherwise not 
encountered or considered (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
However, while these active processes of learning can be investments into future 
advantages, they all represent initial expenditures, some of them of the non-
monetary kind of managerial capacity as outlined by Penrose. For example, Verbeke 
& Kenworthy (2008) suggest that the relevance of these managerial costs is often 
overlooked both in IB theory and practice. This raises an important issue. If 
institutional environments are dynamic systems, institutional change can affect the 
‘return’ to these ‘investment’ processes. In case the local institutional environment 
changes, previously established routines may become obsolete and the MNE must 
allocate managerial services to newly arising learning processes. This would result 
in adjustment costs and an allocation of managerial attention away from 
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entrepreneurial tasks that might be important to secure future competitive 
advantages. 
Such dynamics of the institutional environment have not been frequently discussed 
in the IB literature, even though different forms of institutional change have caught 
the interest of scholars in related research areas (Campbell, 2004; Thelen, 2009). 
There is also some evidence for cross-country heterogeneity in the dynamics of 
institutional change, including persistently turbulent institutional trajectories  
(Levitsky & Murillo, 2013). As MNEs span several institutional environments, it 
seems important to acknowledge these non-market dynamics. Following Penrose’s 
ideas, it may be difficult for MNEs to expand their administrative structures into 
environments that are institutionally unstable. Moreover, institutional changes are 
likely to result in reconfigurations of the already established operations and 
structures of the MNE, leading to managerial deficits. 
For the M-P view and the s-curve model, two implications arise from this. First, the 
contingency of coordination costs is more complex when considering both the 
possibility of learning and environmental changes. In fact, the degree of complexity 
that arises from such a conceptualization of coordination costs raises doubts as to 
whether it is reasonable to integrate systematic diseconomies proportional to 
multinationality in a general model of MNE expansion. Powell (2014) rightly argues 
that diseconomies are determined at the level of the individual firm, not least 
because every MNE has its own topology of institutional environments both in terms 
of its spatial dispersion, but also in terms of the dynamic challenges these produce 
from a temporal perspective. Even so, the contention of Powell (2014) that MNEs are 
constantly searching for an optimal size at which their performance is maximized 
still maintains that there must be some fixed limit to M for each MNE. However, 
especially large MNEs are likely to develop the capacity to transform these 
limitations (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
Second, dynamic diseconomies do not exclusively arise from increases in M as they 
can equally be associated with environmental changes in the existing network of the 
MNE. This seems to be not yet recognized in the s-curve model. For instance, 
Contractor (2012) argues, possibly much to the discontent of the TCI scholars, that 
the reason for observed diseconomies of M are to be explained by either path-
dependency or randomness. The former would reflect the idea that managers, 
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having experienced gains from increasing M over a long time, overextend due to 
false extrapolations. From the perspective introduced here, the fact that 
environmental conditions, including institutional environments, are changing can 
explain why some MNEs may be exposed to diseconomies of multinationality even 
if the decision-making wasn’t characterized by severe irrationality and in the 
absence of changes in the level of M.  
3.1.4 The Growth of the Global Value Chain 
In this section, I present some findings of the global value chain (GVC) literature to 
emphasize the explanatory capacity of a Penrosian discussion of MNE expansion. 
GVCs are production networks in which a lead firm, usually a large MNE, controls 
suppliers often without direct ownership. It may seem problematic to apply TGF’s 
principle outside of the ownership boundaries of the firm, but Penrose’s definition 
of the firm is not based on ownership as much as on administrative reach35. The GVC 
literature has analytically and empirically supported the view that lead firms have 
considerable control over suppliers using multiple governance modes on which I 
will comment further below (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005). 
The phenomenon of the GVC raises two interesting issues. First, how do the 
economies of multinationality manifest in this specific form of organized 
production? Second, how does the GVC structure relate to the diseconomies of 
multinationality? Both questions require us to decide whether M is related to the 
multinationality of an integrated firm or, equally, to the multinational network of a 
lead firm36. Contractor (2012) pointed out the potential importance of non-
ownership networks in his perspective on M, which is why I will assume that an 
expansion of the non-ownership network of the MNE, e.g., through outsourcing, 
corresponds to an increase in M. In the following, I will shortly discuss how the 
Penrosian principles of economies and diseconomies of multinationality relate to 
the GVC phenomenon and what that implies for the M-P approach. 
In terms of the economies of multinational size, the M-P approach specifically 
emphasizes the benefits of multinational scale to reduce the fixed costs of R&D 
                                                     
35 Very similar views are found in Hymer (1976) and Cowling & Sugden (1987). These authors 
differentiate between different levels of authority and decision-making, emphasizing the centralization 
of the strategic level of decision-making and the decentralization of more peripheral decisions. 
36 It is unclear if a single dimension of multinationality could simply include both ownership and 
network aspects of the firm. For example, does a lead firm (hypothetically situated in a single country) 
with 100 independent suppliers in 10 countries have the same level of M as an integrated MNE with 100 
subsidiaries in the same countries? I will avoid a discussion of this issue here. 
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spending. With respect to the current global economy, there is considerable 
evidence of financial activities such as share buy-backs that have partly replaced 
productive investments (Davis, 2017; for a detailed analysis, see Milberg and 
Winkler, 2013). For many lead firms, externalization has meant the shifting of the 
exploitation of internal FSAs to the external FSAs of suppliers (Strange & Newton, 
2006). The use of externalized FSAs has decreased the need for investments in 
productivity enhancing assets (Milberg, 2007). For this reason, the lead firm’s 
imperative to secure economies of scale abroad to amortize investment is reduced. 
This is especially so as the ability to lower prices due to cost-savings has opened new 
demand in already established markets. Moreover, the cost-efficiency of the GVC is 
not necessarily supported by the overall economies of multinational size, as it is the 
supplier’s scale and technology, instead of the size or dispersion of the network, that 
becomes critical. 
The GVC may be better analyzed from the view of economies of multinational 
growth. By optimizing the structure of its supplier network, the lead firm can 
improve its operational cost structure through specific expansions. This benefit 
arises from independent suppliers and is not related to an economy of size of the 
lead firm. For instance, there is no knowledge to be gained, no market share attained 
and a complete separation between supplier and lead firm would affect the former’s 
production costs only marginally. Thus, there is an incentive for the lead firm to 
expand their network selectively in the direction of the most cost-efficient set of 
suppliers. 
In relation to this mode of expansion, Strange & Newton (2006) remind us that the 
growth of the MNE is a ‘double movement’ (p. 138). With this they refer to the 
simultaneous occurrence of centralization and decentralization as well as 
integration and differentiation resulting in ‘more and more sub-parts that can 
function relatively independently of each other’ (p. 138). In other words, MNE 
expansion enables the generation of new planning and administration capabilities 
that may even allow greater autonomy at the periphery while retaining strategic 
control37. This entails that the expansion of the periphery of large MNE networks 
tends to be driven more by economies of growth than multinational size, as the 
                                                     
37 According to the authors, this argument is originally made by Stephen Hymer. 
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overall degree of integration of these activities is reduced to control costs of 
coordination. 
In this light of different sources and types of economies, the M-P relationship 
becomes more complex as the advantages of multinational size and growth must be 
analyzed separately. To complicate the issue, Penrose reminds us that such 
advantages must not persist in the process of competition. Dynamic competition has 
been a major force in the rise of the GVC structure since lead firms were able to 
decrease their production costs sometimes by as much as 40-60% through 
outsourcing (Dossani & Kenney, 2003; Lazonick, 2006). It is likely that this has 
greatly increased the lead firms’ competitive pressure because of the relative 
imitability of the outsourcing strategy (at least for large MNEs). The imitation of 
other competitors and the ensuing price pressures  would suggest that the 
economies of multinational growth gained by individual lead firms may not lead to 
very persistent performance benefits (Milberg, 2006). 
For example, consider two MNEs serving the same market with equal levels of M. 
MNE A is an early mover and expands its outsourcing activity to increase its profit 
margin through lower costs (resulting in higher M). MNE B imitates the strategy 
(achieves the same level of M) and decides to undercut MNE A to challenge its 
market share. MNE A has two potent strategic options: match the price or 
aggressively undercut it based on the expectation that it has the stronger cost 
advantage. No matter which strategy is chosen, the initially gained net profits from 
increasing M are altered through the competitive process. 
Consider a third MNE C with lower levels of M that enjoys a differentiation 
advantage (e.g., product quality) and, thus, is not in direct competition with MNE A 
and B. Even if MNE C does not have the cost-efficiency entailed by the larger supplier 
network of MNE A and B, it may still report higher profits as its less competitive 
environment does not force it to fully utilize its price flexibility. Capturing these 
complexities with linear models and an escalating number of control variables seems 
to be a difficult, if not impossible, task. If the individual competitive position over 
time is fundamentally uncertain, as suggested in Schumpeterian views of 
competition (Metcalfe, 1998), identifying a linear link between economies of 
multinationality and performance for the individual firm in any predictive 
framework seems impossible. 
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Therefore, I would argue that the M-P theory has some merit as an explanatory 
framework on the aggregate level, but that it cannot and should not be used as a 
predictive theory for individual MNEs. For example, Milberg (2007) used sectoral 
data of the US to show that outsourcing has increased the profit share38 in several 
US sectors. On the contrary, Jiang, Frazier and Prater (2006), using panel-
regressions on a sample of individual US firms, found that there is an impact of 
outsourcing on cost-efficiency but not on profitability. With our discussion in mind, 
we could make two propositions here. First, outsourcing did increase aggregate 
profitability, i.e., it strengthened the M-P relationship in the aggregate, while the 
ensuing competition has distributed these gains more evenly across individual lead 
firms. Second, this raises the margin of error in the M-P mapping over time, because 
increased levels of M can result in increasing price competition. Figure 3.3 reflects 
this dynamic ‘error’ using the example of MNE A, B and C above. 
Using the s-curve model, increased aggregate profitability of M could be pictured as 
an upward shift of the curve, representing the tendency of higher gains on average. 
At the same time, a reduced slope of the middle part of the s-curve would indicate 
stronger competition and less gains from each increasing unit of M on the individual 
level of the lead firm. Due to these contestable gains and the uncertain nature of 
                                                     
38 Defined as the profit/wage share. Hence, this measure reflects the distribution of the surplus, but it 
contains no information of the profitability of individual firms. 
Figure 3.3: Example of increasing competition through increasing multinationality. 
The left graph resembles time 1, where MNE A reaps benefits from its level of M. The right 
graph resembles a time 2, where MNE A is challenged by MNE B matching its level of M 
and struggling for cost-leadership. 
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competition, the mapping between profitability and M is prone to deviations over 
time.  
Finally, it must be noted that the aggregate M-P relationship is constantly in flux. 
The increasing prevalence of the GVC structure in the past decades suggests 
increasing gains associated with these supplier structures. It could be argued that 
one reason for this is the stagnating purchasing power in many developed countries 
which has pushed MNEs towards price competition (Dobbs et al., 2016). Moreover, 
changes in corporate governance towards shareholder value principles  have been 
put forward as partial causes for the GVC phenomenon (Lazonick, 2010). These 
conditions are historically contingent, meaning that the strength of an aggregate M-
P relationship is not as fixed as it may seem in the s-curve model. 
The example of the GVC structure can also elucidate the complexities of the 
diseconomies of multinationality. One of the arguments derived from TGF is that the 
intrinsic expansionary tendency of enterprises requires organizational evolution. 
Alongside this Schumpeterian angle of TGF, I have discussed Penrose’s stance on 
environmental change as a condition that moderates and defines diseconomies of 
size and, more importantly, growth. The GVC is a case in point for the evolutionary 
mutation of the large integrated MNE to accommodate environmental conditions 
but also to specify the mode of influence of the lead firm on its environment. 
From the TCI point of view, the GVC is often seen as a response to reduced 
transaction costs (Williamson, 2008); although, it is far from obvious if transaction 
costs have declined to the extent that would fully explain the GVC (Milberg & 
Winkler, 2013). Moreover, while it is true that outsourcing has gained prominence, 
it has not substituted the growth in proprietary assets and employment of the largest 
enterprises (Gospel & Fiedler, 2007). In other words, Penrose’s endogenous growth 
in the presence of moveable constraints performs better as an explanation than the 
idea that the GVC is the outcome of a reduced optimal size of the MNE due to 
transaction costs. 
TGF argued that growth requires the maintenance of administrative reach via firm-
internal institutions. I would argue that the GVC structure is a response to these 
evolutionary pressures. For instance, Lundan (2010) points out that the ability of 
extending the non-ownership network of the MNE comes with the benefit of 
economizing on managerial services as externalization ‘requires neither the resource 
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commitment, nor carries the problems of hierarchical coordination, envisaged by 
Penrose’ (p. 56). The lead firm not only reduces its resource commitments through 
externalizing its capital-intensive FSAs, but also shifts most forms of interaction 
with local institutions (and other environmental conditions) to a subcontractor or 
independent supplier. It thereby reduces the costs associated with responding to 
changing institutional environments, which are prevalent both in developing 
countries with weak governance and emerging markets whose reforms need to keep 
pace with economic development. 
But the GVC structure goes further than this and simultaneously allows the lead firm 
to reduce its managerial burden of hierarchical coordination, while retaining the 
capacity of being an ‘orchestrator’ of value-added activities (Buckley, 2014). This 
represents the social innovation of the GVC structure. Its functioning is dependent 
on new forms of governance mechanisms that have varying – but generally lower – 
needs for managerial oversight (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005). The high level 
of competition in low-margin supplier markets, combined with the monopsony 
power of the lead firm, has created a dependency and, thus, the potential for 
enacting authoritative communication without necessitating an expansion of firm-
internal institutions (Milberg & Winkler, 2013). 
The implications for a theory of systematic diseconomies of multinationality are 
significant. In a classic contribution to the IB field, Rugman & Verbeke (2004) 
empirically traced the concentration of sales and assets in home-regions, arguing 
that MNEs face diseconomies when operating beyond these spatial discontinuities. 
However, more recent work on the geography of MNE activity through input-output 
tables has uncovered the far greater globalization of production hidden in the GVC 
networks of these enterprises (Los, Timmer & Vries, 2015). This implies that 
systematic diseconomies of multinationality are at least contingent upon the form 
of MNE activity and that MNEs have strategic capabilities to affect their exposure to 
the very sources of diseconomies. 
3.1.5 Conclusion 
Any form of evolutionary theory needs to be based on a dynamic mechanism. The 
M-P approach substitutes this mechanism by a fixed relationship between M and P. 
This is seen as the principal law governing the growth of the MNE. In this paper, I 
have argued that alternatives to the TCI-based theory of the firm exist and should 
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be considered as a starting point for M-P scholars. With her focus on growth 
processes and her unique view on the economies and diseconomies of size and 
growth, Penrose provides an interesting starting point to entangle some of the 
theoretical conundrums that still plague an M-P based model such as the s-curve. 
I have focused on three dynamic concepts of TGF. First, the analytical separation 
between states and processes – ‘general dynamism’ – emphasizing the importance of 
historicity and path-dependence. While this is often connected to Penrose’s view on 
related diversification, the separation between (dis)economies of size and growth 
equally arose from her dynamic perspective. Second, dynamic competition is the 
catalyst that perpetuates the endogenous processes of capital and knowledge 
accumulation in TGF. Advantages acquired by the firm, and to this we must count 
the potential advantages from increasing M, are likely to be transitory and may 
require further actions to reap sustainable advantages. Moreover, in a dynamic 
competitive process, the firm’s performance is a multidimensional construct of 
evolutionary fitness, which raises concerns about the ability to measure P through 
profitability or in static cross-sectional studies. Third, environmental change was 
introduced as a factor that stands in conflict with the need for administrative 
stability. While environmental change can often be seen as exogenous, the 
possibility of strategic responses on behalf of the MNE endogenizes the constraints 
that arise from it. 
With the example of the GVC, I attempted to show that these dynamic concepts can 
be used as analytical instruments to understand the relationship between M and P. 
I suggest that the s-curve as proposed by Contractor (2007) does not lend itself very 
well to be a basis for normative implications in the context of individual firms, but 
it  can be a starting point for understanding an aggregate relationship between the 
relative profitability of multinational expansion and the prevalent (or paradigmatic) 
type of organized cross-border production and exchange. 
Competition has reduced the sustainability of advantages derived from the GVC 
structure and, thereby, from increases in multinationality. This also raises the 
question as to the relative importance of advantages derived from multinationality 
per se, which in the GVC example tend to be transitory, and those derived from the 
introduction of new social and physical technologies. I would agree with Cantwell & 
Sanna-Randaccio (1993) that ‘[t]his [the M-P] literature has perhaps tended to 
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overplay the role of multinational advantage, though, which appears to be less 
significant than technological advantages, the growth of technological 
opportunities, and the size of the firm’ (p. 239). In the case of the GVC, it is the 
specific advantage derived from a new form of governance – an innovation in social 
technology – paired with the reduced need for investment in productive assets 
which represents a historical peculiarity of the current global economy. 
Furthermore, I have argued that the competitive conditions in GVC-heavy industries 
can put significant pressures on lead firms to forego profits due to pricing or follow-
the-leader strategies, which is captured by Dunning & Lundan (2008), observing that 
‘[t]oday, it is often imperative for a firm to produce outside its national boundaries 
if it is to remain competitive in global markets – even though, as a result, it manages 
to earn only an average or below-average rate of return’ (italics added, p. 526). 
Finally, a dynamic perspective enables us to explain what happens in cases where 
competitive or environmental conditions change and, thus, affect the M-P 
relationship. Currently, we can observe such a change as both the extent of foreign 
direct investment and GVC expansion is stagnating (UNCTAD, 2018). This suggests 
a new mapping of the aggregate M-P relationship, which could, hypothetically, be 
driven by institutional and political changes with more protectionist overtones. The 
point that TGF makes is that, in time, it is possible that a new form of social or 
physical technology will recast the M-P relationship in unpredictable ways. Thus, 
Penrose (2002) concluded that ‘universal truths without reference to time and space 
are unlikely to characterise economic affairs’ (p. 11). 
I want to conclude this paper with some final points on the s-curve model as a 
theoretical device. In this model, M is a placeholder for a multitude of possible 
effects that are enabled by an expansion across borders. But does this then not also 
entail the question of how this expansion became necessary and possible in the first 
place? Isn’t the competitive mechanism behind the growth of the MNE an 
inseparable part of the M-P puzzle, as the close theoretical link between the 
development and exploitation of FSAs and the expansion of the MNE suggests? 
Contractor criticizes the view of TCI and, specifically, its sterile neoclassical 
principles, which I think is a fair point. At the same time, the s-curve model also 
applies a very peculiar ceteris paribus condition according to which an effect of MNE 
expansion on performance can be assessed holding the competitive process 
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constant. This paper has argued that it is the competitive process that should be the 
basis for explaining how and why an increase in M might occur. 
The important contribution of the M-P approach is to bring back the idea of growth 
in the direction of profitable opportunities which is underdeveloped in many TCI 
accounts as Contractor points out. In the World Investment Reports of the 
UNCTAD39, the return on foreign investment is continuously argued to be a robust 
factor governing the dynamic of foreign direct investments over time. Penrose (1995) 
also equated the growth of investment with the growth in profits but only over the 
long-term. This is not a generalization, but a stochastic relationship based on a 
dynamic theory. The M-P approach and any theoretical model associated with it 
should be based on a dynamic explanation, because expansion and the ensuing 
(dis)economies can only be fully analyzed in an evolutionary setting. The current 
nature of the s-curve model is not evolutionary but linear and based on stages. 
Future theory development should consider Sid Winter’s credo: Dynamics first!40 
  
                                                     
39 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
40 Taken from Dosi (2013). 
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3.2 Essay 2: Institutional Change as a Source of Non-
Market Uncertainty and its Impact on MNE Investment 
Activity in Developing Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
Progressive reforms towards efficient and effective institutional environments 
increase the chances for developing countries to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI). However, this conventional wisdom presupposes that the process of 
institutional change has no adverse effect as a source of uncertainty. This paper 
departs from the conventional wisdom by developing a conceptual framework from 
a review of the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the FDI-uncertainty 
link. I hypothesize that the intensity, volatility and persistency of institutional 
change processes can have an adverse effect on FDI inflows. I test these contentions 
quantitatively on a sample of developing countries. The results support the view that 
it is not only the outcome but the process of institutional change that matters. In 
this context, the development of accurate measures of institutional change over time 
is a frontier for future research. 
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3.2.1 Introduction 
The cross-border activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is affected by the 
economic as well as socio-political conditions in different countries and institutions 
have taken a central position in explanations of its spatial patterns (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008a). High quality institutional environments reduce transaction costs 
and alleviate excess uncertainty, thereby attracting the investments of MNEs. 
Conversely, low quality institutions may ‘act as a tax’ on cross-border business 
operations (Daude & Stein, 2007, p. 18). Therefore, the goal of good state governance 
should be to strive towards higher quality institutions through reform programs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). However, this perspective presupposes that the 
process of institutional change itself has no effect on investor uncertainty and, thus, 
has no effect on the attractiveness of locations for foreign capital.  
This paper approaches two problems that arise from this line of reasoning. First, 
much of the discourse in the existing literature is about calculable risks akin to a tax 
on investment, which disregards the process of institutional change as a source of 
uncertainty. Based on a review of the relevant literature, I propose that this could be 
explained by the analytical focus placed on single events and on structural 
constraints that has taken precedence over more dynamic considerations. Second, 
the paper presents a theoretical framework with testable hypotheses that link the 
characteristics of the process of institutional change to FDI inflows. The findings of 
the empirical analysis strengthen the argument that it is not just the outcome of 
institutional change that is relevant, but also the characteristics of its process. 
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 3.2.2 reviews the literature on the FDI-
uncertainty link with a special emphasis on non-market uncertainty and the goal of 
introducing the issue of institutional change as a source of uncertainty to the 
existing discourse. Section 3.2.3 develops a theoretical framework and three 
hypotheses. Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 explain the data and methods used to test the 
hypotheses. Section 3.2.6 reports and discusses the results, while Section 3.2.7 
concludes the paper. 
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3.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment and Non-Market Uncertainty 
FDI41 is associated both theoretically and empirically with the cross-border activities 
of MNEs (Dunning, 2001; Wacker, 2016). Compared to portfolio investments, FDI is 
a long-term capital flow, which must be interpreted as a bundle of resources, 
including physical and organizational technologies as opposed to pure finance 
capital (Dunning, 1988, p. 123; Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). Due to its relative 
irreversibility, FDI could also be considered as more susceptible to environmental 
uncertainty of the kind that is associated with disruptive environmental change. 
Seminal contributions in economics have argued that investment could be both 
positively or negatively affected by uncertainty (Caballero, 1991; Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994), whereas more recent empirical research has suggested that the negative link 
is more prevalent (Bloom, Bond & Van Reenen, 2007; Noria, Fernández & others, 
2018). 
Much of the earlier FDI-uncertainty research primarily focused on the impact of 
uncertainty arising from market-related (or economic) variables, such as the 
unpredictable variance in exchange rates or aggregate demand (Cushman, 1985, 
1988; Goldberg & Kolstad, 1994). Other researchers have clarified that these market-
related disruptions have to be seen as co-determined by non-market factors (see 
Easterly, 2005). Indeed, according to the World Investment Report of UNCTAD 
(2017), ‘significant uncertainties about the shape of future economic policy 
developments could hamper FDI in the short term’ (p. 2)42. Non-market uncertainty 
is driven by some form of disruption in the socio-political context (Ramcharran, 
1999). For example, Rodrik (1991) argues that the risk of governments to suddenly 
reverse reforms can act as a ‘hefty tax on investment’ (p. 229). However, the term 
tax may not be entirely adequate here, due to the difference between uncertainty 
that is perceived as a tax, i.e., a calculable expense, and uncertainty that makes it 
impossible for the investor to estimate the potential gains or losses resulting from 
an environmental disruption.  
                                                     
41 In this paper, I follow the IMF definition of FDI as direct investments resulting in at least a ten percent 
stock in an enterprise abroad. 
42 With the renewed interest in the uncertainty-investment link after the last global recession, some 
interesting concepts and methodologies were developed in economics (Denis & Kannan, 2013; Baker, 
Bloom & Davis, 2016), and also adapted in IB (Nguyen, Kim & Papanastassiou, 2018). 
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Wei (1997) picks up on this difference by separating between the level of corruption 
in a country and its variability43. His argument goes as follows: Even if country A has 
the same level of corruption compared to country B – the first-moment (average) 
effect – it may be that the process of corruption in country A is more variable 
compared to country B – the second-moment (variability) effect. In this example, 
corruption in country B is more predictable and calculable, leading to a stable cost 
akin to a tax. Country A, on the other hand, shows a variability in corruption-related 
costs due to unpredictable contingencies in the process of corruption. Wei (1997) 
concludes that ‘the second-moment (uncertainty) effect can and does have first-
order importance’ (p.15).44 In the following, I review the FDI-uncertainty literature 
to further develop this distinction between first- and second-moment effects. 
First-moment effects of uncertainty. In the case of FDI, contributions in the area of 
non-market uncertainty began to appear in the 1970s with an increasing awareness 
of political risks, especially expropriations (for an early review, see Kobrin, 1979). 
Nowadays, this literature pays significant attention to ‘the risk that a government 
will opportunistically alter policies to directly or indirectly expropriate a firm’s 
profits or assets’ (Holburn & Zelner, 2010, p. 1290). Given the decline in direct 
expropriations after 1980 (Hajzler, 2012), scholars extended the analysis from direct 
political intervention to other non-opportunistic political events. For example, 
adverse shocks such as regime instability, local riots, armed conflict or terrorism are 
usually not intentional policies by local governments, but are important 
determinants of uncertainty (Kobrin, 1976; Ramcharran, 1999). 
Much of this literature has explored the effect of political events from a punctuated-
equilibrium perspective. In such studies the interest is on determining the extent to 
which an instantaneous disruptive event may increase the uncertainty of foreign 
investors as compared to the pre-event situation. For instance,  Senga et al. (2017) 
explored the effect of the 2012 island conflict between Japan and China on Japanese 
outward FDI to China, finding support for the contention that the disruption 
resulted in a persistent increase of investor uncertainty.  On the contrary, in a study 
of US outward FDI, Enders & Sandler (2011) found that the New York terrorist attack 
                                                     
43 In an unpublished working paper, Büge (2018) also uses the contribution of Wei (1997) in a similar 
way, but in the context of trade. 
44 Heybey & Murrell (1999) propose a similar distinction in the context of policy reform. It is not only 
the ‘level’ of the reform that matters, but also the ‘speed’ of reform. In the terminology I adopt here, 
‘speed’ would be a second-moment effect. 
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of 2001 had no persistent impact. Another example of political events that directly 
affect the area of cross-border investment are state-led expropriations of foreign 
asset owners (Kobrin, 1980). The deterrent effect of expropriations on FDI has long 
been established theoretically (Thomas & Worrall, 1994) and studies have 
empirically analyzed expropriation events (Minor, 1994; Hajzler, 2012). These studies 
focus on a specific context and point in time. Single disruptions of the event-type 
usually do not have a long enough time dimension to be explored outside of a 
punctuated-equilibrium model. 
Another group of scholars has shifted their attention towards the institutional 
environment as a source of uncertainty. Here, uncertainty is argued to be 
structurally determined and not necessarily tied to realized interventions and 
events. Instead, the focus is on constraints of behavior that make countries more 
attractive to incoming FDI such as intellectual property rights (Khoury & Peng, 2011) 
or the strength of contract enforcement (Gastanaga, Nugent & Pashamova, 1998). 
There is also evidence that the presence of institutional constraints in the form of 
political veto-players (Tsebelis, 2002) will decrease the risk of expropriations (Li, 
2009a) and, thus, reduce investor uncertainty. Similarly, Büthe & Milner (2008) 
argued that preferential trade agreements reduce uncertainty by constraining the 
future policy choice of host governments. Finally, investors in institutional 
environments characterized by a lack of political constraints are more likely to face 
sudden government changes (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009).  
Indeed, the argument that political constraints reduce uncertainty has gained 
notable support (North & Weingast, 1989; Henisz, 2000) and it has been extended 
to the discussion of democracy as a ‘meta-institution’ that actively generates the 
necessary constraints and veto-players (Rodrik, 2000). Evidence highlights that FDI 
is, on average, attracted to democratic environments (Feng, 2001; Jensen, 2003). 
However, one problem of these studies is limited empirical diversity as most 
countries have some form of democratic regime. Therefore, Li & Resnick (2003) 
explore in how far democracy strengthens other institutions such as property rights. 
Their findings suggest that democracy itself has a negative effect on FDI flows, while 
its strengthening effect on property rights creates the impression of an overall 
positive effect. 
89 
 
This finding could be related to the fact that democratic processes do not only 
generate political constraints in favor of the interests of foreign investors. While 
extreme political interventions are less likely under the constraints imposed by 
democratic checks and balances, there may be a significant degree of uncertainty 
attached to the question of who develops policies in which direction – questions that 
could sometimes be less nebulous in non-democratic environments. However, these 
issues are of a dynamic nature and the literature on institutional constraints remains 
focused on states instead of processes. 
Second-moment effects of uncertainty. The literature that explores occurrences over 
time as a source of non-market uncertainty is relatively thin. In an early 
contribution, Kobrin (1976) explores the effect of the frequency of political 
assassinations and revolutions, finding no impact on manufacturing FDI in less 
developed countries. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) used indices from the World 
Governance Indicators to test for the FDI deterring effect of the frequency of 
terrorist threats, armed conflict and unrest, but found no impact on FDI inflows. 
Using a different methodology and a larger dataset, Busse & Hefeker (2007) did find 
robust support for a negative relationship between the indicators used by 
Globerman and Shapiro (2003) and FDI inflows. The data used in these studies 
exclusively tracks the frequency of events. 
Few studies have been concerned with issues such as the variance or volatility of 
occurrences over time. In the context of monetary policy, research has indicated a 
negative impact of policy volatility on FDI (Albulescu & Ionescu, 2018). Outside the 
FDI literature, Brunetti, Kisunko & Weder (1998) proposed some additional proxy 
measures of policy volatility such as the standard deviation of the black-market 
premium on foreign exchanges or the standard deviation of the inflation rate, 
finding support of negative relationships with domestic investment. Sahay & Goyal 
(2006) investigated the effect of reform volatility on economic indicators, similarly 
with a negative result on domestic investments. 
In terms of the process of institutional change, i.e., the evolution of constraints, the 
current literature is also limited. Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet & Mayer (2007) suggest 
that ‘in the short run institutional reforms can be detrimental to inward FDI’ (p. 26). 
Unfortunately, their data does not allow for a substantiation of this proposition, and 
they do not elaborate on the theoretical reasons for their contention. Shi, Sun, Yan 
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& Zhu (2017) presented evidence for a positive effect of institutional fragility, 
conceptualized as the irregular pace of intra-country institutional change in China, 
on outward FDI as a form of escapism. Outside the FDI literature, Hartwell (2014) 
operationalized institutional volatility by relying on measures of contract-intensive 
money, finding evidence for a positive relationship with financial volatility. Godoy 
and Stiglitz (2006) found that the speed of institutional change had a negative effect 
on the economic development of transition economies. 
While there seem to be very few studies of country-level FDI that take the process 
of institutional change into account, there exist some related firm-level studies. In 
terms of firm-level FDI decisions, Demirbag, Mcguinnness, Wood & Bayyurt (2015) 
explore data on foreign subsidiaries in the Eastern European post-transition 
economies, finding a negative effect of local corruption on reinvestment decisions; 
reinvestment being a component of FDI. They argue that this effect is more 
pronounced for subsidiaries in the more unstable post-transition periphery, which 
weakly suggests that more dynamic institutional environments might be an 
additional burden for FDI decisions. Santangelo & Meyer (2011), similarly in a 
transition economy context, found that investors tend to prefer flexible low-
commitment entry-modes when institutional changes are not transparent. Finally, 
for domestic firms in India, Chari & Banalieva (2015) conclude that the initial 
uncertainty caused by pro-market reforms can reduce profitability. In so far as 
business unit performance motivates MNEs to invest, such studies could also have 
implications for FDI flows. 
In summary, the review of the FDI-uncertainty literature has suggested a negative 
link and can be categorized into four different perspectives. First, the separation 
between first- and second-moment effects was established: (1) the first-moment 
effect draws our attention to an event, i.e., an occurrence in time; (2) the second-
moment effect puts the focus on processes, i.e., occurrences over time. Second, the 
reviewed studies can be classified into (3) those that are concerned with the non-
structural or ad-hoc features of the non-market environment and (4) those that 
relate to institutional constraints. These categories are displayed in Table 3.1, where 
columns represent (1) and (2). The rows represent (3) and (4). 
The studies in the upper left category (1;3) were focusing on ad-hoc events such as 
terrorist attacks, diplomatic conflict and expropriations. Because of the 
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instantaneous character of these environmental disruptions, processes are of little 
concern and the findings might differ according to the specific disruption under 
scrutiny. The upper right category (2;3) is defined by analyzing the occurrences of 
events over time. Most of the identified literature looks at measures of frequency 
and less on the variability or volatility of a series of events unfolding in time; for an 
exception, see Albulescu & Ionescu (2018). 
The lower left category (1;4) explores the relevance of institutional constraints for 
decreasing the uncertainty of institutional environments. Here, the structural 
features of institutions outweigh dynamic considerations even though Li & Resnick’s 
(2003) study on the democracy-FDI link suggests that this could be an important 
avenue to explore. However, the lower right corner (2;4), which focuses on the 
process of institutional change as a disruption, has received little attention. The 
following sections aim to further develop this corner of Table 3.1 both conceptually 
and empirically. Table 3.1: Conceptualization of the review (Essay 2) 
 First-Moment Effect 
Occurrence in time 
Second-Moment Effect 
Occurrence over time 
Ad-hoc 
events  
(non-
structural) 
 
 
Events 
(Thomas, J. & Worrall, 1994; 
Enders & Sandler, 2011; 
Senga, Chen & others, 2017) 
 
 
Evolution of events 
(Kobrin, 1976; Albulescu & 
Ionescu, 2018) 
Institutional 
constraints  
(structural) 
 
Constraints 
(Henisz, 2000; Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009; Li, 
2009a) 
 
 
 
Changing constraints as the focus 
of this paper 
3.2.3 Second-Moment Effects of Institutional Change in FDI Theory 
In order to discuss the theoretical implications of second-moment effects of 
institutional change for International Business theory, I structure the following 
section in two parts relating to the origin of uncertainty and the composition of 
uncertainty respectively. The first refers to the differences between uncertainty 
originating from institutional change versus those emitting from either of the three 
other identified categories in Table 3.1. The second part will introduce some 
thoughts on the composition of uncertainty, which refers to the extent that 
uncertainty occurs in the form of radical unpredictability. These two themes reflect 
the idea that a discussion of uncertainty should be based on its characteristics rather 
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than its occurrence. After all, uncertainty in social reality is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon (North, 1993). 
The origins of uncertainty were already established as market and non-market 
uncertainties caused by their corresponding environmental disruptions; the latter 
being further divided into a non-structural and an institutional arena. The most 
noticeable difference lies between market- and non-market uncertainty as social 
agents tend to associate the social arena with predictability and stability (Thelen, 
2009), up to the point at which the response to institutions becomes habitual 
(Hodgson, 2007). On the contrary, MNEs would not view global markets as a source 
for stability and predictability, and it is in the nature of the MNE to react to a variety 
of dynamics, including innovations, demand fluctuations and aggressive 
competitors (Tolentino, 2001). The regulatory environment, however, is not 
something MNEs would necessarily expect to be in flux. Any disruptive change could 
introduce uncertainties on top of those already endured in their market operations. 
Thus, the origin of uncertainty matters as social agents can be expected to actively 
hedge against those uncertainties that they assume are bound to occur. For example, 
Frank Knight made the related argument that the institution of the firm was a 
response to the need of entrepreneurs to absorb uncertainty (Langlois & Cosgel, 
1993). Therefore, uncertainty originating from the change of institutional 
constraints is likely to be a significant disruption. 
These disruptions of social constraints can be connected to the Eclectic Paradigm 
(EP) (Dunning, 1977, 1988), which explains MNE investments via FDI in the context 
of the exploitation or augmentation of ownership advantages45 by accessing various 
locational factors. Advantages derived from the various locational factors, including 
institutions, determine the spatial allocation of FDI (Nielsen, Asmussen & 
Weatherall, 2017). The EP suggests two links between the location of FDI and 
institutions. The first link follows the new institutional economics of (North, 1990a,  
2005), arguing that FDI is attracted by institutional quality (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet 
& Mayer, 2007; Daude & Stein, 2007) defined as the extent to which an institutional 
environment allows for efficient transactions, i.e., reducing uncertainty in market 
exchange (North, 1990b; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003 p. 28)46. The second link takes a 
                                                     
45 Ownership advantages refer to MNE advantages derived from its home country and from competitive 
advantages derived from its resources, capabilities and markets (Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). 
46 This link is also characteristic of the internalization theory of the MNE. 
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broader view, based on the idea that institutions have an important enabling role in 
shaping and supporting the exploration and augmentation of ownership advantages 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008a). Here, the importance of the stability of institutional 
structures for innovation, capability development and the absorption of related 
uncertainties could be mentioned as examples (Spender & Kessler, 1995; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2010). 
In order to explain this wider role of institutions, the EP builds significantly on the 
contributions of Douglass North. In North’s words, institutions ‘reduce uncertainty 
by providing a structure for everyday life’ (North, Douglas C., 1990b p. 3-4). This 
overarching function of institutions is enabled by their structural and limiting 
properties. The structure of society generates stickiness and path-dependence of 
behavior (Jackson & Deeg, 2008) as well as orders and hierarchies (Williamson, 1985; 
North, 1993). In his attempt to explain the interrelationship between enterprises and 
institutions, North is inspired by Knight (1921), stating that: 
the real tasks of management are to devise and discover markets, to evaluate 
products and product techniques, and to manage actively the actions of 
employees; these are all tasks in which there is uncertainty and in which 
investment in information must be acquired. (North, 1990, p. 77, italics 
added) 
The institutional environment partly absorbs this uncertainty by offering the 
enterprise cognitive guidance in directions which ‘offer the greatest promise in 
maximizing the organization’s objectives’ (ibid., p. 77)47. The problem with North’s 
account is that this function of institutions is assumed, due to his exclusive attention 
on incremental institutional change. Moreover, his model is one of comparative 
statics, i.e., institutional change is perceived as an instantaneous adjustment from 
one state to another (Vandenberg, 2002); thus, representing a first-moment effect. 
This, however, leads to a problem. If institutions change incrementally, this 
necessitates that there is a process of institutional change, and only in cases of 
revolutionary change does this process collapse to an event. However, North’s 
theory does not really involve revolutionary change in a systematic way and the 
                                                     
47 Some readers might have realized that the idea of profit maximization assumes an ergodic world. In 
a way, North (2005) makes similar observations. Here, I do not assume that firms maximize profit but 
that they are driven by purposeful, nevertheless heuristic, long-term profit-seeking (see, e.g., Penrose, 
1959). 
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result is that institutional change is pictured as so incremental that a study of its 
process seems out of place. Given the primacy of North’s ideas in the EP, the 
question of how uncertainty from institutional change affects the investment 
activity of MNEs has yet to be explored. 
There is, however, empirical evidence of disruptive forms of institutional change, 
often observed in the context of developing countries (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013a). 
Moreover, institutional change subjects an economy to structural shifts that 
regularly result in unintended consequences (Eggertsson, 2009). This can only be 
explained by acknowledging the complex contingencies and resulting uncertainties 
in the process of institutional change. Thus, I propose that a disruptive process of 
institutional change affects the type of uncertainty that is prevalent, i.e., the 
composition of uncertainty.  
There are currently two predominant views on types of uncertainty in the IB 
literature. First, Simon (1955) established the concept of bounded rationality, which 
is reflected in North, p. 18 (2003, p. 18) as ‘[t]he incomplete information and limited 
mental capacity by which to process information’. This view is explicitly reflected in 
the internalization theory of MNE activity. Second, Knight (1921) famously suggested 
a difference between risk and uncertainty. A situation was affected by risk when the 
decision-maker had access to the probability distribution of possible future events. 
Contrary to this epistemological problem, uncertainty affects situations in which 
future states could not be classified and are thus unpredictable in the substantive 
sense, i.e., an issue of ontology (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993; Dunn, 2001)48. This form of 
radical uncertainty was also discussed in North (2005) and taken up by Cantwell, 
Dunning & Lundan (2010) in the IB context. 
Disruptive institutional change is argued to create situations in which social agents 
are exposed to higher degrees of radical uncertainty (Beckert, 1999; Blyth, 2002; 
Dequech, 2004). However, not all types of institutional change are generating radical 
uncertainty for MNEs. Gradual institutional change combined with a transparent 
process of policy-making would lead to significant degrees of predictability as to the 
outcome of reforms (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Hence, we must conceptualize the 
                                                     
48 North (2005) refers to the source of Knightian uncertainty as the ‘non-ergodicity’ of complex social 
systems. 
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disruptiveness of the process of institutional change for which I propose three 
dimensions, namely intensity, volatility and persistency. 
Intensity. As a first dimension I propose the concept of intensity. For instance, a 
reform of intellectual property rights might be a small reduction in the bureaucracy 
of filing a patent or a full-fledged reform of enforcement and litigation mechanisms. 
The latter reform has higher intensity referring to its more encompassing character, 
which is likely to generate uncertainty on behalf of investors. An investor who is 
faced with an intense institutional change will attempt to reduce the uncertainty of 
this change by acquiring new knowledge. The intensity will affect the amount of new 
information needed and its complexity so that an investor with limited mental 
capacities might consider acquiring additional knowledge as too expensive (Casson, 
1999), increasing his perceived uncertainty. 
Volatility. Rodrik (1991) suggested that policy reversals can have adverse effects on 
investment activity and examples of this were observed in some Latin American 
countries. Such reversals could be seen analogous to fluctuations around a trend. 
The dimension of volatility must be distinguished from intensity. Even in the 
absence of high intensity, a volatile institutional change process could put a 
significant burden on investors’ expectations due to mixed signals about its direction 
and the reliability of the outcome. 
Persistency. The persistency dimension reflects whether a reform process is dragging 
and ongoing instead of temporary contained. This dimension is special as its 
uncertainty emitting function is only activated in combination with either intensity 
or volatility. Persistence alone is also compatible with gradual institutional change 
which would not result in uncertainty that is likely to affect the capital commitment 
of foreign investors. Reforms that combine volatility or intensity with persistency, 
however, create environments in which previously acquired knowledge and 
experience ceases to be relevant. Hence, either high intensity or volatility seems to 
be a necessary factor for the composition of uncertainty to shift towards its radical 
kind. All three factors are displayed in context in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses (Essay 2). 
Coming back to the theory of FDI, we must assume that investors are not only 
affected by the state of the institutional environment, but also by its rate of 
transformation. In cases of persistent institutional change, radical uncertainty 
makes it difficult to assess possible future contingencies or to develop expectations 
of future return. MNE investors are sensitive to these issues as FDI usually implies a 
degree of irreversibility and, therefore, investors are driven by long-term 
expectations (Jose & Campa, 1994; Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). Moreover, the MNE-
specific capability of having multiple location alternatives, even when it comes to 
institutional environments, makes it more probable that foreign investors would 
react to environmental conditions by modifying their spatial capital allocation. This 
leads me to the following hypotheses, which are presented in context with the 
conceptual discussion in Figure 3.4. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the intensity of institutional change will lead to 
lower FDI inflows over time. 
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Hypothesis 2: An increasing number of reversals of institutional change will 
lead to lower FDI inflows over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Countries that persistently face high intensity of institutional 
change will, on average, receive lower FDI inflows compared to more stable 
countries. 
3.2.4 Data and Operationalization 
Our sample is comprised of 96 non-OECD countries with a population of more than 
a million. According to prior research, it may be problematic to run regressions on 
a too diverse set of countries (Blonigen & Wang, 2004) and according to our 
theoretical discussion, institutional change of the disruptive kind is most prevalent 
in developing countries. Hence, a sample of developing countries is used. The 
sample is an extended version of that used in Busse and Hefeker (2007)49. The years 
covered by the data are 2004 to 2017. The average panel length is 13 years and total 
observations amount to 1244 and 96 for the cross-section (with slight variations due 
to data availability for the independent variables). 
The dependent variable is annual FDI inflows in current dollars at time t for country 
j exported from the online statistics database of UNCTAD (2018). Some studies use 
alternative measures such as FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP or even per capita 
(Büthe & Milner, 2008); however, Li (2009b) argues that the GDP deflated FDI 
inflows do not represent investment volume, but rather the openness of the 
economy. FDI per capita seems to have no specific advantage over the FDI flow data 
except that it is argued to control for country size (Büthe & Milner, 2008). To avoid 
potential collinearity issues between population size and the market size control 
variable applied in this analysis, I have decided to use absolute FDI flows. This data 
                                                     
49 The sample is comprised of the following countries: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; 
Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo, 
Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Cote d'Ivoire; Czech Republic; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; 
Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia, The; Ghana; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Jamaica; Jordan; Kazakhstan; 
Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Kyrgyz Republic; Lebanon; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mexico; 
Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; 
Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; South Africa; Sri 
Lanka; Sudan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Uruguay; 
Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
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was logarithmically transformed using a technique to retain negative values used in 
Busse and Hefeker (2007). 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = ln (𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + �(𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡2 + 1)) 
The data for the dimensions of the institutional change process is drawn from the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) database, which was already used in time-
series analyses before, testifying to its adequacy in portraying intra- and inter-
country comparisons. The WGI also covers both de jure and de facto information on 
institutions by combining objective measures with expert survey data. Secondary 
databases like the WGI have the advantage that they draw from a variety of data 
sources, arguably averaging out some of the individual errors of the primary 
collection methods. Nevertheless, the quantitative measuring of institutions 
remains difficult (Voigt, 2013, 2018) and some concerns have been raised about the 
validity of the data (for an overview, see Thomas, M. A., 2010). Even if these problems 
of data validity and accuracy are critical, there is currently no feasible remedy to 
these shortcomings. The careful choice of data and the formulation of tentative 
conclusions seems to be the only way to address these issues at present. 
Conceptually, I decomposed institutional change into the dimensions of intensity, 
volatility and persistency. The intensity of institutional change is proxied by the 
absolute change of an institutional indicator from one time period to the next 
(Variable: INT_CHANGE). I use the subcomponents of regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, rule of law and government efficiency to reflect the formal 
institutional or regulative environment. The components control of corruption and 
political violence are excluded as they do not refer to structural institutional 
conditions. 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = |𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤_𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤_𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1| 
where 
 𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤_𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 +𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 +𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 +𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟) 4  
To measure the volatility of institutional change, the simplest way would be to take 
the standard deviation. However, the variation around a mean would disregard the 
prevalence of reform reversal, i.e., a change of direction of the institutional indicator. 
Moreover, as the standard deviation must be calculated over a period of 
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observations, it cannot be accessed in the context of year-on-year panel-regression. 
Therefore, I generate a variable that represents the sum of sign-changes of the 
institutional indicator over a time period (Variable: VOL_CHANGE). For example, 
if regulatory quality improves over five years, there will be no volatility in the 
process. If, instead, regulatory quality improves two years, then worsens for two 
years and again improves for the last year, two sign changes will be reported as a 
time-variant dummy variable. There are more sophisticated ways to explore the 
variability of time-series data, e.g., by use of autoregressive moving average models 
and uncertainty measures in the style of information entropy. However, exploring 
these lies out of the scope of this paper and the limited time series makes it difficult 
to justify the usage of some of these methods. 
Persistency cannot be captured directly in the form of an indicator. In order to see 
if intense and volatile institutional change has an impact on the long-term 
distribution of FDI between countries, I will use a cross-section regression that 
averages both independent and dependent variables over the time dimension 
(between-estimator). Figure 3.5 plots this average of the INT_CHANGE variable over 
the observation period against the average FDI inflows. The size of rectangles 
reflects the institutional quality index based on the WGI data. While Figure 3.5 
seems to support the relevance of the proposed intensity measure, the variance 
around the trend is very high. This is not surprising in the context of cross-country 
comparisons using secondary institutional data, but also reminds us to interpret the 
results with caution. Moreover, institutional quality and the intensity of institutional 
change seem to be only slightly correlated in the long-run, again suggesting that the 
intensity of institutional change is an independent factor. 
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Figure 3.5: INT_CHANGE on the X-axis and FDI inflows averaged over country in 
2004-2017 on the Y-axis. Line is a linear trend. The size of the rectangles represents a 
measure of institutional quality taken from the same WGI data. 
The regressions control for several economic and socio-political factors. Market size 
is generally found to be a significant predictor of FDI. As market size is both a 
function of general economic development and the purchasing power of citizens, I 
use Gross Domestic Product per Capita in constant $US (Variable: gdp_pc). As a 
proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty, I use the change of inflation rate based on 
the GDP deflator (Variable: inf_change). Other studies have used the nominal 
inflation rate, which may cause two issues50. First, both extreme levels of inflation 
and moderate levels of deflation can be a serious problem for economic activity. 
Second, it is the volatility of the inflation rate which is of interest for foreign 
investors as it is the second-moment and not the first-moment that generates 
                                                     
50 For instance, Busse and Hefeker (2007) had trouble finding significant results for the inflation rate 
predictor.  
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uncertainty on future price levels. For the structural model, the standard deviation 
of the inflation rate is used as a proxy for its volatility (Variable: inf_vola), which is 
not available in the panel model. 
In terms of socio-political factors, I added a WGI index score as a control for 
institutional quality (Variable: wgi_qual), which is evidently important to assure 
that there are no spurious correlations between our institutional change variables 
and the dependent variable explained by other institutional effects. To avoid 
correlations with INT_CHANGE, the institutional quality index is based on the WGI 
rank data and the full six WGI dimensions are used. I also include an index capturing 
the static component of institutional constraints as it was used in previous studies 
to represent non-market uncertainty. This variable is taken from the Polity IV 
database and represents the strength of political veto players in a country (Variable: 
pol_con). Further individual country effects are captured by the fixed-effects 
regression. Control variables were chosen beforehand and the specification is kept 
parsimonious to avoid unnecessary assumptions (Aguinis, Ramani & Alabduljader, 
2018). 
The correlation matrix in Table 3.2 shows no worryingly high values for the 
independent variables. The strongest correlation is found between GDP per capita 
and institutional quality, suggesting that these two variables may be collinear. 
However, the correlation is not above 0.6 and the sample used here is large enough 
to compensate for this. Using the cross-section of this data, the variance inflation 
factor scores stay below 2.8, which is not indicative of problematic multicollinearity. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix (Essay 2).  
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
FDI inflow 7.26 3.03 1 
     
INT_CHANGE 2.31 0.60 -0.17 1 
    
VOL_CHANGE 3.63 2.36 0.07 -0.19 1 
   
gdp_pc 7.87 1.25 0.38 -0.13 0.11 1 
  
inf_change -0.04 2.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 1 
 
pol_con 0.24 0.15 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.03 1 
wgi_qual 3.46 0.65 0.25 -0.15 0.03 0.58 0.02 0.26 
All correlation coefficients >0.06 are significant at the 1% level. 
3.2.5 Methods 
I evaluate the hypotheses using two regression models. Following the theoretical 
discussion, hypothesis 1 and 2 are referring to the effect of a change in the intensity 
or volatility of institutional change on the attractiveness of FDI in time. The 
variation of interest is, thus, within countries. As pooled OLS is biased in this case, 
I will use a fixed-effects model based on the outcome of a Hausman test. The fixed-
effects estimator is the most fitting method as it controls for country-specific 
heterogeneity. I have tested for stationarity and underlying trends even if this is not 
likely to be a problem in a short panel51 (Kao, 1999). The resulting panel structure is 
unbalanced. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the effect of intense and volatile institutional change as a 
predictor for average FDI inflow between countries. I follow Busse and Hefeker 
(2007) as well as Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) by applying an OLS model with average 
values for each country over the full observation period. This estimator retains the 
country separation but has several downsides as described in Busse and Hefeker 
(2007), the most relevant of which being that it eliminates the time component of 
the analysis. However, as the fixed-effects model excludes between-country 
variation, it is not suited to detect structural differences, which is why I present the 
OLS with the caveat that the estimates should only be viewed in connection with 
the previously conducted fixed-effects regression. I decided to use standard errors 
                                                     
51 The Im–Pesaran–Shin test was used on the unbalanced panel data, indicating stationarity. 
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robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for both models (Arellano, 
1987). 
3.2.6 Results and Discussion 
Regression 1 tests H1 and H2. There are three separate estimations with year and 
country fixed-effects (unreported). Table 3.3 shows the baseline model (1), the model 
including the INT_CHANGE variable (2) and the full model with the added 
VOL_CHANGE variable (3). 
Table 3.3: Estimation results for fixed-effects regression (Essay 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline H1 H2 
    
INT_CHANGE  -0.338*** -0.333*** 
  (0.115) (0.117) 
VOL_CHANGE   -0.087 
   (0.178) 
gdp_pc 1.510 1.610* 0.730*** 
 (0.969) (0.935) (0.177) 
inf_change -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
pol_con 0.451 0.446 0.451 
 (0.822) (0.794) (0.716) 
wgi_qual 1.192** 1.160** 0.648** 
 (0.547) (0.576) (0.311) 
Constant -9.084 -10.515 -1.199 
 (6.863) (6.689) (1.324) 
    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 
Cluster 96 96 96 
Adj. R-squared +0.0152 +0.0179 -0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The year and country fixed-effects explain 46.5% (adjusted R-squared) of the 
variation with the baseline model improving adjusted R-squared by 1.52%. For 
comparison, the FDI model in Büthe & Milner (2008) explains 39.2% of the variance 
in FDI with fixed-effects and the baseline model added 2.3%. The limited model fit 
is often observed in panel regressions and, especially, using country samples. All 
signs of the control variables are as expected so I assume no fundamental 
specification errors. Institutional quality (wgi_qual) is positive and significant at the 
p<0.05 level. The market size control, gdp_pc, is significant at the p<0.1 level except 
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in the baseline model. The inf_change estimate is not significant but shows a 
negative sign. The pol_con variable representing political constraints remains also 
insignificant. 
Regression 2 is a cross-section regression, which is why all year dummies are 
dropped. As the VOL_CHANGE estimate was insignificant in the fixed-effects 
model, I exclude it from further analysis. I progress sequentially as above and include 
another model that excludes the gdp_pc control. This was done as a response to a 
surprising result for the wgi_qual estimate, as discussed in the following. Moreover, 
I replace the inf_change with the inf_vola variable, which is the standard deviation 
of the inflation rate. The results are presented in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Cross-section regression (Essay 2). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline H2 H2 (gdp_pc) 
    
INT_CHANGE  -2.910** -3.423*** 
  (1.164) (1.271) 
gdp_pc 1.140*** 1.056***  
 (0.229) (0.208)  
inf_vola -1.049*** -1.040*** -0.707* 
 (0.339) (0.332) (0.369) 
pol_con -0.525 -1.321 -2.960 
 (1.892) (1.938) (2.091) 
wgi_qual -0.645 -0.895 0.788* 
 (0.567) (0.558) (0.437) 
Constant -0.747 -7.943** -0.338 
 (2.107) (3.353) (3.410) 
    
Observations 96 96 97 
R-squared 0.376 0.431 0.237 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In terms of the controls, model (2) suggests that average institutional quality is an 
insignificant predictor for average FDI inflows in the comparison between countries 
over time. This is a very unintuitive result. However, given the correlation between 
gdp_pc and wgi_qual, it is likely that their structural effects are strongly correlated 
and, thus, lead to collinearity issues. Model (3) drops the gdp_pc variable and the 
wgi_qual estimate turns significant, which confirms that the negative insignificant 
estimate of wgi_qual in model (2) is a statistical distortion and no substantive 
finding. The volatility of the inflation rate is highly significant with the expected sign 
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and gdp_pc is also highly significant in model (2), retaining its positive sign. Finally, 
the pol_con coefficient remains insignificant. 
Robustness of results. As a first robustness test, I ran bivariate regressions with the 
independent variables. This was done to ensure that there are no problematic 
interactions between the variables used. The results remained qualitatively 
unchanged. In a second step, I ran all regressions with an alternative measure of 
institutional quality derived from the data provided by the Fraser Institute, as well 
as with a crisis dummy for 2007 and 2008 respectively. Both had no qualitative effect 
on the estimate. Third, I generated a similar institutional change index from the 
Fraser Institute data and compared it to the INT_CHANGE variable. The results are 
displayed in Appendix A. Evidently, there is a large margin of error, which raises 
some concerns in relation to the accuracy of the INT_CHANGE variable. The 
correlation between the institutional quality indices of these two databases is high 
(>0.8), while the correlation of the absolute changes over time is far lower (0.41)52. 
Running regression 1 with this alternative measure of institutional change results in 
the same sign but an insignificant estimate. Hence, I must further stress the 
potential inaccuracies of the estimations provided in this paper. 
Using the original variables, I also tried to split the sample to see if this influences 
the results. There are no qualitative changes to the independent variable when using 
the original sample of Busse and Hefeker (2007). In addition, I ran regressions by 
region and income class (as determined by the World Bank). The limited 
observations per sample, specifically for the more fine-grained region samples, give 
no reliable results. By dropping the year fixed-effects, using non-corrected standard 
errors and the coarser income group sampling, the degrees of freedom improve 
enough to get interpretable estimate. However, the actions taken strongly decrease 
their reliability. From these additional regressions in Appendix A, I carefully 
conclude that there are no qualitative differences in terms of the INT_CHANGE 
variable. As could be expected, the variable is insignificant for those developing 
countries classified as high income. These results also show that the sign of the 
                                                     
52 The correlation coefficient is 0.41 at P<0.01. Spearman rank correlation is 0.44. The low correlation 
likely results from a combination of the different foci of the two measures and imprecisions due to 
measurement error as well as variation in subjective data. 
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VOL_CHANGE variable seems to be context dependent. Unfortunately, due to the 
limitations of regression analysis this contention cannot be further explored. 
Discussion. The results presented here lend some support to the argument that the 
second-moment effects of institutional change are relevant for the location of FDIs 
alongside the first-moment effect of institutional quality. Hypothesis 1, which 
argued that a country with increasing intensity of institutional change receives lower 
FDI inflows was supported. Hypothesis 2 was rejected, which suggests that an 
increase in the volatility of the institutional change process does not influence FDI 
attractiveness. One likely explanation is that intensity is a necessary condition for 
disruptions to be strong enough to deter foreign investors by shifting the 
composition of uncertainty towards radical uncertainty. 
In order to explore if there is a long-term impact of persistent and intense 
institutional change, I presented a cross-country comparison model. Hypothesis 3 
was accepted, which supports the idea that the persistence of intense institutional 
change, i.e., a high average intensity over time, would have a negative effect on 
average FDI flows as compared to more stable countries. This finding further 
strengthens my theoretical argument that intensity is a crucial dimension necessary 
for the generation of radical uncertainties. 
To summarize, the results are in line with the previously reviewed literature on the 
effect of uncertainty on FDI. The main additional insight provided by the empirical 
models is that the first- and second-moment effects of institutional change should 
be separated in order to complement existing empirical evidence, especially in the 
case of institutional location factors. The estimate for INT_CHANGE proved to be 
robust to changes in specification. At the same time, I discovered some critical 
limitations which are summarized in the conclusion. 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
Most extant FDI research that links uncertainty with institutions focuses on their 
nature as static constraints. Notwithstanding the valuable contributions that arose 
from this analytical perspective, the process of institutional change has been partly 
neglected. By reviewing relevant parts of the FDI-uncertainty literature, I suggested 
that extant research focused mainly on first-moment effects, even though a more 
dynamic perspective could hold important insights, e.g., in the context of deviating 
findings on the effect of democracy on FDI attractiveness. I structured this argument 
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into a two-by-two table and positioned this study in the lower right corner, reflecting 
my focus on the characteristics of the process of institutional change in relation to 
uncertainty. 
In Section 3.2.3, I discussed the theoretical and conceptual implications resulting 
from a focus on the process of institutional change. Three arguments were 
developed here: First, separating theoretically between the different origins of 
uncertainty is important in order to highlight that social agents are unlikely to 
anticipate disruptions of institutional environments, possibly leading to stronger 
reactions. Second, the characteristics of the institutional change process is likely to 
affect the composition of uncertainty. In a world of ubiquitous uncertainty, it is not 
the existence of uncertainty per se but its form that matters. I argued that the degree 
of radical uncertainty is increased when institutional change is intense, volatile and, 
specifically, when these conditions persist through time. Considering that FDI is an 
investment representing a bundle of resources intended to generate long-term 
returns, the unpredictability generated by radical uncertainty may lead to a loss of 
confidence in expectations on behalf of foreign investors. Third, extant theory in the 
form of the EP can readily integrate these points. Nevertheless, the focus on the 
comparative statics of North (1990, 2005), who developed the institutional 
foundations of the EP, also stresses the need to explore alternative theories of 
institutions (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
Section 3.2.3 also developed three hypotheses on the negative effect of the intensity, 
volatility and persistency of institutional change on FDI inflows explained by 
increasing uncertainty. These hypotheses were tested in Section 3.2.6. The results 
supported the overarching argument developed in this paper: the intensity and 
persistence of institutional changes has a negative effect on the FDI attractiveness 
of a location, and so the process of institutional change matters alongside its 
outcome. However, the volatility of institutional change was found to be irrelevant 
for FDI attractiveness. The regressions presented in this paper were set up to 
highlight the effect of the intensity of institutional change on a country’s FDI inflows 
from two vantage points, one centered on the changes of intensity and volatility 
within countries and the other on the effect of intense and persistent institutional 
change on structural differences in FDI attractiveness between countries. The results 
indicated that an increasing intensity of institutional change of a host country 
relative to its average intensity of institutional change negatively influences the 
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attractiveness for FDI. In addition, countries with a higher average intensity of 
institutional change over the 13-year observation period attract lower average FDI 
inflows. This means that the intensity of institutional change, even if dynamic itself, 
could be a structural phenomenon when comparing countries. Indeed, there is 
evidence of institutional path-dependency as countries or regions tend to reproduce 
unstable institutional environments over time. Unfortunately, I was unable to 
explore this possibility due to data limitations. 
The paper identifies some critical limitations of analyzing institutional change as a 
process. I want to briefly address two points. The first limitation concerns issues of 
data availability and representativeness. I have already mentioned that the available 
time span of the WGI data is not long enough to employ more sophisticated 
statistical techniques. Moreover, the limited sample size makes it difficult to apply 
any subsampling to explore, e.g., regional effects. By having constructed a second 
measure of the intensity of institutional change from a different data source, I found 
a positive but limited correlation between the two. This suggests that the 
representativeness of these institutional databases must not only be examined at a 
point in time, but according to their co-variation over time. Finally, there are 
measurement problems associated with using FDI data. Even if there is evidence 
that FDI approximates the productive economic activities of MNEs, it still comprises 
multiple flows (equity, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans) that may 
respond differently to institutional disruptions. The second limitation is that the 
methodology followed here does not allow for a more in-depth analysis of the 
proposed differences between the origins and composition of uncertainty. For 
example, I have argued that the intensity of institutional change is a necessary factor 
for uncertainty to arise, but I was not able to determine at which point a potential 
investor-specific effect would turn into a more general effect of radical uncertainty 
that depresses FDI regardless of the capabilities of investors. Here, further firm-level 
research with primary data collection will be necessary. 
Given that the evidence on the theoretical argument developed here must be treated 
with caution, I refrain from any detailed policy suggestions. Nevertheless, there are 
some implications for policy-makers in developing countries that result from the 
theoretical discussion. It is well accepted that MNEs are often influential politically, 
be it through lobbying or indirectly through government dependency on FDI. In this 
context, the paper suggests a degree of contradiction between the political demands 
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of MNEs, especially in developing economies, and the resulting investment 
dynamics. Even if MNEs collectively push for munificent reforms, it may well be that 
they withhold further investments as a response to an increase in the intensity of 
institutional change. This could postpone the benefits expected on behalf of 
government officials. Being faced with seemingly unsatisfying results of the initial 
reform, politicians may be driven to commit to further institutional changes or to 
revert previous ones. The result is a vicious rather than virtuous spiral of reform 
programs. 
Hence, being unprepared for the possibility that a reform is not likely to yield 
immediate benefits due to an initial shock on the expectations of foreign investors 
could contribute to chaotic reform processes as observed in parts of Latin America 
(Levitsky & Murillo, 2013b). Policy makers must be aware that institutional changes 
can often only be judged over longer time frames. This adds an important caveat to 
the adaptive efficiency idea (North, 2005), namely that governments must find the 
right balance between changes in some areas of the institutional environment and 
stability in others. Even if the intention behind full-fledged reforms might be a signal 
of change to foreign investors, this paper raises some doubts about such strategies. 
This paper also contributes insights to existing conundrums in IB research. For 
example, in a firm-level study, Kafouros & Aliyev (2016) found that institutional 
development increased the profitability of domestic firms over that of foreign firms. 
The conundrum is that institutional reforms in these environments were often 
directly aimed at foreign investors and studies in other environments have found 
reforms to be more advantageous for foreign enterprises compared to domestic 
firms (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). With my results in mind, the intensity of 
institutional change could be a moderating force. However, to be able to assess such 
firm-level impacts there is need for further conceptual and empirical work. 
In the context of future research, data exploration exercises are needed to determine 
how we can better measure processes of institutional change, and what other proxies 
may prove to be more useful than databases on institutional quality. Second, while 
it would be interesting to extend the macro-approach of this paper, firm-level 
studies are needed to assess the complexity of the relationships proposed here. For 
example, firm-level studies could explore the effect of institutional change on 
realized investments such as MNE subsidiaries. Here, more work needs to be done 
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in, e.g., examining the difference between ex-ante uncertainty effects and those 
related to ex-post (operational) adjustment costs (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Third, 
I discussed the possible contradiction between MNEs lobbying for institutional 
change and the effect on FDI. Here, a very interesting question could be whether 
MNEs that take part in the policy formation process are less prone to the second-
moment effects I have identified. 
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3.2.9 Appendix 
The following tables contain an additional set of robustness checks for Essay 2 
including a brief explanation for each. 
Table 1: Additional panel regression output using untransformed values and a 
minimal specification. Results were qualitatively unchanged. 
 (1) (3) (4) 
    
INT_CHANGE -9,473.321*** -4,421.480* -4,369.172* 
 (2,798.698) (2,579.196) (2,586.857) 
 
wgi_qal 3,816.979***  1,603.569 
 (1,025.952)  (1,001.133) 
 
gdp_pc  2.360*** 2.338*** 
  (0.270) (0.271) 
 
Constant 7,686.309*** -6,814.822*** -6,066.188*** 
 (511.163) (1,520.555) (1,630.320) 
    
Observations 1,352 1,339 1,339 
R-squared 0.71 0.79 0.79 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Panel regression result from a robustness check using an alternative 
institutional indicator taken from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom data 
(Regulation indicator: INT_CH_FI). As noted in the essay, the results were not 
reproducible for the panel dataset. The sample is smaller due to a slightly lower 
coverage of the source data. 
 
Panel (FE 
Estimator) 
 
  
INT_CH_FI -0.528 
 (1.148) 
 
gdp_pc 2.516*** 
 (0.966) 
 
Inf_change -0.007 
 (0.039) 
 
wgi_qual 1.124** 
 (0.517) 
 
pol_con 0.647 
 (0.685) 
 
Constant -16.758** 
 (7.179) 
  
Observations 1,091 
R-squared 0.535 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: The cross-section regression allowed a limited reproduction of the results 
with the alternative Fraser Institute data (INT_CH_FI). The limitation mainly stems 
from the large standard error of the coefficient which is speculated to be a result of 
the inaccuracies of the data and, in that context, a relatively small sample. 
 
Cross-section  
  
INT_CH_FI -2.585* 
 (1.394) 
 
wgi_qual 0.852** 
 (0.395) 
 
Inf_vola -0.660* 
 (0.383) 
 
pol_con -2.059 
 (2.167) 
 
Constant 7.128*** 
 (1.911) 
  
Observations 96 
R-squared 0.203 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: Pairwise correlation matrix of the transformed dependent variable, the 
original independent variable INT_CHANGE, and the alternative measure from the 
Fraser Institute data. 
 
 FDI_Flow INT_CH_FI 
FDI_Flow   
INT_CH_FI -0.2686  
INT_CHANGE -0.3453 0.4142 
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INT_CHANGE on the X-axis plotted against a similarly constructed index from the 
Fraser Institute data on the Y-axis. 
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Table 5: The following regression does not estimate year fixed-effects and uses 
untransformed standard errors. Thus, it should not be interpreted substantially, but 
only be used as a general test for the robustness of the results. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High 
Income 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Low Income 
     
INT_CHANGE -0.703 -0.334** -0.399** -0.447*** 
 (0.622) (0.167) (0.175) (0.165) 
VOL_CHANGE -0.543** -0.023 -0.003 0.180*** 
 (0.235) (0.072) (0.080) (0.065) 
gdp_pc -1.051 1.366 1.475 2.810** 
 (5.010) (1.071) (1.172) (1.120) 
inf_change 0.129 0.073 -0.110** -0.042 
 (0.158) (0.047) (0.047) (0.043) 
pol_con -2.395 1.674 -0.395 -0.189 
 (6.720) (1.077) (1.042) (0.896) 
wgi_qual 20.568** 2.103* 0.464 1.019* 
 (8.091) (1.091) (0.698) (0.529) 
Constant -67.844 -12.530 -6.267 -17.054*** 
 (48.936) (9.002) (8.136) (6.403) 
     
Observations 154 388 403 299 
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.46 0.44 0.53 
Number of Countries 12 30 31 23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.3 Essay 3: Institutional Configurations of FDI Attraction 
in Post-Transition Economies: The Roles of 
Commonality, Diversity and Stability 
 
 
Abstract 
How can the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature contribute to our 
understanding of FDI attraction in the post-transition context? This paper aims to 
show that the focus of transaction cost economics on the importance of universal 
core institutions, e.g., strong property rights, for FDI attraction can be 
complemented by the VoC scholars’ take on institutional diversity. Drawing on prior 
research in the VoC tradition, I apply a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) to a dataset of post-transition economies and find evidence for both core 
institutions and diversity. Moreover, I present support for the VoC-based argument 
that institutional volatility undermines institutional complementarity and thus 
reduces FDI attraction. There are also some interesting findings on the interplay 
between welfare institutions and FDI, which are further discussed. 
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3.3.1 Introduction 
The context of economic transition in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics 
(CEEB), as well as in the commonwealth of independent states (CIS), has stimulated 
research in International Business (IB) and beyond (Meyer & Peng, 2005). One of 
the interesting peculiarities of this context was the radical restructuring of national 
institutional environments towards a liberal market economy (Martin, 2013). Now, 
almost 30 years after the first undertakings of transition, it seems appropriate to 
refer to a post-transition context. However, this paper argues that it is a mistake to 
assume that the end of transition has brought a halt to institutional changes. 
Instead, CEEB and CIS economies have recently drawn the attention of scholars due 
to the ongoing development of distinct institutional configurations of capitalism. 
The question asked here is whether these changes and the resulting systems of 
institutions continue to affect the foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness of 
post-transition countries. 
This paper builds on two specific findings from the transition literature and explores 
them in the context of FDI attractiveness. The first finding is the forming of distinct 
varieties of capitalism in the CEEB and CIS countries (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; 
Drahokoupil & Myant, 2015). Research on the varieties of capitalism (VoC) is gaining 
popularity in the field of IB, raising the question of whether the exploration of 
institutional configurations can complement extant studies focusing on individual 
institutional effects (Jackson, Gregory & Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 2008; Allen, M. M. & 
Aldred, 2011; Witt & Jackson, 2016). The second finding concerns the empirical 
evidence that the speed and intensity of institutional transition had an effect on 
outcomes such as economic growth (Heybey & Murrell, 1999; Godoy & Stiglitz, 
2007), foreign direct investment attraction (Brunetti, Kisunko & Weder, 1997) and 
organizational restructuring (Newman, 2000). In the post-transition context, this 
finding raises the question if unstable national institutional environments remain 
less attractive to FDI, and how this relates to the theory of the VoC. 
These questions are of high significance as FDI is an integral part of the development 
strategies of post-transition economies (Dunning, 2004; Pavlínek, 2004). 
Governments in these economies have tried to attract FDI to benefit from linkages 
and potential spillovers such as the creation of employment or the transfer of new 
technologies (Javorcik, 2004). With the dawn of the post-transition stage, some of 
these countries even rely on FDI as their primary source for investment financing 
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(Nӧlke & Vliegenthart, 2009). For these reasons, the question of which institutional 
factors attract the activity of MNEs in the transition context remains relevant 
(Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005; Gelbuda, Meyer & Delios, 2008).  
In IB, this question is usually approached by discussing the role of transaction or 
information costs. Building on North (1990) and Williamson (1975), efficient 
institutions are seen to reduce uncertainty in market interactions thus reducing the 
costs of economic exchange. IB theories integrate this basic concept into the theory 
of the MNE, highlighting that institutions affect external transaction costs, 
organization costs within the MNE and, thereby, the location of value-added 
activities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). The consensus is that transaction-cost 
reducing institutions will increase the attractiveness of an investment location. 
The transaction cost economics (TCE) strand sees institutions as independent 
enforcement mechanisms whose isolated presence or absence will universally affect 
FDI flows (Bevan, A., Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Daude & Stein, 2007). This also implies 
that there is a common ideal-type of institutions for achieving economic 
performance and, hence, countries should converge on institutions of good 
governance. Such a view contrasts with the prediction of persistent diversity of the 
VoC. Moreover, by studying institutional configurations in the context of FDI 
attractiveness, Pajunen (2008) argued that institutions are interrelated and, hence, 
the analysis of institutional efficiency should rather be based on systems of 
institutions or configurations. Pajunen (2008) was able to empirically support his 
position using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method that can display 
data patterns between an outcome and multiple configurations of explanatory 
conditions (see Ragin, 2009). This capacity makes the method particularly suitable 
for institutional theories that build on an interdependent view of institutions, such 
as the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Jackson, G. & Deeg, 2012; Witt & Jackson, 
2016).  
The first tentative53 proposition of this paper is that the study of institutional 
configurations can help us to understand the interrelationship between TCE’s focus 
on commonalities and VoC’s focus on diversity. I draw significantly from the work 
                                                     
53 The method used in this paper is of an inductive nature. Its strengths lie in the discovery of empirical 
patterns that may yield more detailed propositions for further research. Nevertheless, it is possible, and 
advisable, to have a previous theoretical conceptualization of the potential mechanisms involved. 
These tentative propositions are what Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann (2012) call ‘theory-based hunches’. 
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of Nӧlke & Vliegenthart (2009) who propose a specific form of post-transition 
capitalism, namely the dependent market economy (DME), that strongly builds on 
the attraction of FDI. The argument proposed here is that some of the institutions 
of the DME might act as common foundations for FDI attraction (core institutions), 
while others are related to the specific type of comparative advantage of a country 
and lead to diversity. 
The second tentative proposition is that the identified institutional configurations 
generate positive institutional complementarities only when they remain relatively 
stable. In other words, the volatility of institutional configurations is theorized to 
have a negative impact on FDI attractiveness due to both uncertainties on behalf of 
investors and a possible worsening of institutional performance due to a loss of 
institutional complementarities. 
The empirical part of the paper aims to support and extend these propositions using 
QCA which enables researchers to utilize quantitative data without prior 
assumptions of variable independence or linearity. It also opens up the possibility to 
uncover multiple equally relevant empirical combinations that are necessary and/or 
sufficient for the outcome. Thus, QCA is one of the few methods capable of 
acknowledging equifinality by allowing the presence or absence of an outcome to be 
explained by different models, whereas regression methodology is restricted to a 
single model at a time (Misangyi et al., 2017). The inductive approach of QCA and 
the possibility of multiple solutions makes it difficult, though not entirely 
impossible, to use QCA in hypothesis-testing (Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, 2012). 
In this paper, I treat my findings as empirical regularities rather than causalities, and 
discuss their implications for further research. Finally, a crucial step in the process 
of QCA is to support the algorithm with theoretically grounded expectations of the 
outcome-condition relationship. I formulate these expectations using the 
framework provided by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). 
The paper proceeds in the following way. First, I will introduce the VoC approach, 
focusing on the interplay between institutional diversity and commonality. Second, 
I review VoC contributions in the (post-)transition context and focus on Nӧlke & 
Vliegenthart (2009) who introduced the institutional configuration of the 
Dependent Market Economy (DME). This configuration is argued to generate a 
comparative institutional advantage for the assembly of moderately complex 
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consumer goods by multinational enterprises (MNEs). In relation to this I explain 
the relevance of institutional dynamism. In the process, five expectations are 
formulated that guide the empirical analysis. Fourth, the method of QCA is 
introduced and I explore my tentative propositions by using data on FDI flows and 
institutions in the post-transition context from 2008 onwards. The paper ends with 
a short discussion including exemplary cases and a concluding section. 
3.3.2 Varieties of Capitalism in (Post-)Transition Countries 
The goal of the VoC literature is to explain the stability of systemic differences 
between political economies. Even if the field can be seen as a coherent body of 
institutional research, a number of different takes on the VOC can be identified (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Coates, 2005). Hall & Soskice (2001) provide the most 
parsimonious and popular alternative. The central argument of their theory is that 
the political economies of Western developed capitalism represent one of two 
distinct institutional configurations: The Liberal Market Economy (LME) and the 
Coordinated Market Economy (CME). 
These two institutional configurations are argued to be stable over time. The reason 
for their equilibrium tendency is the institutional complementarity that arises 
between particular institutional manifestations (Amable, 2000). For example, the 
institutional support of radical innovation in LMEs is likely to generate synergies 
with more flexible labor markets and investments in switchable (multi-use) assets 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). These synergies define the comparative institutional 
advantages of an economy. If an economy is close to one of the ideal types, its 
established comparative institutional advantages will generate a lock-in effect. Path-
dependency is then supposed to assure that institutional change is reinforcing the 
existing institutional system. 
One of the weaknesses of the VoC is its focus on developed economies, which makes 
the application of this framework difficult in the context of the global economy (see 
Witt et al., 2017). While the general opposition between market-liberalism and 
market-coordination remains a powerful dimension, it simply cannot account for all 
intricacies of the developing world (Witt & Redding, 2013). It is for this reason that 
several VoC scholars have set out to extend the established taxonomy to include 
non-Western and non-developed countries. The post-transition economies of CEEB 
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and CIS have been of particular interest (Lane, D. S. & Myant, 2007; Bohle & 
Greskovits, 2012; Martin, 2013). 
In the transition context, Bohle & Greskovits (2012) identify three forms of capitalist 
institutional variety: a neoliberal type in the Baltics, an embedded neoliberal type in 
the Visegrád states and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia. The neoliberal variety 
refers to the implementation of pro-market reforms, low social compensation for 
the losers of such reforms and strict fiscal stability up to the point of austerity 
measures. Bohle & Greskovits (2007a) provide evidence that the Baltic countries 
represent the neoliberal model closer than the Visegrád countries. The latter 
economies are equally driven by free-market principles but established a 
comprehensive redistribution system and overall stronger welfare state. Slovenia is 
treated as a special case due to the prevalent labor-capital co-determination of 
economic and industrial policies which puts this economic model closer to the CME 
type (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007b).  
In addition, Cernat (2006), in line with Bohle and Greskovits (2012), proposes the 
so-called ‘cocktail capitalism’ in reference to a mixture of the other three types for 
the case of Bulgaria and Romania. Focusing more on the role of FDI in transition 
economies, Nölke and Vliegenhart (2009) have proposed that the Visegrád countries 
command a comparative institutional advantage ‘in the assembly and production of 
relatively complex and durable consumer goods’ (p. 672). They call this variety 
dependent market economy (DME) and I shall return to it shortly.  
In the light of this search for institutional diversity, it seems of relevance to explore 
how the VoC view relates to the perspective of TCE centered on institutional 
convergence. On the one hand, the VoC replaces TCE’s focus on transaction costs 
with the relevance of non-market institutions, such as labor market regulations, and 
analyzes these from a systemic perspective. At the same time, the VoC view is not 
diametrically opposed to a notion of core institutions that act as crucial building 
blocks for global competitive economies.  
For instance, Streeck (2011) argues that varieties of capitalism are really variegations 
of the underlying dynamics of capitalism. Thus, institutional environments of 
countries cannot be treated as independent trajectories in a globalized economy. For 
example, Streeck (2011) points out that two systems of capitalism can stay relatively 
diverse, but, at the same time, move in a common direction. This position resonates 
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with the research of Rodrik (1997, 2018) who argues that the increasing 
interconnectedness of the global economy generates common economic pressures 
that affect the political spheres of countries and their institutions in similar ways. 
Paying attention to these tensions between diversity and commonality of 
institutional trajectories allows a closer integration of the TCE approach prevalent 
in IB and the VoC. The former views institutions as individual building blocks for an 
efficient market economy. For example, functioning property rights institutions or 
anti-corruption laws constrain individual behavior, i.e., opportunistically biased 
behavior, and, thereby, generate more efficient markets that stimulate economic 
activity (e.g., North, 1990). Hence, economic pressures should cause convergence of 
institutions across countries.54 It should be noted, however, that this view came 
under criticism as it focuses too much on the lessons learned from already developed 
economies (Chang, 2011). For example, most of the institutions relevant to the TCE 
are related to market efficiency and preservation, but developing countries often 
require market-creating institutions (Rodrik, 2003).  
I would argue that the two concepts of commonality and diversity need not be 
mutually exclusive. While the success of developing countries may not be attributed 
to a convergence to TCE-type institutions, and thus overall commonality, research 
has identified commonalities in the institutional environments of developmental 
states (Nӧlke, ten Brink, Claar & May, 2015). Therefore, leaving all other (significant) 
differences between the VoC and the TCE view aside (see, e.g., Allen, M., 2004), 
there is some common ground when acknowledging that the diversity identified by 
the VoC encapsulates significant isntitutional commonalities of interconnected 
local economies that may themselves differ according to broader contexts, such as 
the level of economic development. 
                                                     
54 The VoC’s concept of comparative institutional advantage could be seen as a response to the TCE 
view that there are institutions that confer an absolute institutional advantage in all cases (see, Hall 
and Soskice, 2001, p. 38). 
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Figure 3.6: Commonalities and diversities in two overarching contexts. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the idea of core institutions that represent commonalities 
caused by isomorphic pressures of global capitalism on a set of countries where the 
set could be characterized by, e.g., the stage of economic development. These 
commonalities are encapsulated by institutional diversity of the type that enables a 
particular country to develop its comparative institutional advantages. 
According to this, there is the possibility that the institutional configuration of the 
DME is a set of core institutions required for the attraction of FDI. In other words, 
FDI attractive countries in the post-transition context share this core set of 
institutions. Another option is that a subset of the DME-type institutions could be 
considered as core institutions to attract FDI, i.e., that a specific combination of 
some of the DME components increases the attractiveness for FDI. These 
possibilities will be explored in the QCA analysis. 
3.3.3 DME – A Benchmark for FDI Attraction? 
The following section will introduce the institutional configuration of the DME as a 
determinant for FDI attraction in relation to existing empirical evidence. Nӧlke & 
Vliegenthart (2009) outline the nature of the DME in relation to the typical 
cateogries of the VoC framework: corporate governance, industrial relations, 
training and education systems, research and development, as well as finance. The 
finance category is intertwined with the analytical outcome in this paper as DMEs 
strongly rely on foreign capital. Since Nölke & Vliegenthart (2009) do not explore 
the determinants of FDI, they include foreign capital inflows as an additional 
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characteristic of the DME. Here, I take the position that the institutional 
characteristics of the DME could themselves generate a comparative institutional 
advantage of attracting FDI in the first place. For this reason, I exclude the finance 
component from the explanatory conditions.  
In order to adapt the DME framework into a set of determinants for FDI attraction, 
I will change the labeling of the original categories to better fit with the overall 
findings of the existing literature. For instance, according to Gauselmann, Knell & 
Stephan (2011), a central location factor to attract foreign investors in the transition 
context is the combination of low-cost and relatively skilled labor. As we shall see, 
the DME largely follows this assessment (see, also, Jackson, G. & Deeg, 2012) and 
extends it in the realm of transactional efficiency, which acts in support of transfers 
of knowledge, technology and managers. 
Following this preliminary assessment, I put forward the following four institutional 
components: transactional efficiency, labor market institutions, welfare state, and 
the education system. In what follows, I will explain the choice of these conditions 
in some more detail and review some of the relevant empirical evidence. After each 
section, I will also propose a directional expectation for the condition regarding the 
outcome of FDI attractiveness. 
3.3.3.1 Transactional Efficiency 
In Nӧlke & Vliegenthart (2009) (henceforth N&V), two of the identified categories 
of the DME configuration implicitly describe the role of institutions in reducing 
transaction costs for foreign investors. The first is what N&V name corporate 
governance, referring to the integration of local firms in MNE structures and the 
adoption of the European Union corporate-governance standards. Their argument 
is that a large share of managers of large firms in DMEs operate within the confines 
of MNE networks and, hence, report to foreign officials. This interaction between 
foreign and local management results in relatively high degrees of integration and 
monitoring that requires specific institutional conditions for support. 
The difficulties of integrating a foreign firm into an MNE network is partly a function 
of transaction, coordination and monitoring costs (Hennart, 2001). For example, the 
specifics of local environments may require MNEs to adapt their practices and 
routines, leading to an increase in the managerial burden and coordination costs 
(Brouthers, 2002). Transaction costs may be high in cases of a weak contract law and 
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in the absence of reliable business partners (Dunning, 2004), e.g., due to being 
excluded from local networks (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). For both reasons, the costs 
of monitoring activities within and outside the MNE’s organization are likely to be 
high as well. 
Common regulations and complementary cultural values can enhance the efficiency 
of transactions and the effectiveness of monitoring, whereas differences could be 
expected to be a barrier to MNE activity (Meyer & Peng, 2005). For example, 
compared to the CEEB region, transition economies in the CIS region could be 
considered more distant from Western European countries, potentially increasing 
transaction costs. Considering that Western Europe is a significant source for FDI in 
Eastern Europe and some CIS countries, this could be an advantage for EU member 
states (Medve-Bálint, 2014). 
The second category relating to the area of transactional efficiency is that of research 
and development (R&D). N&V point out a significant difference between the 
innovation systems in CME and LME countries on the one side and DME countries 
on the other. Unlike the former, DMEs have a low domestic innovation capacity and 
rely on the technological assets transferred by MNEs. According to Ban (2013), post-
transition economies have seen an increase in their export complexity, suggesting 
that MNEs have increased their technological investments in local production 
processes. This comes with a high demand for institutions that secure and optimize 
the transfer of knowledge between foreign enterprises and their local subsidiaries 
(Javorcik, 2004). The New Institutional Economics tradition has long emphasized 
the importance of secure property rights as a pillar for such transfers, and for 
economic development in general (North, 1990). 
Expectation: Transaction cost improving institutions enable closer integration 
between MNEs and local agents and the transfer of technology for local exploitation. 
Hence, institutions of transactional efficiency are likely to be associated with FDI 
attraction. 
3.3.3.2 Labor Market Institutions 
According to N&V, the DME relies on a flexible labor market. Empirical evidence 
shows that labor costs are an important determinant for MNE investments in 
transition economies (Bevan & Estrin, 2004). It is also recognized that the cost of 
labor is affected by labor market and welfare institutions, including the power of 
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labor unions and flexible employment schemes (Freeman, 2010; Western & 
Rosenfeld, 2011). Moreover, recent research has indicated a more general weakening 
of labor market institutions and dropping rates of union membership in Europe, 
even in the CME archetype of Germany (Streeck, 2009; Lane, C., 2015). This points 
at the potential relevance of flexible labor markets as a commonality or core 
institution driven by more general economic pressures of globalization. However, 
there are two qualifications to the relevance of labor market institutions for FDI 
attraction in the DME and post-transition context. 
First, Leibrecht & Scharler (2009) find that indirect labor cost factors such as the 
flexibility of the labor market is not a good predictor for FDI. In their study, 
productivity effects or direct labor costs have a stronger impact. Dibben, Wood, Le 
& Williams (2011) equally find that there is no effect of labor regulation on investor 
attractiveness. Technically, it could be possible that the variation between labor 
regimes in the post-transition context is not sufficiently large to affect FDI decisions. 
However, the VoC classifications are partly based on this very variance. It is therefore 
of interest to explore the effect of labor market institutions in context, instead of in 
isolation. 
Second, such policies require counter measures to avoid discontent and the 
resulting challenges to the institutional status quo on behalf of employees (see 
Glassner, 2013). Hypothetically, this could explain why MNEs tend to pay 
comparatively high wages in post-transition countries (Oberhofer, Stöckl & Winner, 
2012). Another potential way to avoid broad discontent would be to invest in 
countries that have a comparatively moderate welfare state, providing a minimum 
of social security. The complete absence of social security for employees is likely to 
destabilize the prevalent labor institutions as it increases the likelihood of political 
engagement and strikes. 
Expectation: Institutions that increase the flexibility of labor markets enable MNEs to 
reduce labor costs, making the presence of such institutions conducive to FDI 
attraction. 
3.3.3.3 Welfare State and Taxation 
The welfare state plays a particular role in the DME. While a strong welfare state 
might not support the flexibility of labor markets, the absence of any social 
compensation is likely to have destabilizing effects on social cohesion. Thus, the 
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DME combines flexible labor market institutions with a moderate welfare state. 
Finally, the condition of the welfare state is connected to the issues of taxation as a 
source of state funding. Here, empirical evidence indicates that low-tax regimes are 
an important location factor for FDI (Bellak & Leibrecht, 2009). This points towards 
an inherent tension between low statutory tax rates55 and low government 
expenditure on the one side, and flexible labor institutions without social security 
on the other. 
Expectation: Due to the potential tension between labor flexibility and low 
government spending, I do not make a directional expectation concerning the 
presence of absence of a weak welfare state. 
3.3.3.4 Education System 
The education system of the DME is focused on a strong secondary education 
(N&V). From the MNE perspective, there is no need for large amounts of very high-
skilled personnel in the production of moderately complex goods, especially as these 
are likely to require additional wage premiums. However, since MNEs have over 
time increased the technological intensity of their activity in post-transition 
economies (e.g., Ban, 2013), there is a need for educated employees that are capable 
of operating within a high-technology context. Accordingly, existing research has 
found a positive impact of educational attainment on FDI in the transition economy 
context (Carstensen & Toubal, 2004). 
Expectation: The educational attainment of a country’s workforce is conducive to FDI 
inflows, especially in the DME context where MNEs require relatively skilled 
employees due to higher technological intensity. 
3.3.3.5 Institutional Dynamism and Institutional Complementarity 
The extension of the VoC to the context of transition economies gives us viable 
analytical tools and taxonomies to better understand the link between FDI and 
institutional configurations. However, one shortcoming of the VoC is its focus on 
stability as a direct consequence of institutional complementarity (Crouch, 2005). 
Several scholars have suggested that the VoC will have to embrace a more dynamic 
view on institutions and considerable theoretical work is aiming to incorporate 
different forms of institutional change. In a critique, Schneider, M. R. & Paunescu 
                                                     
55 Another complication is that MNEs have a strong capacity to optimize their tax liabilities across 
borders, which is why statutory tax rates might not represent the real tax burden. 
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(2012) provided evidence that the stability of institutional varieties is merely a 
tendency as opposed to a necessity. The authors observe some movement of country 
institutions between the CME and LME types with a bias towards the latter 
configuration. This implies that it could be relevant to recognize the inverse of the 
complementarity-stability relationship, namely that a change in the subcomponents 
of an institutional configuration may reduce the performance that arose from the 
former positive externalities (see, e.g., Deeg, 2007). 
The need to incorporate a more dynamic perspective on institutions is also 
formulated in the field of IB, for example by Jackson & Deeg (2008). In a commentary 
on this article, Lundan & Li (2019) outline the need to entangle the full complexity 
of institutions arising from their diversity and dynamism. The latter term reflects the 
possibility that volatile institutional changes (Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Chari & 
Banalieva, 2015) act as barriers to the operation of MNEs (see, e.g., Meyer & Peng, 
2005, 2005). There are two main problems with volatile institutional environments 
from the MNE perspective. One is the need to adjust towards new conditions on the 
organizational level. For example, Meyer and Peng (2005) argue that the instability 
of regulatory institutions in transition economies is likely to force MNEs to adapt 
their organizational structures. This adaptation results in adjustment costs 
(Santangelo & Meyer, 2011) and learning costs caused by the need to cope with novel 
conditions (Casson, 1999; Fortwengel, 2017). 
The second problem is that volatile institutional change causes institutions to lose 
their capacity of reducing uncertainty. This function is especially vital in 
environments with fluctuating markets and unstable macro-economic situations. 
Several countries in the post-transition context are still characterized by instabilities 
in their economic and market developments56 (Bevan & Estrin, 2004). These market-
driven uncertainties make stable social institutions even more relevant for reliable 
MNE operations. 
Both problems are significant in the context of the DME that is characterized by 
‘skilled, but cheap, labor; the transfer of technological innovations within 
transnational enterprises; and the provision of capital via foreign direct investment 
(FDI)’ (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 672). These conditions are maintained by a 
                                                     
56 Poland is an interesting counterexample that overcame the financial crisis far better than many of 
its neighbors. 
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specific configuration of institutions that generates substantial links between MNE 
networks and local subsidiaries. Such links are based on organizational integration, 
which becomes difficult under volatile institutional change as explained above. 
Moreover, MNE routines cannot be adjusted to a local environment that is 
continuously in flux. While MNEs with strong dynamic capabilities might be able to 
deal with such situations (Henisz & Delios, 2015), it is unlikely that MNEs would take 
the significant expense of transferring such capabilities for the assembly of 
moderately complex goods in DMEs. 
In addition, the uncertainty that is created by volatile institutional change strongly 
impacts the expectations of foreign investors in terms of labor costs and intellectual 
property rights protection. Even if labor costs in a country were relatively low, MNEs 
could still decide to invest elsewhere as they are uncertain whether the institutional 
environment preserves the current level of labor costs. The same principle applies 
to the security of property rights. Ongoing changes are likely to reduce the trust in 
local governments and increase the perceived danger of ineffectively secured 
property rights. The security of property is not a single institution but embedded in 
an arrangement of judicial and executive institutions. Overall stability of the 
institutional environment is a precondition to build trust in these specific 
institutional arrangements. 
Expectation: The presence of volatile institutional change is likely to be associated 
with FDI unattractive countries. 
3.3.4 Method 
The following introduces the QCA method and outlines its differences to regression 
analysis for the sake of clarity. Afterwards, I describe the data set, the general 
procedure and the calibration of conditions. 
3.3.5 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Even if QCA is not a new methodology, its application has become more popular 
rather recently (see Misangyi et al., 2017), not least by providing a complementary 
quantitative approach to statistical regressions. Regression methods begin with a 
dependent variable and a set of independent variables that are thought to 
independently explain the former. QCA on the other hand begins with a similar 
distinction between an outcome and several conditions that are thought to explain 
the outcome. However, the outcome as well as conditions are formulated in set-
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theoretic terms, i.e., they are membership indicators for a case to exhibit the 
outcome or condition (Ragin, 2009). 
For example, if we were interested in the effect of the strength of a property rights 
regime on FDI attractiveness, QCA would allow us to see if the countries with a 
strong property rights system, i.e., members of the set of strong property rights, 
would also exhibit the outcome of being a member in the set of FDI attractive 
countries. However, this is still a gross simplification of QCA as its ontological 
position differs markedly from regression analysis. This is because QCA analyzes 
necessity and sufficiency of conditions for the outcome, whereas regression 
techniques only focus on simultaneously necessary and sufficient variables 
(Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, 2012). 
If we would assume that a strong property rights regime is a necessary condition to 
be an FDI attractive country, no country without a strong property rights regime 
would be in the set of FDI attractive countries. In other words, if there are empirical 
cases where the condition is present, but the outcome is absent, we would reject a 
claim of necessity. Strong property rights as a sufficient condition for FDI 
attractiveness would mean that all countries with a strong property rights system 
would be in the set of FDI attractive countries, while there is no claim that countries 
without a strong property rights system could not also be in the set of FDI attractive 
countries. Here, empirical cases in which the outcome would be present but the 
condition absent would lead to a rejection of sufficiency. The fundamental 
difference to regression analysis can be visualized with three simple plots, 
emphasizing how regression techniques focus on one data pattern, while QCA 
focuses on another. This shows how both methods can be used in a complementary 
manner. 
In the above, I have assumed that membership is binary which is referred to as a 
crisp-set QCA. In this paper, I apply fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) that differs in the type 
of membership indicators used. Since the binary coding of membership assumes a 
rather deterministic relation in the data, Ragin (2009) developed fsQCA that works 
with interval scaled membership scores between 0 and 1. This is a significant 
advancement especially for quantitative research. After all, any binary coding would 
strongly reduce the information content of continuous data, whereas a fuzzy-set 
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coding between 0 and 1 allows one to take as much information from the data as 
possible while retaining the possibility of theory-driven calibration. 
Calibration is the process by which membership scores are assigned. Qualitative 
researchers would most likely set these scores manually by referring to theory and 
empirical evidence (see, e.g., Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, 2010). Quantitative 
researchers can use indirect calibration based on the transformation of raw data 
through a parameterized function made available by software packages (Duşa, 2018, 
Ch. 4). The advantage is that the researcher retains some control over the shape of 
the function by setting three parameter points: (1) the point at which cases are 
treated as fully out of a given set; (2) the point at which cases are neither more in 
nor more out of the set, i.e., the threshold point; (3) the point at which cases are fully 
in the set. Sometimes, theory may require altering these points from the otherwise 
received standard of setting (1), (2) and (3) to the 10th percentile, the median and the 
90th percentile respectively. 
Another difference between regression and fsQCA is the interdependence of 
conditions. Where independent variables are interpreted ceteris paribus, the 
conditions of a QCA can form more complex causal chains. This is the main purpose 
of the QCA, and will result in equifinality of the outcome (Misangyi et al., 2017). This 
means that the outcome can be associated with several combinations of the 
conditions. Such a solution is retrieved through a minimization algorithm, often of 
the Quine-McCluskey type, that yields interpretable combinations of conditions, so-
called conjunctions, that can be the bases for further inquiry (Schneider, C. Q. & 
Wagemann, 2010). This is precisely why the method of fsQCA is useful for empirical 
work in the context of the VoC that builds significantly on interactive effects 
(institutional complementarity) arising from institutional configurations. 
Finally, quantitative studies on country characteristics in the transition context 
often struggle with the issues of limited sample size. QCA is a method that supports 
a moderate sample size and, thus, bridges between individual case analysis and 
large-scale samples (Ragin, 2009). This is possible as QCA does not rely on an 
underlying probability distribution which also makes it robust to outliers (Fiss, 2011). 
Through the minimization process, QCA can yield three solution forms (see 
Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, 2012). The first is called the conservative solution 
and portrays all logical conjunctions based on the empirical evidence. Such a 
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solution output can be rather extensive, which is why the solution is sometimes 
referred to as the complex solution. To reduce the number of solution terms and 
conjunctions within them, QCA can use logical remainders. These are 
counterfactuals that logically derive from the combination of available conditions, 
but which are not empirically observed. The parsimonious solution will freely use 
any logical remainders by treating them as though they were observed. In this way, 
the minimization process can often be continued to generate more parsimonious 
and interpretable solution terms.  
The reader will notice that using counterfactuals can sometimes be problematic, for 
instance, when some of the counterfactuals are not observed because they are 
impossible to be observed. These untenable simplifying assumptions have to be 
excluded from the minimization in order to avoid wrong conclusions from the 
solution term (Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, 2010; Duşa, 2018). This process yields 
the intermediary solution which should stand at the center of interpretation. It is 
free of untenable assumptions and makes use of easy counterfactuals, i.e., those that 
are clearly supported by theory. 
3.3.6 Data and Procedure 
The dataset consists of five indices based on secondary data calculated from an 
underlying panel data set containing 22 transition economies57 over the period 2008-
2016. The focus of this paper is to test in how far the DME benchmark reflects a 
model for FDI attractiveness, which is why I have matched the previously presented 
institutional components with the institutional database of the Heritage Foundation 
(2018). This data has the advantage of a time series component and it can reflect 
most of the conditions identified earlier apart from education quality and an 
additional condition representing economic development and market size. The 
latter two were taken from the World Bank database. All indicators are described in 
Table 3.5. In order to assure that I capture the long-term effects of institutions and 
not fluctuations based on easily reversible conditions, I average the institutional 
data across the entire eight-years period. I would argue that this represents the 
relative positioning of institutional configurations from a cross-country perspective, 
                                                     
57 Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, Macedonia, Uzbekistan. 
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while it avoids paying too much attention to short-term deviations, which are of 
interest in the exploration of institutional volatility. 
I have also suggested that there may be core institutions that are shared across the 
post-transition context and take a predominant role in attracting FDI for post-
transition economies. Here, I draw on Fiss (2011) who suggests a method to 
distinguish between core and peripheral conditions in a QCA by comparing the 
solution terms of the parsimonious and the intermediate solution. Fiss (2011) argues 
that those conditions present in both solutions can be treated as core conditions, 
i.e., conditions that are of particular importance to the outcome. This method is 
applied here to determine whether some institutional conditions can be identified 
as core institutions for FDI attraction (deterrence). 
The DME configuration was identified as a system of institutions that reflects a 
specific type of institutional complementarity. In this context, institutions are often 
seen as stable or gradually changing. However, I argued that the post-transition 
context still faces institutional change at different rates and that volatile 
institutional fluctuations are likely to reduce the gains from established institutional 
complementarities. Hence, stable trajectories of change could present themselves as 
a crucial support for accumulating advantages of institutional complementarity, and 
volatile institutional change might thus deter FDI. To explore this proposition, I 
include a variable that represents the standard deviation of the institutional sub-
components as a measure of volatility. The education variable (secondary school 
enrollment) is excluded as it is based on a proxy, secondary school enrollment, that 
displayed almost no volatility. 
Finally, I include the condition ‘income’ represented by GDP per capita as a proxy 
for economic development and market potential. I considered using FDI as a 
percentage of GDP in order to take these economic factors into account. However, 
Li (2009) points out that FDI as a percentage of GDP is inferior to FDI inflows due 
to a lack of conceptual consistency of the former measure. Indeed, when plotting 
FDI/GDP in the present case, the result is a highly distorted view on FDI 
attractiveness, where Poland is in the lower quartile of FDI inflows. Thus, I take 
economic factors into account by including a condition that reflects an important 
economic attractor for FDI, namely GDP per capita. The data used is summarized in 
Table 3.5. 
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As the data used is quantitative, the calibration points are set by using the 10-50-90 
percentile method. While I would agree with the potential criticism that a manual 
calibration can always improve on the 10-50-90 principle, especially in the light of 
substantive knowledge of cases, it seems equally or even more important to establish 
transparency in a first step. 
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Table 3.5: Data Sources and Measures (Essay 3) 
 Reflecting DME 
component 
Source Measure 
Outcome    
FDI 
attractiveness 
~ World Bank Development 
Indicators: Foreign direct 
investment inflows in constant 
$US (2010) 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
Conditions 
(expectation) 
   
Strong 
Property 
Rights (+) 
Transactional 
Efficiency 
Heritage Foundation Economic 
Freedom Data: Property rights 
indicator. 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
Labor Market 
Flexibility (+) 
Labor Market 
Institutions 
Heritage Foundation Economic 
Freedom Data: Labor flexibility 
indicator. 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
Education 
Quality (+) 
Welfare State 
and Taxation 
World Bank Development 
Indicators: Gross Secondary 
School Enrollment. 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
Welfare State 
(~) 
Education 
System 
Heritage Foundation Economic 
Freedom Data: Government 
Spending & Tax Burden 
indicator. 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
Institutional 
Volatility (-) 
Institutional 
dynamism 
Indicators used above except 
education quality. 
Sum of the standard 
deviation of 
individual indicators 
by country (2008-
2016). 
Income (+) ~ Word Bank Development 
Indicators: Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita in constant 
$US (2010) 
Average (2008-2016) 
by country. 
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3.3.7 Results 
The first analytical step of the QCA is to test for necessity relations in the data. For 
this, the threshold consistency level is set to the suggested 0.9 and the coverage 
threshold at 0.6. After testing for consistent necessary relations, I judge in how far 
they represent trivial conditions. The latter refers to conditions that are indeed 
necessary but trivially observed in virtually all observations58. All solution terms are 
expressed by using the following notation: the star (“*”) represents a logical “and”, 
whereas the tilde (“~”) represents the absence of a condition. 
3.3.7.1 Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
The algorithm did not detect any single necessary conditions for FDI attraction. One 
of the conjunctions displays a relevance of necessity (RoN) value of above 0.6, 
indicating that it is the only non-trivial necessary condition to explain the outcome. 
The conjunction comprises a configuration of transactional efficiency and education 
quality and is presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Test of necessary conditions (Essay 3). 
Test-
Direction 
 Consist. Cov. RoN 
FDI 
attraction 
Strong PR * Education Quality 0.92 0.70 0.61 
FDI 
deterrence 
Institutional Volatility * ~Education Quality 0.93 0.70 0.65 
 
This finding is in line with my directional expectations. Strong property rights and 
education quality are jointly necessary conditions to attract FDI in the post-
transition context, suggesting that a considerable amount of FDI is now focused on 
value-added activities with higher technological and knowledge intensity. Besides 
this upgrading of the technological basis of production, we have also observed a shift 
towards services. For example, business service offshoring has become a prominent 
strategy for Western European MNEs (Sass & Fifekova, 2011). To assure the quality 
                                                     
58 For example, the condition ‚presence of air’ would be a trivially necessary condition to explain the 
outcome ‘fire’. 
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of services, employees must often be fluent in a second language, requiring well-
functioning secondary education. 
There is also one conjunction of a relevant necessary condition for FDI deterrence, 
comprising institutional volatility and the absence of education quality. Again, the 
configuration is in line with my directional expectations. The absence of education 
quality as a necessary condition for FDI deterrence mirrors the necessity analysis for 
FDI attraction. Institutional volatility is the second necessary condition to deter FDI 
inflows, highlighting its potential relevance as an explanation for FDI allocation. 
3.3.7.2 Sufficient Configurations for FDI Attractiveness 
 
Table 3.7: Sufficiency analysis, FDI attraction (Essay 3). 
            
            
 Solution 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
Strong PR      
Welfare State      
Flexible Labor Market      
Education Quality      
Institutional Volatility      
Income      
            
Consistency 0.95 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.78 
Raw Coverage 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.37 0.35 
Unique Coverage 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.06 
       
           
Overall Solution Consistency 0.85    
Overall Solution Coverage 0.75    
            
      
In the following, the presence of a core condition is represented by “” and the 
presence of a peripheral condition by “”. The absence of a core condition is 
represented by “” and the absence of a peripheral condition by “”. 
The intermediate solution reported in Table 3.7 is composed of a single disjunction 
(solution term) with five conjunctions of conditions. The logical remainders were 
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chosen so that they do not stand in contradiction with the analysis of necessity 
conducted before. In a first step, I will go through these configurations. In order to 
make this easier to follow, I will group those solution terms that are of specific 
interest due to the inclusion of the institutional volatility condition.  
Solution-set 1: Three of the solution terms include the absence of the institutional 
volatility condition that this paper aims to explore specifically, and I will start to 
discuss these as solution set 1.  
Solution 1: Welfare State * Flexible Labor Market * Education Quality * ~Institutional 
Volatility * Income 
The combination of the presence of a strong welfare state, the presence of flexible 
labor markets, educational attainment and the stability of these institutional 
conditions through time is, together with the economic condition, identified as a 
sufficient configuration for FDI attractiveness. This configuration is consistent with 
prior research both in terms of the DME postulates and the quantitative evidence 
on the determinants of FDI attraction (see, e.g., Carstensen & Toubal, 2004). Given 
the irrelevance of strong property rights in this solution this configuration resembles 
closest the ‘assembly-line-type’ production regime emphasized by Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009), or other forms of FDI in which labor costs are critical but the 
security of property rights is not.  
One of the cases identified with this solution is Bulgaria, which is characterized by 
a sectoral distribution of FDI flows skewed towards the manufacturing and retail 
sectors (National Statistical Institute, 2018). These make up 50% of FDI inflows and 
are mostly associated with production of low to moderate complexity. A second case 
illustrative of this solution is Kazakhstan, where FDI is clearly focused on the 
extractive sector (OECD, 2017). Resource oriented MNEs such as oil extractors may 
engage in significant technology transfer through such FDIs, but most of the 
technology is difficult to imitate or of limited use for smaller scale domestic firms so 
that the appropriation risk is limited. This solution also highlights that economies 
with different comparative advantages can be associated with similar institutional 
configurations. 
Institutional stability is an important complement to the types of FDI discussed 
above. In the Bulgarian case, a considerable amount of FDI represents typical 
outsourcing (Marin, 2006) where foreign investors tend to make their decisions 
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according to their expectations of cost-reduction in the future based on experiences. 
High institutional dynamism is likely to reduce the confidence in their estimations. 
Moreover, MNEs that already are present in the area face organizational and 
strategic adjustment costs and will lose confidence in the government’s capabilities. 
Stable institutional trajectories are supportive of resource investments that are often 
highly irreversible and prone to opportunistic government intervention.  
Solution 2: Welfare System * Education Quality * ~Institutional volatility * ~Income 
This configuration differs from the above by emphasizing the presence of a welfare 
state and, interestingly, the absence of the income condition as explanatory 
components. The illustrative cases here are Belarus and Ukraine, which are both 
somewhat peculiar. Ukraine has received considerable FDI inflows in the financial 
and insurance sectors (Kirchner, Kravchuk & Ries, 2015). These FDIs require more 
educated employees with language skills and, given the high profitability of finance 
activities, employee compensation may be less critical than in producing industry. 
In Belarus, most FDI focuses on trade and transport, which leads to a similar 
assessment. In both cases, the relatively strong welfare system could reflect the 
socialist heritage that is argued to be specifically strong in the case of Belarus where 
the state avoids unemployment by subsidizing otherwise unprofitable sectors of the 
economy (Danilovich & Croucher, 2015).  
The absence of institutional volatility could be related to the relative persistence of 
this model over time. This may have been supported by their history of quasi-
authoritarian governments fixated on a status quo throughout much of the 
observation period. Only recently has Ukraine been shaken up by armed conflict 
which, however, is contained in one region and is unlikely to influence the 
institutional conditions examined here. The absence of the income condition further 
underlines that the FDI attractiveness is not driven by the productive capacity or 
market size of the economy but by more sector-specific strategic motivations of 
finance and trade activities. 
Solution 3: Strong PR * ~Welfare State * ~Institutional Volatility* Income 
This configuration is a combination of strong transactional institutions, a weak 
welfare system, the absence of institutional volatility and the presence of the income 
condition. This solution contains the case of Romania. Prior literature has identified 
the Romanian institutional configuration as ‘cocktail-capitalism’, reflecting its 
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unclear political direction. At the same time, the economy realized significant FDI 
inflows largely in commodity-type manufacturing, but also increasingly in support 
services such as call-centers and accounting. The low complexity of the FDI in 
Romania makes it the prime example of a low-labor cost location with relatively 
well-secured property rights, access to the EU common market and low corporate 
taxes, which is reflected in the absence of the welfare state condition. 
Solution-set 2: These two solution terms do not include the institutional volatility 
condition but share the presence of strong property rights and the presence of a 
welfare state. 
Solution 4: Strong PR * Welfare State * Flexible Labor Market *Income  
This solution bears a close resemblance to the DME-type benchmark outlined in 
Section 3. Accordingly, two of the illustrative cases are the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, which are both classified as DMEs by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). 
Another case belonging to this solution is the Slovak Republic which has become a 
hub for several global value chains, e.g., in the automobile, machine equipment and 
electronics industries (OECD, 2018).  The combination of strong property rights and 
flexible labor markets allows foreign investors to integrate moderately complex 
assembly-type operations. Hence, the configuration seems to be conducive for 
industrial FDI which is moderately technology-intensive, still strongly dependent on 
low labor cost, but also in favor of some government expenditure to reduce labor-
turnover and to meet infrastructural needs. This solution supports the argument of 
the welfare state as a compensation for flexible labor markets. 
Solution 5: Strong PR * Welfare State * ~Flexible Labor Market * Education Quality  
Finally, the last configuration is similar to the above but substitutes labor flexibility 
with education quality. While a similar analysis applies, this is more likely to refer 
to high tech FDIs or FDI in a more complex service industry such as finance. This is 
because wages are not the most crucial bottleneck in these industries and education 
seems paramount. Moreover, just like in technology-intensive manufacturing, the 
technology-intensive service sector often needs at least some long-term employees 
to develop its human capital. It also equally depends on infrastructure such as high-
speed internet which requires funding from taxation and, thus, explains the 
presence of a strong welfare state. 
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One of the cases that highlights the tension between weak labor institutions and the 
need for a modicum of social security is that of Estonia which has seen rapid growth 
in the presence of strong inequality and social insecurity. In order to distribute the 
gains from growth more equitably, the Estonian, welfare system was strengthened, 
giving the country an advantage in shouldering the 2008-9 crisis over its Baltic 
neighbors (Aidukaite, 2013). The resulting resilience of the labor market may be 
especially interesting for foreign investors in a strong service economy such as 
Estonia, with high relative importance of human capital development, low employee 
turnover and intellectual property protection. 
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3.3.7.3 Sufficient Configurations for the Absence of FDI Attractiveness 
Table 3.8: Sufficiency analysis, FDI deterrence (Essay 3).  
        
       
 Solution 
  1n 2n 3n 
    
Strong PR    
Welfare State    
Flexible Labor Market    
Education Quality    
Institutional Volatility    
Income    
        
Consistency 0.97 0.94 0.91 
Raw Coverage 0.91 0.14 0.30 
Unique Coverage 0.15 0.04 0.14 
    
        
Overall Solution Consistency 0.91  
Overall Solution Coverage 0.62  
        
     
The following briefly presents the solutions for the FDI deterring effect. Not only are 
these solutions less informative (from a normative standpoint) than configurations 
that lead to FDI attractiveness, but they are also perfectly in line with expectations, 
which is why I do not discuss them extensively. An overall assessment of the role of 
FDI deterring institutional configurations is given in the discussion. In this case, the 
intermediate solution is composed of a single disjunction with three conjunctions of 
conditions. These three possible solutions are depicted in Table 3.8. 
Solution 1n: ~Strong PR * ~Welfare System * ~Education Quality * Institutional 
Volatility * ~Income 
The absence of transactional efficiency combined with the absence of a strong 
welfare system, an underperforming education system, low national income and 
institutional volatility is sufficient for a country to display the outcome of FDI 
unattractiveness. Strong property rights are indicated as a peripheral condition 
which is sensible considering that these are associated with economies that may not 
receive significant technology transfers from FDI, while being relatively unstable in 
their institutional configurations, e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia.  
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Solution 2n: ~Welfare System * ~Flexible Labor Market * ~Education Quality * 
~Income * Institutional Volatility 
This solution only covers the case of Moldova, which is institutionally characterized 
by the absence of a welfare system, the absence of flexible labor markets, the absence 
of educational attainment and institutional volatility. In terms of the latter, Moldova 
can be characterized as a politically unstable country, with significant regime 
changes (Roper, 2008) and high political and party volatility (Lane, J.-E. & Ersson, 
2007). Together with the overall weak performance of the economy of Moldova, the 
environment is highly unattractive for FDI. 
Solution 3n: ~Strong PR * ~Welfare System * ~Flexible Labor Market * ~Education 
Quality * ~Income 
The solution is similar to the first and includes the single peripheral condition of the 
absence of strong property rights. The exception here is that institutional volatility 
is not included in the solution term. Here, countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
are representative cases, both of which seemed to have failed to develop a clear 
comparative institutional advantage. 
3.3.8 Discussion 
This paper explored two tentative propositions in the context of post-transition 
economies. The first proposition was that a focus on institutional configurations can 
add to the existing literature that sees FDI as being primarily attracted by individual 
market institutions. I have argued that pressures for institutional commonality and 
diversity operate simultaneously. Hence, it is possible that a set of core institutions 
of FDI attraction is observed for a broad category of countries that are exposed to 
similar economic pressures. At the same time, the common core institutions can be 
encapsulated by institutional diversity that defines an individual country’s 
comparative institutional advantage. The institutional configuration of the DME 
was identified as a set representing potential core institutions.  
The QCA analysis enabled the identification of core institutions following the 
methodology proposed by Fiss (2012). This analysis has shown that configurations 
for attracting FDI display a high density of core institutions that are present in 
multiple solution terms. Thus, it can be argued (see, Fiss, 2012, p. 409) that there are 
considerable constraints to developing institutional diversity when focusing on the 
attraction of FDI in the post-transition context. The three most frequent core 
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institutions are represented in three solution terms respectively. These core 
institutions are strong property rights, the quality of education and the absence of 
institutional volatility. In addition, the flexibility of labor market institutions was 
part of two solution terms and is also considered a relevant core institution. At the 
same time, the analysis discovered some diversity around these core institutions.  
For example, Solution 3, 4 and 5 all combined strong property rights with other 
institutional conditions conducive to their respective comparative institutional 
advantage. Locations attractive for the moderately complex activities of global value 
chains, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, were identified with flexible labor 
markets. In contrast, for the more service intensive economy of Estonia, FDI was 
attracted by the core institution of property rights in combination with education 
quality. This suggests the presence of some core institutions which are quite in line 
with the DME-type structure. Hence, it is possible that governments will continue 
to strengthen these core institutions in order to secure further FDI. This would 
identify FDI attraction as a crucial isomorphic pressure, i.e., source of convergence 
to a form of ‘liberal dependency’ (King & Sznajder, 2006; Nӧlke & Vliegenthart, 
2009). 
In the case of configurations that deter FDI inflows, the findings show an even higher 
density of core conditions that reflect the absence of institutional conditions. This 
is in line with existing studies that have emphasized the problems MNEs face in 
contexts with institutional voids in several different areas of the institutional 
environment (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). While deficiencies in individual areas of the 
institutional system can be reduced through strategic agency (Cantwell, Dunning & 
Lundan, 2010), broader institutional voids make it difficult to justify investments due 
to increasing costs of coping with often unforeseen difficulties. 
The second tentative proposition was that the volatility of an institutional 
configuration has a negative impact on institutional complementarity and, thus, 
reduces FDI attractiveness. This was argued to be especially crucial in the 
comparatively volatile markets of post-transition economies. The QCA analysis 
confirmed the relevance of institutional volatility. The absence of institutional 
volatility was found to be part of three sufficient configurations for FDI attraction. I 
argued that in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, the stability could be explainable by 
the status-quo interests of the government. Such an artificial stability might be 
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attractive to some forms of FDI (see Hecock & Jepsen, 2014). However, for the other 
two solutions, it is very possible that institutional complementarities have led to a 
stabilization of their trajectories. 
Another interesting finding was discovered when exploring the negation of FDI 
attractiveness. Here, institutional volatility was found to be a necessary condition. 
Thus, institutional volatility alone may have a strong effect on the FDI 
unattractiveness of a country, acting as gatekeeper for FDI in countries that have 
not yet established sufficient institutional complementarities. This finding also 
highlights the advantage of QCA over regression methodologies as the latter could 
have not uncovered the asymmetric role of institutional volatility for FDI 
attractiveness and unattractiveness respectively. 
In the context of these findings, it seems relevant to think about the sources of 
institutional volatility with reference to the empirical patterns discovered. In the 
analysis of sufficiency for not being an FDI attractive country, the condition of 
institutional volatility always appeared in conjunction with a weak welfare state. As 
mentioned before, it is possible that low-redistribution regimes result in 
considerable social tensions. Thus, a weak welfare and taxation system may be 
conducive for institutional volatility as it generates societal discontent with existing 
institutions. Rodrik (1998) has emphasized that the absence of social security is 
likely to enhance societal conflicts and struggle, and that this can reduce the 
resilience of countries to economic shocks. MNEs are less likely to invest in such 
shock-prone environments. The possibility of the welfare state as a balancing device 
between the economic and social pressures was also outlined by the analysis of 
sufficiency. Even though the absence of a strong welfare state was identified as a 
core institution, most solution terms showed the presence of a strong welfare state, 
and with it a higher degree of taxation. This further supports the idea that MNEs 
may expect that the absence of a welfare state could harm their operations in the 
long-term.  
In summary, this paper presented evidence for the existence of core institutions in 
the post-transition context, as well as for the relevance of institutional volatility in 
determining FDI attractiveness. The core limitations of this study are the limited 
scope of the utilized institutional data and the inductive nature of the QCA method 
(Seawright, 2005). Future research could take a broader basis of institutional data 
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and combine the QCA method with regression methods for quantitative 
triangulation. Moreover, there is need for future research in two distinct directions. 
First, the possibility that FDI can act as an isomorphic pressure that guides 
institutional transformations in the post-transition context towards core 
institutions offers interesting research opportunities; these have not ceased to be 
relevant in the post-transition phase. Second, and in connection with the above, 
future studies are needed to evaluate the link between weak welfare systems and 
institutional volatility in relation to MNE activity. How much institutional volatility 
can MNEs tolerate? And are MNEs actively supporting the reproduction of social 
institutions for reasons of stability? These questions are of high interests for scholars 
and policy-makers alike. 
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3.3.10 Appendix 
This appendix provides some additional information on the data of essay 3. 
Table 1: Transformed data. 
 
Trans. 
Eff. 
Welf. Flex. 
Lab. 
Edu. Vola. Income FDI 
Albania 0.25 0.92 0.08 0.20 0.75 0.45 0.29 
Armenia 0.16 0.96 0.79 0.37 0.98 0.12 0.03 
Bulgaria 0.21 0.62 0.91 0.65 0.06 0.54 0.52 
Belarus 0.03 0.21 0.90 1.00 0.50 0.28 0.38 
Croatia 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.91 0.63 0.02 0.52 
Czech R. 0.98 0.14 0.90 0.90 0.16 0.71 0.91 
Estonia 1.00 0.35 0.16 1.00 0.22 0.70 0.18 
Georgia 0.53 0.84 0.98 0.62 0.10 0.65 0.43 
Hungary 0.95 0.02 0.65 0.95 0.17 0.58 1.00 
Kazakhstan 0.22 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.09 0.88 0.96 
Kyrgyz R. 0.06 0.85 0.95 0.13 0.85 0.08 0.15 
Latvia 0.86 0.41 0.52 0.99 0.86 0.74 0.21 
Lithuania 0.93 0.65 0.37 0.99 0.71 0.96 0.24 
Moldova 0.56 0.33 0.02 0.05 0.96 0.17 0.02 
Poland 0.91 0.09 0.41 0.97 0.80 0.99 0.99 
Romania 0.51 0.67 0.48 0.41 0.05 0.61 0.80 
Slovak R. 0.84 0.38 0.52 0.20 0.95 0.97 0.67 
Slovenia 0.94 0.01 0.05 0.99 0.86 0.00 0.33 
Tajikistan 0.06 0.95 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.03 
Ukraine 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.62 0.06 0.01 0.61 
Macedonia 0.37 0.83 0.82 0.00 0.50 0.37 0.11 
Uzbekistan 0.02 0.84 0.43 0.16 0.04 0.32 0.02 
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Table 2: Truth table. 
Trans
. Eff. 
Welf. Flex. 
Lab. 
Edu. Vola. Inco
me 
OUT n incl PRI 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.9 0.777 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.908 0.691 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.438 0.167 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.571 0.036 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 0.336 0.016 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0.934 0.878 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.539 0.131 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.817 0.643 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0.819 0.489 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.892 0.755 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.902 0.778 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0.975 0.956 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.887 0.725 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.9 0.766 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.78 0.295 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.97 0.917 
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4 Thesis Conclusion 
The following section shortly sums up the contents of the thesis, develops some 
implications for theory and policy, and spells out possible areas for future research. Since 
the thesis is cumulative, the following summary does not reflect the full answers to the 
research questions, as these are embodied in the essays. 
Question 1: Can the interrelationship between institutional change, uncertainty and 
FDI be conceptualized based on the existing theory of the MNE? 
The goal of this thesis was to explore the relationship between institutional changes, 
specifically in a radical form, and FDI as a strategic investment of MNEs. In a first step, the 
Framework Chapter confronted the question of how the relationship between 
institutional change, FDI and uncertainty can be approached by drawing from the existing 
theory of the MNE. Based on the IB literature, I argued that two paradigmatic approaches, 
the ‘exchange’ and the ‘value-added’ view, have different explanations for FDI and that 
their implications for the role of institutional change is different as well. By reviewing the 
underpinnings of the theories, and particularly the common underpinning of institutional 
theory in form of the NIE, I agreed with Jackson and Deeg (2008) that current IB theory 
has a narrow perspective on the role of institutions in the economic activity of the MNE. 
In an effort to broaden the discussion, I introduced some of Jackson and Deeg’s (2008) 
propositions that followed in the tradition of the Comparative Capitalism literature, 
arguing that a redefinition of strategic fit as strategic agency under uncertainty emphasizes 
the role of institutions as cognitive resources for strategic agents, which are the basis for 
developing confidence in their expectations. Radical institutional changes would 
undermine these mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of delaying or aborting 
investment decisions. This basic framework was then related back to the MNE. Instead of 
delaying and aborting investments, MNEs have the capacity to relocate their investments 
to a different institutional environment, which is impossible for national enterprises. 
However, despite this advantage I drew the attention to the MNE as a foreigner, which is 
unfamiliar with its environment. This view elevates the importance of foreign institutional 
environments as cognitive resources. The resulting main argument of this thesis is to 
suggest that the FDI attractiveness of a location is not only determined by the institutional 
structure at a point in time, but also by the consistency of this structure through time. 
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Question 2: How does a dynamic view on the economic and social environment of 
the MNE affect current theory building in International Business? 
Essay 1 took up the most general and important aspect of the conceptual framework, 
namely its attention to temporal dynamics and the resulting uncertainty. By drawing 
extensively from Penrose (1995), I criticized the attempt of Contractor (2007) to propose a 
positive relationship between the multinationality and performance of an MNE as a 
theoretical alternative to the TCI view. While I agreed with some of Contractor’s points, I 
also suggested that his views were not much more evolutionary than those of the TCI. To 
underline the explanatory potential of the dynamic perspective on the MNE inherited 
from Chapter 2, I discussed the observable increase in the popularity of the global value 
chain from this perspective. 
Question 3: How can we measure degrees institutional change and what is the 
relationship between radical institutional change and the FDI attractiveness of a 
country? 
Essay 2 took up the first empirical question of how we can measure radical institutional 
change and developed a set of hypotheses of the relationship between institutional change 
and FDI. Using secondary data and a regression approach, the Essay found a negative 
relationship between the intensity of institutional change and FDI inflows to a country 
over time, as well as between the average intensity of institutional change and the average 
FDI inflows relative to other countries. This supported two of my hypotheses and provided 
some evidence for the main thesis of this work. However, some critical limitations were 
discovered, most of which were related to data insufficiencies. 
Question 4: How is the concept of institutional complementarity affected by varying 
degrees of institutional instability? 
Essay 3 developed another idea derived from the conceptual framework, namely that it is 
not only individual institutions that act as determinants for FDI attraction but also the 
institutional system as such. Moreover, institutional volatility was proposed to be a factor 
that opposes the development of institutional complementarities and, thus, could be a 
critical barrier to FDI. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I was able to generate some 
support for these propositions. Specifically, I found data patterns that confirmed the 
importance of institutional volatility as a critical deterrent for FDI attraction. 
I must stress that the empirical results have to be treated as tentative. Both data and 
resource limitations played critical roles here. Therefore, a lot of attention was given to 
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the conceptual and theoretical aspects of this work, and the practical implications 
discussed should not be read as prescriptions. However, in accordance with my critical 
realist stance, I support an explanatory instead of predictive view of social science. From 
such a perspective, this thesis contributed substantially by disentangling the theoretical 
relationship between varying degrees of institutional change and FDI, while providing 
some empirical support for its most basic propositions. It is my hope that the results of 
this thesis can be the starting point for future research in directions that may have 
remained underexplored in the past. 
4.1 Contributions to Theory 
[F]actors [factor endowments] are used to produce goods or services (that is, they 
are used for transformational activities), whereas institutions are used for the 
exchange of inputs and outputs with other firms (that is, for transactional activities). 
(Wan & Hoskisson, 2003, p. 28) 
The above quotation sums up the position of a significant part of IB theory towards 
institutions. One of the conceptual contributions of this thesis was to explain why such a 
perspective is not universally supportable and could be considered as narrow. By defining 
institutions as cognitive devices that enable strategic investments instead of exclusively 
focusing on their role as mediators of exchange, we can significantly advance our 
knowledge of how institutional environments might affect productive investments. For 
example, Ietto-Gillies (2007) has criticized that the TCI is unable to explain how MNEs 
could benefit from FDI into countries with more flexible employment regimes than in 
their home country (see, also, Bas & Carluccio, 2010). Seeing FDI as a strategic investment 
elevates labor institutions, as well as other social institutions, into the analytical focus. 
This blurs the artificial distinction between exchange, where institutions take the role of 
regulating transaction costs, and issues of production, where institutions take on a broader 
role from providing predictable means-end relationships to directly affecting the relative 
profitability of investment options. 
Another contribution to the existing theory, specifically the TCI, is the dynamic view on 
both social and environmental factors. In the case of institutional dynamics, it was 
proposed that the TCI view has difficulties to acknowledge continuous social change, not 
least because of its focus on transaction costs and the associated equilibrium conditions. 
For example, the TCI cannot argue that the global value chain is a response to institutional 
instabilities in its periphery as well as dynamic competition without the assumption of a 
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parallel decrease in transaction costs. I would argue that the implicit link between 
institutions, transaction costs and an optimal size of the firm is problematic. Take for 
example the work of Kumar, Rajan & Zingales (1999), who found that developed 
institutional environments, i.e., those characterized by the lowest transaction costs, have 
larger firms than less developed institutional environments. What leads to such an 
outcome if transaction costs were the only force at work here? Is it not equally possible 
that the stability of highly developed institutional environments contributes to the 
accumulation of capital, i.e., supports Hymer’s law of increasing firm size? These questions 
go beyond the present work but are very relevant for future theorists to pose. 
Alongside institutional change I introduced the dynamics of the economic sphere of the 
MNE in order to argue that uncertainty is endogenously generated. Unlike TCI’s focus on 
equilibrium, I introduced alternative perspectives that can explain why the stability of the 
social environment is likely to be of such importance for MNEs. In imperfect competition 
approaches, the uncertain reality of business operations is often forgotten as entry barriers 
stabilize market dynamics (Bain, 1956). However, this should be treated as a special and 
not as the paradigmatic case, which stresses the stabilizing properties of institutions and 
further develops the ideas of Knight (1921) who saw the institution of the firm as a reaction 
to radical uncertainty. This thesis contributes by stimulating theoretical work in the 
direction of a dynamic Eclectic Paradigm that is grounded in the process of MNE 
expansion and competition, avoiding Coase’s (1937) notion of seeing markets and 
institutions (firms) as substitutes. 
While the Coasian heritage was critiqued from many different angles in the past (Pitelis, 
1998; Dunning, 2003; Lazonick, 2015), this thesis focused on the argument that 
institutional systems serve a purpose that is qualitatively different from economic systems, 
as they generate structure, path-dependency and degrees of predictability. By contrast, 
economic systems generate uncertainty by constantly offsetting the status quo. This 
dualistic framework allows one to identify synergies and dependencies, instead of mere 
substitutability, between the two spheres. For an example of dependency, Streeck (2011) 
stresses how social institutions provide the necessary social cohesion to support economic 
institutions that tend to spread the uncertainty of the market. For an example of synergy, 
Dunning & Lundan (2010) argued that the stable institutional structures of firms 
paradoxically allow for flexible experimentation and learning. 
Finally, the thesis contributed by reviewing the relationship between institutional 
commonalities and diversity, suggesting that theory needs to take both into account 
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simultaneously. Essay 3 argued that these two views are not necessarily in contradiction. 
By using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I contributed a way to use the method that is 
capable of distinguishing between core and peripheral conditions, which could be a 
powerful tool to advance the research on institutional diversity and commonality. 
4.2 Contributions to Policy Perspectives 
The rate of [institutional] change is often of no less importance than the direction of 
the change itself; but while the latter frequently does not depend upon our volition, 
it is the rate at which we allow change to take place which may well depend upon us. 
 
Polanyi (1944, pp. 36-37) 
 
I want to begin this brief discussion by returning to the opening quote by Karl Polanyi. He 
wrote these words in a section referring to the enclosure movement in Britain and how 
state legislation aimed to slow down the disruptive effects of this social change. Here, he 
took up a progressive view of the state and suggested that ‘[a] belief in spontaneous 
progress makes us blind to the role of government in economic life. This role consists often 
in altering the rate of change, speeding it up or slowing it down as the case may be’ (ibid., 
p. 37). Therefore, the natural realm of policy is not only to control, or attempt to control, 
the direction of institutional change, but also to decide on the way of progressing to a new 
state. 
In this context, Essay 2 argued that policy implications derived from the NIE position on 
institutions only prescribe a direction and implicitly suggest that a fast adjustment is the 
most efficient way of social change. However, this thesis aimed to show that this is not a 
universal truth. While the effects of radical institutional changes have been explored in 
the context of domestic investments and growth, I presented some evidence that it can 
equally serve as a barrier to FDI attraction. Thus, governments must be aware that the very 
goals of why reform programs are implemented are affected by the nature of the 
implementation process. Ignoring the potential effect of an initial worsening could lead to 
a vicious cycle of policy changes as seen in some parts of Latin America. 
In Essay 3, I discussed the role of the welfare state in relation to institutional instabilities. 
Again, I can refer to the ideas of Polanyi, as does Rodrik (1997), in suggesting that social 
stability might be a precondition for institutional stability. Governments that are 
interested in FDI attraction must acknowledge that a shift towards higher value-added 
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activities may require the establishment of institutional complementarities which rely on 
a degree of stability. Assuring this stability might be associated with a reform of social 
institutions alongside economic institutions. Here, I would make the case for a more 
pronounced role of societal progress alongside economic developments. While these are 
not exactly novel ideas, they are important contributions to the discussion of policy 
implications in IB, which, through its focus on economic institutions (Buckley, 2018), may 
have tended to see other institutions as confined to some artificial notion of ‘civil society’. 
This thesis thus contributes more credibility to the position that policy makers should not 
dismiss the indirect economic impacts of strengthening societal institutions outside of the 
realm of transaction-cost reduction. 
4.3 Future Research 
There are two general paths for future research that have been opened by this thesis, 
namely one focused on the MNE as an organization and another on theory development.  
The latter has already been covered above, so that I will focus on the organizational level 
here. Organizational issues could be approached with the general framework outlined in 
Section 2.4, which has several promising points of contact for organization-based research. 
For example, we still know little about which MNEs may be more resilient when faced with 
institutional change and uncertainty. Can some firms develop capabilities to cope with 
such issues (Lundan & Li, 2018)? Moreover, the potential processes of restructuring firm-
internal institutions as a response to institutional change and an exploration of the 
associated adjustment costs will be vital to better understand the underlying micro-
processes. This also reminds us that the MNE is a network organization and it should be 
interesting to test whether simultaneous radical institutional change in multiple host 
countries of an MNE has a compounding effect. Finally, there is a pressing need to explore 
the possibility that MNE’s act as strategic agents and either stabilize otherwise volatile 
institutional environments or destabilize existing institutional environments through 
their strategic actions, as is described by Beckert (1996). 
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